Edited by Frances Frisken

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Metropolitan Toronto and the Regions of Durham, York, Peel and Halton



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Conflict or Cooperation? The Toronto-Centred Region in the 1980s

Edited by Frances Frisken

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Contents

Foreword 5

Introduction
Old Problems, New Priorities: Changing Perspectives on Governmental Needs in an Expanding Region
Frances Frisken 7

PART A
Governmental Responses to Urban Growth and Change

Looking Backward: From Reality to Plan
Eli Comay 16

The Region Today I: Housing

Governments and Housing
George Fallis 21

Housing: Redevelopment or Sprawl
Marvyn Novick 23

Social Housing in Peel Region
Peter Smith 25

Patterns of Housing Development in the Toronto-Centred Region
Peter G. Tomlinson 28

Discussion 30

The Region Today II: Inter-Municipal Coordination

The Regional Information Systems Committee
Katharine Bladen 33

The Toronto-Centred Transportation Planning and Coordinating Committee
Ian C. Campbell 35

Cooperation for Conservation
Alyson Deans 38

Discussion 39

The Region Today III: Social and Community Services

The Toronto Urban Rim Study
John Gandy 42

Serving a Scattered Population
W. Douglas Johns 44

Social Services in a Time of Restraint
Don R. Richmond 47

Discussion 49

The Region Today IV: Local Impacts of Regional and Provincial Decisions

The Local Interest in Regional Planning
Hazel McCallion 52

Provincial Transit Priorities and the Metropolitan Toronto Plan
A. Bruce Davidson 54

Impacts of the York-Durham Servicing Scheme on the Town of Markham
Anthony Roman 55

Discussion 56

PART B
Planning for Development in the Toronto-Centred Region: Past, Present and Future

The Toronto-Centred Region in Retrospect
H. Ian Macdonald 62

Discussion 68

Alternative Regional Morphologies
John Marshall 68

Discussion 73

The City and the Region
June Rowlands 75

Discussion 77

Recent Economic Trends in the Toronto Region
George Fallis 79

Discussion 82

Foreword

York's annual Urban Studies Symposium provides an opportunity for members of the academic community to join urban practitioners and interested citizens in exploring issues of mutual concern. Selection of each year's topic naturally entails an element of risk, for there is always the possibility that a matter that absorbs the attention of those who teach and write about urban affairs will be of little interest to those who engage in them. We were particularly conscious of that risk this year when we decided to resurrect an issue that has received little attention for almost a decade: the present state and future prospects of the Toronto-Centred Region. We were pleased when the response to our search for speakers and the size of our audience confirmed our suspicion that the issue, though dormant, is far from dead. There are still many people who think seriously about the way the Region is developing and who want to share their thoughts with others. We thank both speakers and audience members for the many fresh perspectives and insights that make this publication not only possible but worthwhile.

Our thanks also go out to those who contributed to the planning, organization and presentation of the Symposium and its Proceedings. Early meetings with staff members of the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, the Ministry of Treasury and Economics, the Regional Municipality of Peel and the Regional Municipality of York yielded useful ideas for topics and for speakers who could address them. Colleagues in the Urban Studies Programme helped to plan the event and were generous in giving help when it was needed. Four of these people — George Fallis, Don Freeman, Michael Goldrick and Dalton Kehoe — also moderated the panel sessions. Members of the senior class did art work, prepared visual displays and made themselves generally useful. Dean Harold Kaplan of the Faculty of Arts gave both moral and financial support. None of these contributions would have borne fruit, however, if it had not been for the efforts of those members of the York staff who have attended to the many details of organization and publication. Pat O'Hara has been closely involved with the Symposium from the moment of its inception to the final stage of publication. This was only one of several demanding assignments that came her way when she took on a brand new job, and she has carried it out both well and cheerfully. In doing do she has had able assistance from Liliana Guadagnoli in the Urban Studies Office, and from Wendie Mitchell and Irene Kearns in the Communications Department. Together they have helped to make the tasks of coordination and editing both pleasant and hassle-free, and for that I am most grateful.

F.F.

Introduction

Old Problems, New Priorities. Changing Perspectives on Governmental Needs in an Expanding Region

Frances Frisken

Post World-War II Toronto was a mature city that was beginning to manifest some of the characteristics of aging central cities in metropolitan areas in other parts of North America: a decline in its resident population; an exodus of both young and middle class residents to newly-built homes in sprawling outer suburbs; an influx of migrants from Europe and rural Canada; and an aging housing stock whose rate of deterioration had been accelerated by Depression and wartime overcrowding. Unlike many North American cities, however, Toronto's financial situation was still sound — so much so that its ratepayers gave their approval to two projects that constituted "firsts" in the annals of Canadian city-building: a public housing project for which the City would bear most of the costs and a subway for which the City would finance the relocation of physical services. Some saw the writing on the wall, however. The public housing project renewed only one small section of a ring of inner residential neighbourhoods that City planners had identified as badly in need of renewal. The subway would consume all the reserves of the City's Transportation Commission while relieving only a small part of the growing pressure on its transportation facilities, much of which took the form of increasing automobile congestion on narrow streets. The changing character of the city's population, together with the pressures placed on city services by the burgeoning populations of its suburban neighbours, promised to produce a steady rise in demands on the City's tax base.

The suburban municipalities had their own problems, stemming from the rapid rate of new construction and population growth and the service demands they generated. Their heavy reliance on residential taxes made them understandably reluctant to accept those types of housing (particularly private and public housing for lower income families and senior citizens) associated with heavy financial outlays. Their reluctance to invest significantly in public health, welfare or recreation programs increased the likelihood that residents in need of such services would gravitate to, or remain in, the city. Inequalities in their ability to finance education and other local services out of local tax revenues were contributing to noticeable inequalities in the standard of services enjoyed by the residents of different jurisdictions. High service costs in the most rapidly growing municipalities were forcing some of them heavily into debt.

There were larger concerns as well. The Depression was still a vivid memory for those who had lived through it. Despite the economic boom that followed the war, there were many who expected the economy to relapse into its pre-war sluggishness as soon as it caught up with pent-up demand. Thus, some of those who welcomed the prosperity that accompanied Toronto's rapid expansion also feared that the problems associated with growth — insufficient housing and inadequate services in the suburbs; a shortage of land for new development in the city — would stifle the very forces on which prosperity depended.

Such was the context out of which Metropolitan Toronto emerged. In the minds of its principal proponents, the fundamental purpose of the new system of government was to remove those obstacles to the area's economic development that derived from the nature of, or constraints on, the performance of its local governments. At the same time, they tried to design a governmental system from which each of the participants could derive some benefits while helping to meet the area's long-term needs. The City, with its large industrial and commercial tax base, would

help to finance the services needed by the fast-growing suburbs. In return it would receive help in housing and providing services to the low-income segment of the community. And the residents of the area's poorer municipalities would begin to receive services of a quality enjoyed by the residents of their wealthier neighbours.

Metropolitan Toronto attracted considerable attention at the time it was created and for a considerable period thereafter. Its claim to significance in the North American context rested on three principal factors, each of which is relevant to an evaluation of its current situation. These factors were as follows:

First, Metropolitan Toronto was the first large-scale attempt in over 50 years to adapt the governmental system of a North American metropolis to the outward movement of urban settlement. What made it particularly noteworthy was the fact that it occurred at a time when similar efforts to reorganize metropolitan area governments were meeting defeat throughout the United States. Thus, it seemed to signify that the Canadian political system was responding differently and (as some saw it) more effectively than the American system to large city growth and expansion.

Second, the creation of Metropolitan Toronto represented the most thoroughgoing governmental commitment to comprehensive metropolitan planning ever made in North America. That commitment involved three levels of government, for the new Metropolitan Council became immediately responsible for producing a plan for an area three times the size of that encompassed by its area of jurisdiction; the Province had the authority to approve that plan (thereby making it "Official") and the area municipalities were required to produce plans that conformed to it. Other efforts to plan for large metropolitan regions in North America (such as those that occurred in the New York, Los Angeles and Chicago areas in the 1920s) never achieved the degree of state backing or intergovernmental integration implied by the planning arrangements instituted in Toronto.

Finally, Metropolitan Toronto's creation served as evidence that the governments of Canadian municipalities stood in a different relationship to their parent governments than did the governments of their American counterparts. There were two perspectives on Metropolitan Toronto's place in the spectrum of central-local relations. The more common of these emphasized the relatively greater control over municipal affairs exercised by provincial as compared to state governments. Its proponents pointed to the absence of municipal "home rule" and other legal restraints on provincial actions towards municipalities as the reason why the Ontario government was able to change the area's governmental system without resorting to a referendum — a step in the approval process that usually spelled defeat for metropolitan reorganization campaigns in the United States. The Province's willingness both to mandate and approve local plans was further evidence of its greater interest in, and ability to influence, developments at the local level. From another perspective, however, the creation of Metropolitan Toronto represented a reaffirmation of faith in he viability of local government, for it reasserted the principle that local institutions, if properly constituted and funded, can perform the responsibilities and provide the facilities that are necessary to maintain economic and social well-being.

The principle of local-self-sufficiency had already undergone some erosion during the years of Depression and post-war Reconstruction, for by the time the Toronto reorganization occurred the federal and provincial governments, separately or in combination, had relieved municipalities of all or most of their responsibilities for old age pensions, mothers' allowances, unemployment relief and other social services; a federal-municipal partnership was helping municipalities to build public housing, and the Provincial government was making grants for such tangible components of the urban fabric as roads, schools, community centres and public libraries. Nonetheless, the rationale for reorganization contained the implicit assumption that the pooling or redistribution of local revenues that would follow the move would enable the area to provide, and so retain control over, most of the physical services and facilities that would help to shape its destiny.

To summarize, the creation of Metropolitan Toronto occurred at a time when concerns with the consequences of rapid economic growth and urban expansion were tempered by a desire to sustain the prosperity that went with them. The new system of government was particularly significant for three reasons: as a successful attempt to adapt the governmental system of a metropolitan area to the outward spread of urban settlement; as a commitment by government to comprehensive and integrated metropolitan planning; and as an attempt by a parent government to ensure that the municipal institutions of a large and growing region would be able to perform most of the functions traditionally assigned to them. These three early perspectives on the Metro experiment provide a useful framework for the summary and assessment of the

perspectives on Metropolitan Toronto and its larger Region that emerge in the papers and discussion sessions included in this volume.

Governmental Reorganization and the Management of Growth

The significance of Metropolitan Toronto as an adaptation of government to the city's outward movement has faded with the passage of time. Not only have there been more recent examples of metropolitan government reorganization in both the United States and Canada, but there is now substantial historical evidence that some American states sanctioned or imposed even more radical forms of local government reorganization during periods of rapid urban expansion in the nineteenth century. What this volume makes particularly evident, however, is that metropolitan reorganization was only a temporary solution — if solution it was — to problems generated by Toronto's expansion. While the new metropolitan government did succeed as a mechanism for providing the physical services needed to sustain growth and development, it did not manage to contain that growth and development within its own boundaries. Lorne Cumming, the OMB Chairman who formally recommended the new system of government, foresaw that this would be the case, and expected that Metro's boundaries would expand in later years to encompass communities further out from the centre. The Provincial government chose not to adopt that course, however, but decided instead, in the early 1970s, to encircle Metropolitan Toronto with four two-tier municipalities (the regional municipalities of Durham, York, Peel, and Halton) having governmental systems based on the Metro model. Today, Metropolitan Toronto is a large central city in a much larger urban region. The most recent Royal Commission to study the area observed, in fact, that

> In some ways the relationship of Metropolitan Toronto to the larger Toronto region resembles the relationship between the City of Toronto and the suburbs twenty-five years ago, when the Metro system was created. The reliance of the population residing outside Metro's boundaries on employment and cultural opportunities within Metro, and conversely, the dependence of a significant portion of Metro's labour force on those regions for housing and recreation are two important features of this interdependence.*

Contributors to this volume reinforce this impression of similarity between the two periods in the development of the Toronto area, for they identify several problems in the Region that correspond to problems identified in the late 1940s. Principal among these is the problem of competition among municipalities (both lower- and upper-tier) for new economic investment and the tax revenues that come with it. Today this competition is occurring in an environment where there is limited investment to go around, however, and not in an environment charged with the expansionist fervour of the 1950s. That fact only highlights the anxieties of those who fear they may lose out in the scramble. Recent census data that show population declines in both Metropolitan Toronto and the City make this anxiety especially apparent among spokesmen for those two jurisdictions. Evidence that Metropolitan Toronto is losing manufacturing jobs has the same effect, even though it is gaining jobs in the commercial and service sectors. Representatives of fast-growing suburban communities (like the City of Mississauga and the Town of Markham) are less concerned than City spokesmen about the negative consequences of competition, although Mayor McCallion of Mississauga suggests that intermunicipal competition is inhibiting cooperation or coordination among neighbouring communities with common concerns.

Other similarities between the Toronto situation then and now are found in discussions of transportation and housing. The expansion of both population and economic activity to ever-greater distances from central employment sites has generated perceptions of transportation problems similar to those expressed thirty years ago, but on a much larger scale. Area residents appear little more inclined now than they were then to reside close to their places of work, thereby compounding the difficulties of those who plan or administer the Region's transportation facilities. And the proliferation of automobile ownership and use to the outer communities continues apace, a matter of mounting concern to those inner municipalities that must bear an ever-increasing share of regional traffic.

Lack of sufficient or appropriate housing for lower-income families and individuals and for elderly persons in need of care remains another problem that has survived the passage of time. According to Marvyn Novick, the nature of housing needs in the region is much more complex than it was in the 1950s, because social changes have greatly altered the nature of housing demand. These changes include a dramatic increase in one-parent families and in families with both parents working, as well as a rise in the proportion of elderly persons in the population. The

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*Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto (June, 1977). *Report.* Vol. II. *Detailed Findings and Recommendations.* (Toronto: Ontario Government Bookstore), 128.

basic challenge, as he sees it, is to generate the political will to acknowledge the housing and other needs that these changes imply and then to alter municipal laws and practices so that the existing housing stock can be adapted to current needs and preferences.

Other contributors see the fundamental housing problem to be essentially the same as it has always been, however — a lack of sufficient housing, particularly rental housing, for persons at the lower end of the income scale. They suggest that this problem has become even more intractable than it was when Metro began because of the different approach taken by senior governments toward urban housing needs. Whereas those governments seemed in the early 1950s to be ready to support the development of public housing wherever municipalities asked for it, they now prefer to limit their aid to programs that will eventually pay their own way.

There are other important differences between the situation in which Metro finds itself today and that faced by Toronto thirty years ago. One is a different situation for public transportation. In 1950, the City of Toronto had a public Transportation Commission with a proven capacity to finance, design and construct extensive improvements to its own facilities — improvements that included the country's first subway line. The Commission was the logical agency to take over smaller local companies and assume full responsibility for meeting the public transportation needs of the metropolitan area. That metropolitan transit agency, the Toronto Transit Commission, is once again the largest and most prominent of several local transit companies operating in different parts of the Region. It neither faces the prospect of elevation to the status of regional transit authority, however, nor is it the agency with primary responsibility for financing, developing or implementing major new transit facilities within the Region. Those functions have passed to a variety of Provincial bodies — the GO Transit Authority, which administers the area's rail and bus commuter system; the Ministry of Transportation, which subsidizes both the operating and capital costs of local transit companies, including the TTC; and the Urban Transportation Development Corporation, which has developed an Intermediate Capacity Transit technology that the Provincial government hopes to sell to the TTC and other large city transit companies in other parts of the continent. The problems of coordinating the activities of these various transit agencies with each other, with the activities of other transportation units and with municipal land use plans and preferences have become much more complex than they were when Metro got underway.

The nature of the housing problem has also changed. While a shortage of low-cost housing remains an important and unresolved issue in the Region, it is no longer exclusively, or even predominantly, an "inner city" concern. If anything the reverse is true, for a steady rise in the value of inner city real estate has accompanied the development of Metropolitan Toronto and the growth of the Region. As a result, as Eli Comay observes, "if you draw a semi-circle four to five miles from downtown Toronto, you find there's not much old housing that is still accessible to the poor because it's all been taken over by the non-poor."

It was the suburban municipalities within Metro that absorbed a large proportion of the lower-cost rental housing built in the 1960s and early 1970s, particularly after the Ontario Housing Corporation began to develop and build public housing in 1964. Even those municipalities are approaching the limit of their capacity to absorb new residential development of any sort — public or private — with the result that municipalities outside Metropolitan Toronto are beginning to experience a sharp rise in demand for low-cost and subsidized rental units. Because lower suburban land prices make it easier for developers to meet that demand outside rather than inside Metro, the decentralization and dispersal of the Region's low-income population, which began in Metro in the late 1950s, is likely to continue into the future.

The gradual diffusion of the low-cost housing problem away from the central city implies a diffusion of demand for "social" and "human" services. A perception that suburban municipalities were failing to provide adequate services of this type entered into deliberations that preceded Metro's formation. It also prompted the Provincial government, in 1967, to transfer responsibility for welfare services to the Metropolitan Council. That perception does not seem to exist today. The Provincial government adhered to the principle of upper-tier responsibility for social services when it established regional governments outside Metro, and there now appears to be little difference in the way Metro and regional government officials perceive social service needs within their areas of jurisdiction. Those officials not only perform similar responsibilities, (most of them mandated by the Province), but they are united in their view that the most serious problem they face is insufficient funding — a problem they attribute to Provincial spending restraints rather than to the parsimony of local councils.

The administrative problems faced by social agencies operating in different parts of the Region are somewhat different, however, because of differences in the pattern and density of development inside and outside Metro. While Metro's Department of Social Services tries to adapt to the decentralization of its clients into suburban enclaves of high density, low-cost housing, their regional counterparts must devise ways to deliver services over large and often sparsely populated expanses of territory dotted with only a few urban settlements.

Retreat from Regional Planning

The commitment to rely on areawide planning as a guide to future development remained an important element of Provincial responses to the area's expansion until the mid-1970s, despite Metro's own failure to adopt an Official Plan until the Province insisted, in 1979, that it do so. By that time Metro's area of planning jurisdiction coincided with its boundaries, for the Province had taken on the task of planning for the larger Region in the early 1960s, when it initiated a Metropolitan Toronto and Region Transportation Study (MTRTS). That Study led to a more comprehensive regional planning exercise which culminated, in 1970, in a wide-ranging program entitled *Design for Development: The Toronto-Centred Region*. The most recent document to address the Region's future was a 1975 study of the Central Ontario Lakeshore Urban Complex (COLUC) issued by a provincial-municipal task force. While less ambitious than the TCR plan in spelling out goals for the Region, that report did emphasize that the government should anticipate and then make provision for the Region's long-term needs.

Perhaps the most noteworthy change in perceptions of the Toronto metropolis and its problems made evident in this volume has been a decline in confidence in the ability of comprehensive regional planning to solve the problems of urban expansion. Although several contributors do advocate the need for planning controls to counter the negative effects of private market processes or to overcome market distortions in regional development, even those most closely involved in planning for the Region seem to recognize that planning objectives often give way to more pragmatic considerations in the decisions made by governments. This has become particularly apparent at this time of economic slowdown, when governments often seem more concerned with protecting their revenue sources than with furthering any other objectives. But the fate of planning in both Metro and the Region have also made it clear that public and private interests may successfully ignore, or circumvent, regional planning objectives if these conflict with their own goals or preferences.

Apparently there are several reasons why regional planning has failed to fulfill the expectations of early enthusiasts. First, there has been growing awareness of the limitations inherent in planning as an intellectual activity. Planners are situated in a particular place and time, and draw inspiration from the circumstances in which they find themselves. In the early 1960s, most planners assumed a continuation of the pattern of life and the pattern of settlement that prevailed at that time. Thus, their plans did little to prepare decision-makers for the remarkable social and cultural changes that had begun to occur even before that decade ended — changes like the dramatic fall in the birth rate and an equally dramatic rise in the number of women in the work force; a rising divorce rate and the corresponding rise in the number of single-parent families; the environmental movement, with the pressures it placed on government for tighter regulations on sewage disposal, water supply and industrial development; the shock of the energy crisis and its implications for economic development and for patterns of urban settlement. In addition, it has become evident that planners had limited capacity to foresee, let alone control, the urban impacts of decisions made by other levels or branches of government with different responsibilities and priorities. Liberal immigration laws instituted by the Canadian government after World War II effected profound but unforeseen changes in the nature and needs of Toronto's population. Many of the policies that have important implications for the pattern and pace of urban development — policies affecting energy costs, interest rates, and environmental standards — originate with governments or governmental agencies far removed from the regional planning process, sometimes in response to events occurring outside the country altogether.

A second reason for the change in attitudes toward planning relates to what several contributors refer to as a lack of "political will" — or the reluctance of decision-makers to act on the recommendations of planners and other advocates of change in the face of strong countervailing pressures. In the present economic climate, governments have become especially reluctant to risk the costs of lost jobs or tax revenues by adhering to plans designed to direct growth and development away from some parts of the Region and into others (from the central city to the suburbs; from the west of Metro to the east). There are other types of costs associated with a too-rigid adherence to plans. The Provincial government apparently

decided in 1971 that it would not risk the political costs of approving an expressway directed at the very heart of the City of Toronto, even though that expressway (the Spadina) was an integral part of the Metropolitan Toronto Plan. It also violated its own planning objectives in the early 1970s when it responded to growing concern with the high cost of housing within Metro Toronto by lifting its controls on peripheral expansion and by providing some of the services that would allow expansion to occur.

A third factor contributing to the revised judgment of regional planning is an awareness that the observance of such plans may have consequences that were neither foreseen nor desired. The planned decentralization of low-income families and elderly persons to suburban locations throughout Metro Toronto — an objective for which planners won support from Metro Council and its member municipalities — resulted in the development of large clusters of low-income and immigrant neighbourhoods in the outer suburbs, often far removed from the community facilities and support services that characterize such neighbourhoods in older parts of the city. That clustering, together with the normal processes of aging in both the housing stock and the population, have produced the remarkable changes in the suburban population and suburban service needs documented in the Social Planning Council Study discussed by John Gandy. The separation of Metro Toronto from the outer part of the Region, one planning objective that the Province did adopt, has added to the costs of suburban services, and thus means higher outlays for both municipal and Provincial taxpayers.

Inability to predict or control future events, government unwillingness to absorb the economic or political costs of implementing planning goals, and a recognition that the observance of plans can lead to negative as well as positive outcomes help to account for the revised attitudes toward regional planning that run through this volume. This does not mean, however, that planning is no longer a matter of interest to those concerned with the current and future state of the Region. While some contributors appear to be asking, "Can we afford to plan?" others pose the question, "Can we afford not to?". They suggest that there are serious costs involved in a too-complete surrender of responsibility for the Region'a future to private market forces and the land use decisions of local Councils. There are the costs of providing new services in sprawling suburban communities while existing capacity in the inner municipalities remains unused; the costs associated with a continuing loss of peripheral green space for agricultural or recreational purposes; and the costs to municipalities throughout the Region of participating in the competition for new economic investment. There is a lack of consensus, however, on the best way to address these problems. June Rowlands describes the City of Toronto's call for a Select Committee of the Provincial Legislature to review planning policies and spell out what the Provincial government intends to do about urban sprawl. John Marshall suggests that planners should abandon the two incompatible assumptions that were basic to Provincial plans for the Toronto Region — that all development in Southern Ontario be Toronto-centred and that somehow the growth of the Toronto complex must be contained — and develop a planning framework that both recognizes the integrity of the many communities in the Region and protects amenities (such as open space) that make life more pleasant for people who live there. His comments reinforce the conclusion of Ian Macdonald, one of the chief architects of the Toronto-Centred Region Plan, that "perhaps our best efforts should be directed after all at the quality of our cities and their human dimension." In his concluding contribution, George Fallis calls for a return to the "accommodative" mode that characterized Provincial and local responses to urban expansion in the 1950s and early 1960s — away from the "prescriptive" planning and other forms of intervention undertaken by those governments in the early 1970s. He questions whether governments are ever prepared to bear the costs of altering basic economic and social trends, and argues that a better strategy is to work within those trends, dealing with problems as they arise with policies that redistribute the costs and benefits of growth as equally as possible throughout the urban community.

Increasing Governmental Complexity

The importance attached to the past, present and future role of the Provincial government in the Region's development and management highlights what is perhaps the most conspicuous failure of the Metro experiment — its inability to stem the trend toward Provincial intervention (both financial and administrative) in the affairs of the expanding city. That intervention reached a new level in the mid-1960s when the Province assumed responsibility for regional planning, launched a rail commuter service to link Metropolitan Toronto to other communities along the shore of Lake Ontario, and began to construct trunk sewer facilities outside Metro. Those actions signalled the end of the Province's reliance on municipal government to produce the infrastructure needed to sustain the Region's growth and development. Even within established local jurisdictions, however, Provincial involvement in the

planning, financing and administration of local services had become all-pervasive by that time. The two decades after Metro's creation not only saw an acceleration of the trend toward increased federal and provincial involvement in the provision of human services; it also saw the Province become steadily more involved in most of the other activities that had traditionally belonged to local government. That involvement has helped to produce a governmental system of great complexity, composed as it now is of a bewildering array of governmental units made up of various combinations of appointed and elected officials from several levels of government. Papers in this volume refer to only some of these units: local and regional (or metropolitan) Councils and their many departments and commissions; The Provincial Cabinet, Legislature and ministries; the Ontario Municipal Board; The Ontario Water Resources Commission; GO-Transit; The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority; the Ontario Housing Corporation, and municipally-sponsored non-profit Housing Corporations. Most of these agencies are limited in their functional responsibilities or in their area of jurisdiction, or both. Only the Ontario Municipal Board, with its powers to resolve disputes over municipal land use and to approve municipal borrowing, has the potential to develop a general understanding of, or sense of responsibility for, the development of the Region as a whole. Whether it will do so, however, is still an open question.

The current absence of any formally constituted mechanism for coordinating the Region's many governmental units or for planning its future has generated efforts to achieve these goals through less formal mechanisms for coordination and consultation. This volume contains examples of two such efforts. One is the Regional Information Systems Committee, set up to assemble and disseminate information relevant to regional planning. The second is the Toronto Centred Transportation and Planning Coordinating Committee, a forum established by the Provincial Government to discuss and, if possible, resolve questions pertaining to the Region's transportation needs. These two committees represent interesting new developments in the effort to adapt the Region's governmental system to the pressures of growth and change. Because they lack formal authority to mandate cooperation from participating units or to implement plans and programs even when their members agree to them, however, their effectiveness is likely to be limited.

Conclusion

The principal force driving governmental activity in the Toronto Region at the present time is competition among its many municipal governments for both private and public investment. At the same time, these governments are experiencing many of the problems faced by the City of Toronto and its suburbs in the early 1950s, although those problems take somewhat different forms and are distributed somewhat differently now than they were then. There is little likelihood that attempts to solve them will take the forms adopted earlier, however. Both large-scale governmental reorganization and comprehensive regional planning appear to have few adherents among those who survey the state of the Region from a contemporary vantage point.

There appears to be general consensus that the Provincial government is the appropriate government to administer to or make policy for the Region as a whole. At the moment, however, the Province seems reluctant to assume a leadership role, preferring to leave discussions of intra-Regional issues to special purpose authorities or to encourage informal consultation among specialized government agencies. These devices are unlikely to do much to alter existing trends.

PART A:

Governmental Responses to Urban Growth and Change

Looking Backward: From Reality to Plan

Eli Comay
Professor of Environmental Studies, York University

Introduction

I'll start with the good news. Back in the mid-to-late 1950s, when the Metro planners seriously got down to putting a Metro plan together, they took a crack at predicting what would happen in the area. They decided that by 1980 there'd be about 2.8 million people in what was then the Metro planning area, which included Metro Toronto and the surrounding fringe. They came pretty close. The population in 1980 was probably close to 2.6 million — so they were only off about six to seven percent. I sometimes think that's the last time anybody made a halfway decent prediction about population in this area. In fact, it was probably also the first time that anybody did so. Before that, the only organized attempt to figure out what was likely to happen was that made in the late war years by Norman Wilson, the man who invented our subway system. He predicted for the Toronto and York Planning Board, the predecessor of the Metro Planning Board, that there'd be about 1.65 million people in the area by 1970. As it turned out, there were about 2.3 million. So he was off about 40%, which meant something like 30,000 people too few per year, each and every year, over the period he was dealing with. That wasn't very good. The Metro people were much closer. There hasn't been a decent population projection since.

It isn't really hard to project population growth reasonably well. All you need is one decent fact and a couple of rules of thumb. As long as your fact holds and you don't run out of thumbs you're okay. For a considerable period of time the fact was that about a hundred thousand people were coming into Canada from abroad every year. For some immutable reason about half of them settled in Ontario and about half of those settled in Toronto. If you figured out how many would die and how many would be born and subtracted the former and added the latter, then looked at what was happening to the rest of us, you concluded that the area would probably grow by about sixty thousand persons a year. That's how we came up with a prediction, and it worked. If you were a Metro planning official you were lucky if you got out while the getting was good — before decent facts started to become indecent facts and before you ran out of thumbs. There have been four Metro planning commissioners. Three of them got out in time; the last one is in trouble.

That's the good news, at least if you are inclined to have faith in planning, planning machinery and what planners do. I'm not sure if the theme of my talk will be whether you should or should not have faith. Let's see how it comes out.

Now for some bad news. They got it all wrong. (Incidentally, when it was right it's "we"; when it was wrong it's "they".) "They" got it all wrong. They decided that there'd be about 140,000 to 150,000 more people in the City of Toronto and the inner suburbs by 1980 than were actually there. They decided there'd be about 90,000 or 100,000 more people in Scarborough and Etobicoke than actually turned out to be there. And they were off on North York the other way. North York ended up with about 45,000 or 50,000 more people than the Metro planners had predicted scientifically. (The fringe prediction was pretty good. They said half a million and it came out half a million.)

So there was obviously some trouble with predicting how growth was going to be distributed. Is that a serious issue? It's serious if you think it's important to guess right when you're planning public facilities like schools and parks and

roadways. If you don't have as many people in Etobicoke and Scarborough as you think you're going to have, for example, then you have to question whether you really need a Scarborough Expressway or a Richview Expressway. In fact you don't need them, and you don't have them. The Scarborough Expressway got fought over and never got built. The Richview Expressway didn't even get fought over. It just disappeared, although it shows up in the Etobicoke District Eight plan as something called the Eglinton Linear Parkway. If you have a bicycle you can now bicycle up and down the former Richview Expressway. The Scarborough Expressway still managed to show up in one of the earlier versions of the current Metro Plan until they had second or third thoughts. It showed up as something called a "Corridor of High Accessibility" — and that is a good euphemism for a failed expressway.

The other side of the coin is that if you have more people in North York than you thought you were going to have and if you have more jobs in Toronto than you thought you were going to have — and I'll get to that in a minute — then the Spadina Expressway or Highway 400 become important issues. That, in fact, is what Professor Soberman and the Metro Toronto Transportation Plan Review had to wrestle with about five years ago. How do you get people in and out of North York?[1]

Let me stick with the bad news. I mentioned the matter of employment. The planners thought there'd be about 1.2 million jobs in the Metro area. They were wrong. There turned out to be about 1.45 million. That's a fairly big difference — something like 18–20% more jobs than predicted. How did they manage to get their population forecast high and their employment forecast low? It's not hard if you're not smart enough to foresee the radical changes that occurred in the economic and social structure. In 1957, 1958 and 1959, when all this planning was going on, we assumed that for every hundred people living in the area, 43 would be working. The existing rule of thumb was for a labour force participation rate of only 40%, so it was a struggle to get it up to 43. It turns out to be something like 55% today.

So we ended up with more people working; more small households; more housing units built and occupied than anybody thought would be needed. We also ended up with fewer school children and more vacant school sites built into the middle of subdivision plans. It's a hell of a job trying to figure out what to do with a vacant school site when it's in the middle of a neighbourhood. You also have more empty and under-used school buildings and a lot of local anxiety about what's going to happen to them, which serves to make school trustees and local politicians anxious in turn.

The plan in retrospect: how well did it work?

That is by way of introduction. As the program for this Symposium pointed out, Metro was supposed to produce a plan to guide the area's development, to facilitate the provision of services, to promote the distribution of low- and moderately-priced housing throughout the area and to distribute the costs and benefits of human services more equitably. I'm not going to deal with the latter goal because they didn't give me enough time. As for services — they were provided. I'll have a few words on that. And on housing. But first I'll talk about the plan.

A Metro Plan was produced. What did Metro say should happen, and did we get there? More or less. The plan contained some principles dressed up as policies, and I'll deal with a few of them.

Disperse both jobs and residences

One principle was that you disperse employment throughout the area. Then you provide a widespread transportation network that connects all residential areas with all employment areas and connects everything to the central area so that people can get to and from work. The planning of the metropolitan area hinged on the journey to work, and was dressed up as a principle: to minimize the need for commuting and to maximize the opportunity for commuting. We didn't count — excuse me, I'm forgetting my rule of thumb — "they" didn't count on all those workers and all those jobs. Whether the need to commute has been minimized I don't know, but I'm doubtful. Whether the opportunity to commute has been maximized, I think probably it has. Certainly there's a lot of commuting going on — a lot of travelling to and from work.

Some things persist. Way back then East York had a nice post-war industrial area with a lot of jobs. It also had a mixture of late pre-war and early post-war housing. It was noteworthy, then, that about 85% of the people who lived in East York and worked for a living worked somewhere else, and 85% of the people who worked in East York lived somewhere else. This has persisted. The same thing now goes for Don Mills and I expect the same thing holds for Downsview.[2] So the need for commuting may have been minimized and the jobs were placed where people were living, but the opportunity for commuting had to be maximized because people weren't going to work where

they were living and vice versa.

Social Mix

Another principle was that all the residential areas of Metro Toronto should provide for a reasonable mixture of people and houses: all kinds of housing, all kinds of people, all kinds of tenure (rental and ownership), all kinds of price ranges; all kinds of incomes — poor people as well as rich. In fact the principle held that any area that is suitable for housing is by definition suitable for public housing, with one proviso — that there be jobs and transit available. It's difficult for poor people to live where they can't get to their jobs. But that approach was based on a premise that public housing is really for those whom Dr. Albert Rose used to call the "working poor" — just ordinary family people like you and me, but with less money. They would have a car (perhaps a beat-up jalopy but still a car) and the same kind of community needs as the rest of us. It probably worked before the Ontario Housing Corporation took the Metro Plan at its word and decided that public housing be provided everywhere — all over the place. OHC had another requirement. It saw public housing as a scarce resource and therefore decided that it had to allocate it on the basis of a priority system. If you don't have very many public housing units or if you don't have enough public housing, you have to give somebody priority when you select tenants. Those in greatest need turned out not to be the working poor but single parent or "mother-led" families — whatever the current term is — people without a job, living on some form of transfer payments, and with particular social service needs that were very hard to supply in northern Etobicoke or at the corner of Jane and Finch.

So the principle contained in the Metro Plan got carried out, but it didn't get carried out the way Metro intended. There are broad sections of North York, Scarborough and northern Etobicoke — anywhere from twelve to eighteen miles from downtown Toronto — where one out of every five or every six households lives in some kind of government-assisted housing unit. The planning principle was an easy one; the way it worked in practice was another matter. I don't think "they" would have sat down in 1958 and 1959 and said that you should build a corridor through the outer suburbs and load it up with poor people without making sure there are jobs and buses and community clinics and the kind of stores that sell on credit and thrift shops where you can buy used furniture and used clothing and all the rest of it.

Separate urban from rural

Another principle is that if you are urbanizing you should have a boundary and it should be firm. It is a law of planning that there is a distinction between what's urban and what isn't urban, and that distinction should be visible — now you're there and now you're not. Here is the city and there is the country. In those days it was easy to decide what the urban boundary would be because there was a good reason for it. There was an economically determine range over which you could provide services out of Lake Ontario — water supply coming from the lake, sewage disposal back into the lake. The economics of the time dictated that range to be about twelve or fourteen miles. That meant that you could effectively service all of Metro Toronto and a thin slice to the north with lake-oriented water and lake-oriented sewers. The areas beyond that should be rural.

There was one exception, however. There's a narrow corridor along Yonge Street that has been urbanizing for longer than Metro has been planning. This area, between Bathurst on the west and Bayview on the east, was about two and a half miles wide and was obviously going to be urban. You couldn't get the sewers up that far so you provided for upstream sewage disposal with something that everybody talked about and somebody must have understood and the planners took as gospel. It's called "tertiary treatment", and there was a rule of thumb. The sanitation and the public health people said that if you had six times as much water in a receiving stream as the amount of effluent you were depositing you were going to get a reasonable environmental result — a dilution factor of six. There was six times as much water in the upper Don River as the amount of sewage that was going to be deposited from Richmond Hill and Thornhill and Maple, so according to the rule it was okay to put an upstream plant there. That rule changed. Times change; standards change; government imperatives changed; and upstream sewage disposal became a "no no". So the whole sewage system changed and the urban boundary changed. We now have a nice, big fat sewer that starts way out there below Ajax, goes up and out toward Highway 400, up Bayview, starts working its way to Yonge Street and is ultimately going to end up in Newmarket. That sewer totally changed the basic concept of where the urban boundary would be, how much urban development there would be and how it would be serviced.

Balance Roads and Transit

What about transportation? We envisaged a

transportation system to serve 2.8 million people. It had three rings; an inner ring, an intermediate ring, and an outer ring. The inner ring consisted of an expressway running down the west end of Toronto near Christie and Grace Streets, an expressway running along the CPR belt line railway north of Dupont, an expressway running through the Don Valley, and the Gardiner Expressway at the base. There was no doubt — then — of the need for an inner ring; the only question was what size it should be. There are conceptual differences. If it's a tight inner ring you're not pushing cars through residential areas surrounding the core but you don't have enough room to distribute them. If it's a loose inner ring you have all kinds of room to distribute the cars in and out of the ring but, unfortunately, you're distributing them through a lot of residential areas. Needless to say, the inner ring was never built, nor will it be built. The intermediate ring was the Gardiner, Highway 427, and Highway 401. Most of that was in place by the time Metro decided it was a good idea. The only part of it that wasn't in place then was a piece of the Gardiner that runs through the East end and then through Scarborough; it's still not in place.

The outer ring? I don't think anyone cared very much about that one, one way or the other. It's called Highway 407, which is slowly getting itself built, and a notional facility called the East Metro Freeway that is as little likely to be built as the airport and new town it was conceived of as serving.

There was also a transit system with two north-south lines and two east-west lines. The two north-south lines got built and one of the east-west lines got built. The other east-west line was Queen Street. Queen Street, in fact, was where it all began when Norman Wilson first invented the subway system in the early war years. The Queen line never got built, although they dug a hole under Yonge Street for the future platform of the Queen Street subway. Somehow or other that east-west subway line seems to persist. It's still on the agenda. The newspapers keep talking about a report that's going to come out in the spring which could put the east-west line anywhere between the waterfront and Finch, a distance of some nine or ten miles. That's so flexible it might actually get built.

The persistent problem of low-rental housing

Let's turn to low-income housing. Metro couldn't resist dealing in numbers. What characterizes the question of housing for poor people in the metropolitan area — maybe in the world for all I know — is that it's a numbers game. Metro got into numbers right at the beginning. They said . . . we said . . . that we could do about fifteen hundred housing units a year; that is, a thousand family units and five hundred elderly person units a year. Over twenty years that's about thirty thousand units. We knew that twenty five to thirty thousand units was not enough to meet the need (though we didn't know what the need was) and that the vast majority of low-income households would have to continue to rely on the existing stock of older housing. That meant that you shouldn't tear down the old houses the way the City of Toronto was proposing to do in those days, when it had some really massive urban development schemes on its books. It meant that you should carry out what was called "a comprehensive and effective program of urban renewal based on conservation and rehabilitation". Two things happened. Ontario Housing Corporation figured out how to produce public housing. (They called them "developer proposals"). We didn't get five or thirty thousand units, but something like fifty-five or sixty thousand units. That's good, because there are fifty-five thousand or sixty thousand low-income families and elderly persons who are now being housed who would not have been housed had OHC not been able to do what it did. But the other thing that happened is that little of that old housing that was supposed to be "conserved and rehabilitated" remained available for poor people. It didn't get rehabilitated; it got renovated. There is very little cheap old housing still left in the Metropolitan Toronto area. Certainly if you draw a semicircle four to five miles from downtown Toronto, you find there's not much old housing that is still accessible to the poor because most of it has been taken over by the non-poor. If low-rental or low-income housing was a problem in the late 1950s, it's certainly a problem today.

One problem that has probably been solved is that of local resistance to public housing. Metro was concerned that it couldn't get public housing because the suburbs didn't want it. It was a real battle, in fact, until Ontario Housing Corporation figured out how to do it (which is to keep it quiet until it's in place and occupied). You couldn't get a single public housing unit into East York, for example. You could get it all around the periphery of East York, but not into East York. That battle is over. The (recently approved) Metroplan says that each municipality will take its "fair share" of public housing. There was a bit of a fight over that, but not nearly as much of a fight as there was over the parallel issue of whether each municipality should be required to accept group homes in its residential areas. The municipalities agreed without much of a fight to take their "fair share" of public housing because there isn't any public housing programme. There's no way to produce

public housing, and a "fair share" of nothing is . . . nothing.

So how did the plan work? That is the question that Carl Goldenberg, the first Royal Commissioner to study Metro Toronto, asked the then Metro Planning Commissioner in 1965.[3] The then Metro Planning Commissioner said, "It worked okay". The planning machinery had operated fairly effectively, in the sense of controlling urban development and not allowing sprawl to occur. Adequate development standards, in terms of amenity and space, had been maintained. A satisfactory level of public services had been provided. What the then Metro Planning Commissioner forgot to tell Mr. Goldenberg was that there was a cost to this. Housing in Metro Toronto was even then probably the most expensive in North America. We seemed to be willing to accept the fact that the cost of effective metropolitan planning is to make housing extremely expensive.

Beyond Metro

As a way of concluding, I shall deal with some persistent and recurring issues. First, there is the question of boundaries and planning control. Metro was set up to produce a metropolitan plan and the planning machinery to guide and regulate the area's long term development. The area in question was not the Metropolitan Toronto area but the Toronto urban area as it was emerging. The Province gave Metro planning control over the fringe tier of rural townships to the west, to the north, and to the east. These contained a number of urban municipalities within them. By some nice stroke of somebody's imagination, there were exactly thirteen municipalities to balance the thirteen municipalities within Metro. Metro was given extra-territorial planning jurisdiction over the Metropolitan Toronto planning area. It was apparent in Dr. Cumming's report that he didn't expect the boundaries to stay the way they were at the time of Metro's creation.[4] He seemed to say that the last thing he expected to see was a recurrence of the situation that led him to conclude that something had to be done. In other words, he expected the boundaries to move outward as further growth took place. He used words like "temporary" and "not permanent". In the meantime he wanted Metro to have control over what was taking place out there.

The Province didn't pay much attention to that. Ultimately it decided to fix the boundaries in a formal way and then to eliminate the extra-territorial planning control. It created three regional municipalities — to the west, to the north, and to the east — but it didn't figure out how to carry out the coordinating function that, for better or for worse, Metro Planning was providing. There was no way to coordinate what was taking place in Peel, in Regional York, or in Regional Durham with what was taking place in Metro, particularly when it came to such questions as how many people, how many houses, what kinds of houses, how many jobs, what kinds of jobs. Mr. Robarts thought it was a serious issue and called for a coordinating mechanism which he called a Toronto Region Coordinating Agency.[5] It was still-born. For a while there was something that consisted of all kinds of regional chairmen and ministers and their loyal civil servants, but that died too. There may be some discussion on today's program of some on-the-ground coordination with respect to highways and transportation and the provision of information on a regional basis, but the machinery for coordination doesn't really exist.

Provincial Plans for the Region

The Province thought it had another way of doing it. Rather than provide the machinery to coordinate what happens, it would plan what was going to happen. It went into regional planning in a big way. For a while it looked as if we might get some kind of super-coordination by way of a super-regional plan. It started out being called MTRTS (Metropolitan Toronto and Region Transportation Study), became TCR (Toronto Centred Region) along the way, and ended up as something called COLUC (Central Ontario Lakeshore Urban Complex). They decided they would impose development envelopes throughout the area. Urban development would be allowed to take place within them and would be forbidden outside them. They were going to allocate specific quantities of people and jobs within those envelopes. Of course it didn't happen. Even while this planning on paper was going on, there were things happening at the local, regional and provincial levels that were in absolute conflict with the theoretical notions emerging from TCR and COLUC.

There was a basic theme, however. It was that you have to stop what's happening in the west and you have to go east. This issue of lopsidedness has permeated planners' thinking about the metropolitan area for a long time. On paper this is a nice place to plan. You have a lake at the base and land to the north. All you have to do is draw a semicircle and you have an area to plan. You have roads and rail facilities that radiate out and sewers that go up and across and parks that come down. A semicircle is a neat way to plan (I suppose a square is a good thing to have and so is a total circle, but then you don't have Lake Ontario in which to deposit your sewage effluent. I guess in Denver they do it some other way). But that semicircle never really

worked. If you're going to have a semicircle then you probably want as many people in the eastern half of your semicircle as in the western half.

The last time anybody came close to looking at Metro Toronto — that is, at the emerging metropolitan area — in terms of that kind of balance was back in 1943 when we had the first legitimate planning effort for the City of Toronto and the urbanizing area around it. That was the "Master Plan for the City of Toronto and its Environs", done by the City of Toronto Planning Board. They did it the right way because they did it on a piece of paper. They said that in our new suburban areas 40% of the people will live to the north, 30% will live to the east and 30% will live to the west. By 1966, when Metro's unofficial Official Plan was adopted, you still had 30% of the suburban growth proposed for the east but about 38% in the west. In 1977, when Professor Soberman took a cool, calculating look at what was happening and what was likely to happen, projected suburban development to the east was down to about 24% and suburban development to the west was up to about 44%. During that period we went from a suburban area of about half a million, as envisaged in 1943, to a suburban area of about three and a half million, as envisaged in 1977. Nobody envisages that kind of suburban area any more. We're back down to a nice neat suburban area of about two and a half million, and we're not growing. The west is somewhat down in current thinking to about 42% and the east is holding steady at 24%.

The Provincial planners thought this was a problem. Metro thought it was a problem initially and then decided that it wasn't a problem; that there is a good reason why development would take place to the west. But the Provincial plans said you've got to stop what's happening in Erin Mills and Meadowvale and Brampton and Bramalea. If you've made commitments, figure out how to get out of them and find some way of getting all those people to live in North Pickering, a place called Columbus, and the City of Oshawa. But it didn't work. They decided to call North Pickering Seaton and it still didn't work.

Where the Regional Planners Went Wrong

It didn't work, it seems to me, because the Province was up against a simple fact of life. Hans Blumenfeld, who was Metro's resident thinker and a very effective one, once stumbled on an interesting phenomenon. He observed that in most metropolitan areas the rich people usually live in the west and the poor people live in the east. There are exceptions, but in general that seems to hold true. And Hans used to ruminate over this. He said rich people have two characteristics. They're likely to drive to work (unless the Province is prepared to subsidize their travel on comfortable trains at the rate of $3.00 a trip) because they've got cars and can afford the convenience. And they're likely to live in the west. So, said Hans, as surely as the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, they're going to have the sun in their eyes when they drive to work in the morning and when they drive home at night. I think that is why the last serious crack at balanced development took place in 1943 before they knew that people were going to have cars and people were going to have money. Clearly, we feel very moral about this! There has to be a price for being rich and the price you pay is having the sun in your eyes. Nothing that the regional planners do is every going to change that.

Editor's Notes

[1]See: Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review, *Choices for the Future* (Toronto: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board, 1975), pp. 124–135.

[2]Don Mills and Downsview are two North York neighbourhoods that contain a mixture of residential and industrial uses. York University is located in Downsview.

[3]Professor Comay was Metro Toronto Planning Commissioner from 1961 to 1966.

[4]Lorne Cumming was the Ontario Municipal Board Commissioner who recommended a metropolitan form of government for the City of Toronto and its twelve suburbs in 1953. See: Ontario Municipal Board, *In the Matter of Sections 20 and 22 of the Municipal Act. Decisions and Recommendations of the Board.* (Toronto: January 20, 1953), pp. 86–88.

[5]See: The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto. *Report. Volume II. Detailed Findings and Recommendations.* (Toronto: June 1977), pp. 128–133.

The Region Today I: Housing

Governments and Housing

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I shall begin by briefly outlining the responsibilities of the federal, provincial and local governments in the housing area, pointing out the main points of conflict among them. This will provide a background for the consideration of institutional changes.

Divided Responsibilities

In the housing sphere, as in almost every area of government activity in Canada, we have a mix of government levels involved. The Federal Government has substantial responsibility for insuring the efficient operation of markets. In the mortgage market it has been instrumental in developing mortgage insurance programs and it has experimented with alternative mortgage instruments. It has also had a substantial indirect effect on the overall housing market, as we're now very aware, through its responsibility for macro-economic policy — principally through its policies with respect to general interest rate levels. These set mortgage rate levels and have significant effects on construction and on people's ability to purchase owner-occupied housing.

The Federal Government has also been involved in the provision of social housing. I think it's fair to say that it has always been the principal initiator of social housing programs. Provincial governments have occasionally engaged in independent social housing programs but, in the main, they've confined themselves to sharing the costs of social housing programs with the federal government. Local government has also been involved in social housing programs, in part sharing the costs and in part as a kind of gatekeeper, particularly in the area of public housing where local approval was required before a project could go forward. Local governments have almost never had independent social housing programs. Whether this is a good or a bad thing remains to be seen.

The Provincial government has responsibility for the provision of trunk servicing, and has had an enormous influence on the spatial allocation of housing, as we heard in the last address.

The sphere of influence of local government has been principally in planning, zoning, and re-zoning within the broader context of provincial servicing plans. Thus local government has had to react very much to the initiatives of the federal and provincial governments.

That gives some feeling for the responsibilities of the various levels of government. They haven't changed very much in response to the growth of major metropolitan areas over the last twenty years, and it's unlikely that they will change very much as the Metropolitan Toronto region grows over the next twenty years. Within that framework, then, what sorts of conflicts arise?

Conflicting Goals and Interests

Obviously there is always the higher level / lower level conflict. The Federal and Provincial governments make decisions about the amount of assistance and the form it will take. Although there is local control in the sense of the gatekeeper function, higher levels of government have exerted substantial influence there as well. So there is always the dilemma of local control versus higher authority. It's also true, of course, that local decisions can

work against the objectives of higher authorities, as we saw this morning. What local governments believe to be good planning often leads to restrictions on the supply of new housing and, on average, to much higher housing prices. These restrictions make it much more difficult for higher level governments to carry out their responsibilities for the provision of assisted housing. So conflicts between higher and lower levels of government can work both ways.

There's also a possibility for substantial conflict between metropolitan governments or between local governments in a metropolitan area. This can take several forms. One grows out of a practice that is sometimes called "fiscal zoning". A local government may decide not to zone for high density housing, which brings in relatively low taxes for the services that have to be provided and so puts a net drain on the people already living in that community. Thus, we tend not to get high density housing in that community. This practice passes on the burden of trying to provide high density housing to adjacent jurisdictions. Everybody tries to keep out the housing which is going to put a drain on existing residents.

Of course there's inter-municipal conflict about the kind of metropolitan area that we want to create. For example you may have the metropolitan government deciding to run a mass transit line along Eglinton and the City of Toronto and the Borough of East York saying that they don't want high density housing along Eglinton. There's also a dilemma, which has been documented recently, arising from the way assisted housing is distributed. People within a metropolitan area are very mobile, so that if assisted housing is provided in North York, people from Peel or Vaughan or Durham can move there. There's always the problem of making sure that everyone in the region takes their fair share of assisted housing. We saw that this has worked out fairly well in Metro. When you look at the Toronto Centred Region, however, you find that in 1975 the outer part of the region had 25% of the population and provided 5% of the assisted housing. It's clear that people could move from Peel to Metro to receive assisted housing. There's a lot of possibility for inter-municipal conflict and a lot of need for coordination in the distribution of assisted housing in a large metropolitan region.

I think that is the basic structure of inter-governmental relations in the housing sphere. I also think those are some of the main areas of conflict, and therefore perhaps the main areas where coordination and cooperation are required both between and among different levels of government. Perhaps toward the end we can ask ourselves whether or not there are some kinds of institutional changes that might help to move us in the direction we think desirable.

Housing: Redevelopment or Sprawl?

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I'm not convinced that the issue of regional development is an issue of political arrangements, because I think it's more basic than that. The more basic issue, it seems to me, is the absence of public will to act on the housing issue. There's a conflict built into housing's social dimension, not so much related to the need to deal with poverty as to the need to understand and deal with the enormous complexity that will surround housing issues for the next ten to fifteen years.

In my judgment, it was easier to get the social consensus that resulted in the political decision to develop low cost housing that Eli Comay described than it will be to get a social consensus on how to deal with the kinds of housing concerns that have since emerged. That social consensus recognized the need to take essentially new lands in a period of growth and prosperity and assign a portion of those lands to housing for the low-income population. The issue now is how to contend with established, settled interests while trying to deal with significant distributional and redevelopment issues, and that's a lot tougher. So to me it's public will as opposed to political structure.

Housing Needs in a Time of Social Change

There are four or five dimensions of the issue that I want to deal with. In my judgment, we are in a watershed period because the social and economic forces shaping the urban and regional environment have shifted profoundly in two or three fundamental ways. First, in terms of population structure, we have attained stability. The metropolitan area resembles an inner city area relative to the outer region. The latest 1981 census count pretty much confirms that. Second, there's a profound shift occurring in the structure of employment. The loss of industrial employment within the metropolitan region has been quite profound. Industrial employment has been replaced by private service employment and, more recently, by public service employment.

As a social planner I hold a different perspective on the housing issue than others might have. I will not deal with issues of production and issues associated with the allocation of uses in a formally induced framework. In this mature region with these changing factors, we have to remember the enormous diversity of households that we're dealing with. From a social standpoint we don't have a simple set of community structures made up of adults and children, some single people and some elderly. We have a community, particularly in Metropolitan Toronto, where households are becoming remarkably diverse. In fact there is no one prototype household which we can say characterizes the community. This is where social complexity comes in, because the more diverse the community, the more complex the contending interests. For example, households with children 0–18 years of age are now a minority of households. This is not the case in all areas but it is the case in most municipalities within Metro, although it is probably not true out in the regions. To be raising children in most parts of Metropolitan Toronto is not a mainstream or majority household activity. The number of solitary person households has grown, as most of you know. In Metro as a whole one out of five households, and in some parts of the Region, perhaps two out of five households are composed of people living on their own. We have increasing numbers of elderly who live on their own. We have a growing proportion of single-parent households. One out of every five households with children is, in fact, a single-parent household. These are composed of adults in solitary adult living arrangements with dependent children.

So the kind of households and the users of housing have to be remembered. A common feature of these household changes is that they tend to introduce greater dependency by the household on the physical and social resources of the surrounding area. The notion of household self-sufficiency that was associated with the prototypical post-war family household is clearly breaking down. In the metropolitan region, up to 60% of two-parent families with kids have both parents in the labour force. Here again we see an increased dependence on the surrounding environment.

A Crisis in Distribution

We also have a distribution crisis, in my judgment, because of this complexity. The distribution crisis has to do with the differential capacity of adult households with children and adult households of the same income, but without children, to purchase housing in today's market. That's a dimension that has not been examined seriously. At the Social Planning Council we have looked quite closely at family budgeting issues. To use the terminology "rich" "middle income" and "poor" is to be back 20 years ago in a set of social images that are losing their significance. To have a $40,000 or $45,000 household income is not a significant indicator of the ability to consume. There are horizontal issues. If your $40,000–$45,000 household is composed of two adults with no children, your capacity to consume and to alter discretionary expenses is quite staggering relative to the capacity of a $40,000–$45,000 household with two or three children. The distinction between these two groups in terms of differential ability to consume existing housing is quite significant but has yet to be spelled out, at least in English Canada. That is why I become very suspicious of the notion that we have a housing crisis. In my judgment, we don't have a housing crisis if the question is one of availability of stock. We don't have a housing crisis in a universal sense. The crisis is most acute for that minority of households composed of adults who are attempting both to raise children and to enter the home ownership market. It's a distribution crisis.

Of course we have the other distribution crisis arising from the young-old situation. We have an increasing amount of ground level housing in the community occupied by one or two older adults. We face painful social questions about legitimate sets of entitlements. To what extent should public policy reinforce the principle that people should be able to spend their older years in housing to which they have important social and emotional attachments, and to what extent should public policy encourage a recycling process, with preferential emphasis on adult households with young children.

The distribution crisis makes political decision making quite difficult. It's not just a question of the rich giving to the poor because the notion of those who are fairly secure relative to those who are not secure is becoming more complex. It encompasses the issue of distribution between the young and the old and, within the middle income group, between those with children and those without children. Those issues can only be addressed if there is willingness to give these social factors much greater emphasis than has been the case so far.

The Costs of Sprawl

In addition to questions of equity, there are also questions of overall public cost. If we allow what is currently occurring to continue; that is, if we allow a new generation of sprawl to take care of the distribution issue, then we are introducing a significant set of public dilemmas. We now have 40–45% of ground level housing in parts of Metropolitan Toronto being consumed by one or two adults and significant numbers of public schools being closed. Thus, there is a public cost in solving our distribution issues by allowing major new developments to occur outside Metro. In a time of scarce public resources, when the government can't sustain a health system and a post-secondary educational system, should it be investing in new schools, new libraries, new community centres and new and very costly commuter systems?

I think that the issue of housing is really the issue of coming to grips with urban form. It's coming to recognize that intensification is a vital issue. Very often the groups for whom intensification might be critical — the solitary elderly, the de-institutionalized single parent family, the two paycheque families with kids — are probably the least articulate when it comes to the political process. My perspective is that we shouldn't talk about new political structures and new levels of coordination because without the social consensus and the public will, these structures will be hard-pressed to act effectively. What's important is that new sets of constituents become involved in the question of regional development.

Part of our work at the Social Planning Council has been to say to people who have traditionally been outside the political debates that they have as much right to be part of those debates as do producer groups and land use professionals. The groups that we refer to are family agencies, child welfare groups, school boards. These people have as much to say about the nature of redevelopment and the principles that ought to guide redevelopment and determine public policies with respect to housing as do the traditional groups that played a major role in the mid and late '50s in managing the growth of this community.

Social Housing in Peel Region

Peter Smith
Director of Housing, Peel Non-profit Housing Corporation

Peel is what Mr. Comay would refer to as the "land to the west", but not all of us from Peel are wealthy. We don't live there because we want the sun in our eyes on the way to work and on the way home. But we do refer to it as the Peel-Centred Region.

The phenomenal growth that has occurred in the western part of Metropolitan Toronto was partly a result of the "pipe it" and "pump it" and "pave it" philosophy of the mid-'60s. It was the Provincial government that put in the South Peel Servicing Scheme. The big sewer that Mr. Comay referred to as travelling east and west across the northern boundary of Toronto also went from the lake north through Peel. It services the whole area of Erin Mills, Meadowvale and part of Bramalea. So that major Provincial decision in the early '60s and its implementation in the mid-'60s accounts for the growth that we've seen in Peel Region since it was established in 1974. That growth resulted in over 55,000 new residential units, or about 11.2% of the total residential starts in the Province of Ontario, between 1974 and 1980. During the latter few years of that period, that percentage increased to almost

17% of the total residential unit starts in Ontario. We accounted for over 40% of the residential construction starts in the greater Toronto Region during that period. The population of Peel by the end of this year will probably exceed 500,000. Whereas Metro planners way back when were predicting 500,000 for the whole suburban area, that figure is being realized this year in Peel alone.

Housing-Related Activities in Peel Region

You're probably aware that Peel consists of ten local municipalities put into three: the City of Mississauga, the City of Brampton and the more rural Town of Caledon. The regional government came into effect in January 1974. One of the first decisions of the Peel Regional Council was that the Region of Peel would not do an Official Plan until the area municipalities had completed their plans. That was a fairly controversial decision and obviously not one that the Provincial government liked. The local Councillors representing the three municipalities felt, however, that it was the only way they could live with this new beast that they were confronted with.

Two of the most important initiatives taken in the Region of Peel in its seven or eight year history have been in the area of social development, addressing the kinds of things that Marvyn Novick talked about, and in the area of housing policy and the implementation of housing production targets. One of the big decisions taken by the Regional Council after it decided not to prepare an Official Plan was the decision that housing should be coordinated at the regional level. In 1975, with the support of the Provincial government, it set up the Region of Peel Housing Task Force. This included members from the area municipalities, the Provincial government, the Urban Development Institute and the cooperative housing sector. For two years that group prepared a long term strategy for the Region of Peel with respect to the production of housing and the provision of low- and moderate-income housing. It attempted to address the question that has come up at least three of four times this morning — the question of "fair share". In 1977, it issued a set of reports that were in basic agreement with the work being done at that time for the Metro Planning Department by Don Richmond's group. The Task Force agreed that Peel had not in fact taken its fair share of assisted or low- or moderate-income housing. One of the major recommendations of that set of reports in 1977, therefore, was that Peel establish a non-profit housing corporation with the goal of providing affordable accommodation. It also recommended a strategy with respect to participation in other government-assisted programs such as the infamous AHOP programme, ARP, HOME and so on, as well as a more balanced approach to the provision of non-assisted housing that would appeal to the low- and moderate-income group. The report also said that the Region should coordinate the housing research being done by the planners in the three area municipalities and should work as closely as possible with the surrounding regional governments.

As I indicated, the Housing Task Force Report clearly showed that Peel had not taken its "fair share". George Fallis indicated that the Regions had less than 5% of the assisted housing in 1975 but that he didn't know what had happened since then. It's my job to tell you what has happened. The Non-Profit Housing Corporation started to do its work in 1978. It operated under Section 15 and subsequently under Section 56:1 of the National Housing Act, "The Provision of Non-Profit Housing". We did one project in 1978, and some people in the region probably thought that would be the end. It was a nice little Senior Citizens project that did not create much community opposition. Things have changed in the last few years. In the last two years Peel has produced more housing under the Federal non-profit housing program than any other municipality in the country, and that includes the City of Toronto. Today we have 2300 units in operation, under construction, in development or at the planning stage. We're nowhere near the size of Metro Toronto or the City of Toronto, or the City of Ottawa for that matter, but we've made more use of the existing non-profit housing programme, and I think we have been pressured to make more use of it, than any of those jurisdictions. Because of that big sewer that went in in the 1960s, we've had land available. That hasn't been the case in Toronto.

A Second Housing Authority

Along the way, Peel decided it would take a shot at Ontario Housing. We were fortunate, for whereas Metro has Finch and Rexdale-Islington, Peel has no history of massive concentrations of Ontario Housing Corporation projects. There is very little public housing in Peel. What public housing there is has been provided through the private assisted rental program, whereby assisted rental units were included in private apartment buildings. In the whole Region of Peel we have two family public housing projects, both of them very small. One is in Brampton and one is in Mississauga. So there wasn't really a history of public housing opposition or community concern. In fact most of the public housing projects that have been

developed have been for seniors, and were built by the smaller communities that preceded regional government. They were Port Credit OHC, or Streetsville OHC, or Bolton, or Caledon East, as opposed to the region and the province. So they were local projects that were accepted within the community.

When we decided to take on OHC, the Province was in the process of trying to establish a local authority in Peel to complete its portfolio across the province. We resisted, saying that the Region of Peel was in a position to assume responsibility for administering that portfolio. We did not win that battle so we now have a housing authority. There are efforts underway to bring the two bodies together and perhaps in a couple of years the two organizations will be one and the same.

How the Corporation Operates

The basic philosophy of our corporation is that there should be no impact on the local tax base. Municipalities shared the financial cost of the earlier public and assisted housing programs but in 1980 the local 7 1/2% share of operating deficits was eliminated. So we have no impact on the tax base. All the costs of our operations are charged directly to the corporation and returned through federal subsidy or through rents. We have one other basic principle, and I think it may be unique in the country. The only other non-profit corporation that comes close to sharing our philosophy is Greater Vancouver. We believe that the private sector is in a better position to produce the housing than we are and that by and large we should use the expertise of that sector. What we use is the proposal call. I know it's difficult to do this in the City of Toronto because land is scarce and there are particularly unique problems, but land isn't that scarce in Peel and there has been a fair amount of construction activity. Not only did we feel that the private sector is best able to produce these units, but it keeps that sector working. I think production has been so high in the last couple of years because we have taken that role.

Our corporation has been self-financing since early 1980. We produced $40,000,000 worth of housing last year and our projected capital budget for this year is $49,000,000. The targets that we work toward were developed out of a joint provincial/regional study — a major needs study — completed in 1980. It identified the need for roughly 12,000 units in the region. Our waiting list indicates an immediate serious need for over 1250 rent-geared-to-income units in the Region of Peel. There is no way that we can produce that many this year.

Liaison with Governments

One of the positive aspects of regional government in Peel has been the support given to the housing corporation by the three area municipalities. With the support of those municipalities we see a stronger role for the corporation in the future. A major problem is the interest rate situation, which is forcing us to try to respond to needs that we can't possibly meet. There's also a problem with the program itself. I don't see how the federal government can continue to fund this program because of the massive subsidies involved, not only for those on rent-geared-to-income but for those receiving or paying the so-called low-end-of-market rents. Because the program is "market driven", we are housing people whom the program was never intended to house. The low-end-of-market rents that we must ask of 75% of the tenants in some of our projects are in excess of $650.00 a month.

What we find is that our program is serving two types of people. It is serving that part of the community that Mr. Comay mentioned earlier this morning — those on Family Benefits, General Welfare Assistance, and single-parent families earning less than $6,000 a year. Then we're serving families paying low-end-of-market rents with average incomes way in excess of $18,000 a year. We are serving virtually no one in between. In conjunction with Metro, the City of Toronto and the City of Ottawa, we are battling the Province and the Federal government about the definition of this new "market" program. We are doing it both individually and collectively, and perhaps that attests to cooperation among the regions. We're also doing it through the Association of Municipalities of Ontario. Our biggest concerns are not with inter-regional cooperation but with problems and conflicts that result from the difference between the provincial interpretation of this program and the local interests in it. We also see impending doom at the federal level because at this very moment CMHC is undertaking a national review of the non-profit housing program.

The Scope of Housing Needs

The basic issue for the future is that we cannot possibly satisfy the needs of all low- to moderate-income families in the Region of Peel. We could lose those people because, as happened in the early 1970s, people in search of accommodation will be searching places other than Peel. I don't think that accommodation is available in Metro either. I think we have a serious national economic problem. Present financial positions and policies allow the private sector to have virtually no involvement in the

production of rental housing. That's a very serious problem, as I realized when I looked at the report of the Commissioner of Building and Development for the City of Mississauga, issued in early February. It indicated that the dollar value of residential construction starts in January of this year had exceeded the dollar value of industrial starts for the first time in Mississauga's history. It also showed that the Peel Non-Profit Housing Corporation accounted for 95% of the dollar value of construction starts in the City of Mississauga. We thought in 1976 and 1977 that we would be focusing on a fairly small part of the market with particularly serious problems — those persons who are not being served by private sector initiatives. Primarily we were looking at senior citizens and handicapped persons. We have moved to a position where, in 1981, we accounted for 20% of all rental construction in the Region of Peel. We accounted for 52% of all the assisted housing built in the Region last year. That 20% has to be looked at in light of the fact that the M.U.R.B. (Multiple Unit Residential Buildings) program, which was cancelled at year end, accounted for an incredible amount of activity in the last few months of 1981. Despite all that activity, we were still taking a 20% share of the market. I think that is a sad comment on the economy, and certainly on what is happening in Peel. Unless there are changes in the initiatives provided by, and to, the private sector, I foresee that we will be producing 50% of the rental housing in the region by the end of this year, and I think that is inappropriate.

"Fair Share" Not the Real Issue

My final comment is with respect to fair share. I think it is fair to say that Peel hasn't addressed all the issues (transportation, employment, etc.) that were raised in the Metro planning studies of the early 1970s, but we have taken the statement about "fair share" in the provision of low and moderate income housing seriously. I think our efforts over the last three or four years indicate that Peel is prepared to accept its "fair share". It has done so not only in the various kinds of assisted programs, but in the HOME program and AHOP as well. As I have indicated, the provision of assisted housing in our community is proportionately far greater than it is in Metropolitan Toronto. That is a real problem for Metro but it is not one that has been created by, or can be solved by, regional governments. The problem is a federal one, and results from the inability of any kind of private rental housing corporation to function in this country during the present period.

Patterns of Housing Development in the Toronto-Centred Region

Peter Tomlinson,
Manager, Policy Section,
City of Toronto Planning & Development Department

The housing stock in the Toronto Region, as in other growing metropolitan areas, is expanding as a result of two processes. First, there is redevelopment and infill within the existing perimeter of settlement. Second, there is expansion of the outward movement of the perimeter itself. The normative question I would like to address concerns the optimal balance between these two forms of expansion.

I think this question becomes increasingly relevant as the results of the 1981 Census become available. We now know on a preliminary basis that between 1976 and 1981 the growth in households within Metro was 53,260 while in the Toronto Region outside Metro the growth in households was 89,675. Of the growth within Metro, about half (26,780) was in Scarborough, where first-time development still predominates. If one assumes that roughly 20,000 of the Scarborough units represent development by expansion of the perimeter of settlement, we would have totals of about 33,000 additional households via redevelopment, 110,000 via outward expansion.

These figures, while not in themselves indicative of imbalance, provide a starting point for discussion of

whether or not there may be departure from optimality. One possible answer is that the observed pattern is optimal because this is a market response. The demand is for ground-oriented single residences, and the simplest way of expanding the stock of that type of residence is through outward expansion of the perimeter of settlement rather than by redevelopment and infill.

Market Distortions

Before we agree to this possible answer, however, we have to recognize that what we see is not an undistorted market outcome. There are at least two distortions operating on the development of new housing, both of which are publicly imposed. As far as redevelopment and infill are concerned, there are restrictions on the supply of land available for residential redevelopment within the existing perimeter of settlement. Zoning by-laws regulate this supply, and I think everyone accepts the need for some such regulation to eliminate externalities or undesirable patterns of land use within the existing settled area.

The second distortion, consisting of restrictions on agricultural to residential land-use conversion, operates in the opposite direction. Its effect on the market is to slow the rate of outward expansion of the perimeter.

So the first distortion tends to bias the market toward sprawl, by limiting the supply of land for redevelopment and infill, and thus making the price of housing produced by that means higher. It tends to shift demand out to the fringe and create more sprawl than would otherwise occur. The second distortion tends to increase the price of land and housing on the fringe and to bias demand back toward new units created by infill and redevelopment.

The Role of Regional Planning

Now the economic theory of second best holds that when you're stuck with one distortion you should try to make your second distortion counteract it. You approximate the results of an ideal free market by counterposing these two distortions. I think this is the best regional planning can aim at. The ideal laissez-faire solution is simply not available to us unless we repeal all zoning by-laws and all proscriptions on land use both within Metro and in the outer regions. I don't think anyone is currently addressing the question of balanced controls on land supply both within the area of settlement and at the outer fringe, however. Only the Provincial government has the mandate to address that question. Each municipality has control over a piece of territory but it makes its decision without regard to what is happening elsewhere in the region.

The optimum balance of expansion is something we can only describe in very general, abstract terms. I think that we should be looking for a situation in which the next marginal expansion of the housing supply occurs where the excess of consumer benefit over social cost is greatest. It involves comparing what people are prepared to pay for redevelopment or infill housing as a measure of the satisfaction they get from it over the longer term, and the marginal cost of servicing it. The result of this comparison should then be related to the difference between the costs and benefits of outward expansion on the fringe of settlement. Wherever the excess of benefit over cost is greatest is where the housing should go. It should continue to go there until we have equality in the net economic benefit in both places and there should then be balanced expansion by both means, keeping that equality in effect.

The function of regional planning, which the Province should be undertaking, is to make sure we are not expanding the housing supply inappropriately in areas where the net social benefit is less than it would be if it were occurring somewhere else. I hope the Province will give increased attention to the need for appropriate balancing.

The issues at stake are significant. If we sit back passively and allow things to drift as they have been doing, the long-run implications may be very undesirable. There is strong demand now for single housing units, and it is being met in the outer regions. The long-run implications of over-developing that form of housing may become apparent, however, only after the last of the baby boom gets beyond the child-rearing years. After we have developed a large proportion of our housing stock in that form we may wish that we had instead expanded the housing stock more intensively by redevelopment and infill.

In conclusion, I believe that we should not be deluded into thinking there is any "market optimality" about development patterns as we see them today. They are just as much the result of uncoordinated bureaucratic regulation as they are of demand and supply. Ideal market solutions are unattainable to us. We have to simulate them by means of regional planning to counteract one set of distortions with another. I don't see that we're doing this at the present time, given the seeming lack of interest in regional planning at the Provincial level.

Discussion

QUESTIONER: I was interested in Mr. Novick's remarks about the inappropriate occupancy of ground-level housing by older and single adults. Has he given any thought to the sorts of carrots or sticks that might be used to free those homes for families?

MARVYN NOVICK: There are enormous complexities attached to that. It raises the question of how to increase supply within existing stock whereas we tend to think of increasing supply by the production of new units. I don't think the question can be discussed effectively at the individual municipal level. This question of redevelopment policies and redevelopment thinking should have been an integral part of Metroplan, and I suspect the professionals who prepared Metroplan were aware of that. But the political will wasn't there.

An example of the kind of thing that could be done is North York's present attempt to introduce a conversion by-law that would enable duplexing to occur. It would mean that, just as we propose to have fair share policies with respect to public housing, we would have fair share policies with respect to residential redevelopment, with respect to infill, with respect to questions of upgrading density levels. We have to look at the supply of publicly provided housing, we have to look at conversion, we have to look at small-scale apartment development. We have to recognize that the question of group home distribution is just the leading edge of a broader question relating to a form of housing that will become increasingly necessary — collective housing. There is increasing evidence that certain other population groups, like single parents and seniors, may find some form of congregate living preferable or desirable. We have to look at the structure of public subsidies to housing users, at who is getting those subsidies and why.

We also have to look at major questions like the orientation of new rapid transit development. The rapid transit schemes that are being hatched in Metro at the present time are fundamentally related to the question of housing stock. The waterfront line, and more particularly the Finch corridor line, are oriented toward sprawl. They're not designed to encourage and facilitate intensification. They will not be serving built-up areas where redevelopment might be promoted.

There are a range of policy issues that we could discuss. But political will is paramount. Political will emerges when many interests begin to talk about housing concerns and we no longer have the debate about what the market can do and what government can do. That's a silly, tired debate. In many instances it doesn't deal with reality, as Peter indicated. There are other groups that should be part of the housing debate today in Metro. Those groups haven't been heard. If they were as much a part of that debate as they were in the debate about group homes, we might be building a consensus for the kind of redevelopment framework that we don't have at present.

QUESTIONER: I have two questions. The first one is directed towards Professor Fallis. In your opening remarks you alluded to the bureaucratic cost of housing at the various levels of government. Do you think these costs could be reduced or controlled and efficiency increased if housing were centred in one particular government — for example, the provincial government?

My second question is directed towards Peter Tomlinson. You alluded to the idea that housing policy should aim to maximize social benefits. In the City of Toronto, luxury condominiums are the only units being built. Do you see that as a problem, given the fact that the vacancy rate in the city of Toronto is 3% and there is very little rental accommodation being built?

PROFESSOR FALLIS: I'm somewhat uncertain about what part of my opening remarks you are referring to. I think housing costs could be reduced very slightly by allocating responsibility to a single level of government, in the sense of getting rid of a few civil servants, but I don't think that allocation of responsibility to a single agency would be very wise politically. Although we hear a lot about intergovernmental strife and problems of getting together and so on, I think there are great benefits in having many avenues through which to express our public demands and our discontents. On balance, I don't think we would be well served by trying to allocate responsibility to a single level of government. The cost saving in terms of having fewer civil servants would be minor in relation to the average price of a dwelling unit.

MR. TOMLINSON: Our department has been criticized a number of times for rolling out the red carpet for luxury condominium developers in the downtown core. It's certainly true that our downtown plan has facilitated the development of this form of housing. Of course it's commonly remarked that the social needs are for rental housing, especially moderately-priced rental housing. But

we have come to the view that if we did not accommodate the existing demand for luxury housing in the downtown with new construction, that demand might result in even greater pressure on the older rental buildings than we now have. There is considerable pressure to convert these to luxury rental accommodation or to condominiums. The more the demand for high-priced housing is satisfied by new construction on what used to be parking lots in the commercial areas of the city, the less you have to satisfy it by means that result in the loss of moderately-priced housing. We certainly have plenty of luxury conversions of lower-priced buildings going on in the city. I don't want to do anything that would result in even more of that.

QUESTIONER: I'd like to ask Mr. Novick where taxes fit into this. There has been recent controversy about tax assessments in the City of Toronto, for example, but people in condominium townhouses on the outskirts of Scarborough feel they get very little in the way of services compared with what people get for the taxes they are paying on older homes in the City of Toronto. Where does market value assessment fit in?

MR. NOVICK: The issue of fair market value assessment is part of the distribution question, and it's a very tough one. In principle, we ought to move to market value assessment and provide targeted subsidies to those users where there is a demonstrated public interest to do so. But we haven't got the political will and ability yet to face the subsidy issue because everybody's screaming that they are going to be hurt by market value assessment. There are some groups that are inconvenienced. There are painful public policy issues concerning differentials in entitlement to the subsidy among single adults, older adults living alone in a six or seven room home and adults with dependent young children. We can't deal with those issues until we bring them to the surface and discuss them in a way that will allow some form of political judgment to occur. Within the current framework we become paralyzed, we duck away wherever these painful social questions begin to emerge.

QUESTIONER: One of the frustrating problems of being involved on the board of City Home is a conflict between governments that is somewhat hidden. This has to do with the new federal government program which, as Peter Smith suggested, dictates how you may charge rents and to whom and under what circumstances. It allows virtually no flexibility to administer the program in a way that will reach that inner range of low-income earners. You must either do one thing or the other and the middle is left blank. As I perceive it, that is a result of the way the federal government devises subsidies for public housing. It seems to me that the most senior level of government, the one that knows least about local issues, is establishing a seriously distorted policy for local governments to deal with.

MR. SMITH: I couldn't agree more. Certainly that's the effect of the program that's now in place. I understand that is not the program that was debated and worked out at the senior level at CMHC. I guess we're dealing with a program that was politically acceptable.

The program provides a subsidy down to a certain mortgage interest rate, and allows the provinces to administer the program. Part of the reason for the new program in 1978 was to disentangle governments. We are now disentangled from the federal government but we are terribly entangled with the provincial government. When you cross the country you find that some cities have been able to deal with the CMHC program in an effective way. I think Vancouver has dealt with it. Probably Vancouver has been able to deal with it because the Province of British Columbia has no input whatsoever into the program. Vancouver has been able to deal directly with CMHC. They take a huge subsidy pool and spread it through the projects.

The Provincial piggyback onto this program in Ontario appears to be an unlimited subsidy pool. That is the way the brochures are written up. They tell the municipality to get involved in this program because the feds will write down the mortgage to 2%, and that if you ever have any deficits the Province will cover them. So it appears to be an open-ended program for the municipalities and it appears that the Province is being fairly generous.

There are some Provincial people here writing notes. That's fine. You've heard me say this before. There is only the appearance of generosity. The real problem is not so much the fact that CMHC has decided that the low-end-of-market rent must reflect the low end of rents for comparable projects in the area; it's the way the policy is being administered by the Ontario government. They have severely restricted the federal definition of low-end-of-market rent. There is an implicit drive in the province to increase those rents on an annual basis for one purpose only — to reduce or eliminate provincial involvement in the program. Increasing the rents at or near or even above the inflation rate, particularly in family projects, guarantee

that there will be no provincial subsidy. We end up, then, housing the well-to-do and the very poor. Seventy-five percent of our people are well-to-do and 25% are people whom even OHC didn't intend to house in the first place. Or it didn't think they were there in those numbers. So federal constraints on the program pose a problem, but the way the program is administered, particularly in Ontario, adds another dimension to the problem. The Province decided to get a lot of P.R. out of the program and pay very little for it.

PROFESSOR FALLIS: I have just one comment about the previous speaker's idea that this program was imposed by the higher level of government, to illustrate the policy conflict that I alluded to in my introduction. The speaker perceives this policy as an imposition from the highest level of government. If one looks at the evolution of the policy historically, however, one finds that it was a response to a locally expressed social planning concern. The policy was designed as it was because of the desire to mix tenants by income class, and to let the local housing authority decide on income mix. After the policy came forward, market rents surged upward. In order to subsidize your low-income people, therefore, you have to bring in people of higher and higher incomes. This policy was the outcome of the interaction of all levels of government, not simply an expression of CMHC's own view of the world.

I must make one concluding comment and steal the last word. I agree completely with Marvyn Novick that the issue is political will. I think we're at a critical point in the evolution of our welfare state in terms of our commitment to the disadvantaged. I don't think the most important thing we should do now is to try to find complex new paradigms in which we define the $45,000 a year couple with two children as being somehow in need, or in which cooperative housing projects for families earning $28,000 a year get subsidies that are far higher than a public housing unit subsidy. There is a widespread public belief that the solution to our economic problem is to restrict the size of government and stop redistributing income. In response, our highest priority must be to take care of the neediest first. That means less housing of the co-op type, because if you scratch that program you will find that a lot of the subsidy is going to moderate-and-high-income people. If we get into these complex paradigms and find that $45,000 a year people need government help, we will not take care of the neediest first.

MARVYN NOVICK: George, it confirms my view that people with a market perspective abhor complexity.

The Region Today II: Inter-Municipal Coordination

Regional Information Systems Committee

Katharine Bladen
Senior Planner, Economic
Regional Municipality of Peel

I want to comment on two points made by Professor Comay. First, he suggested that nobody has done half decent population projections since the late 1950s. At the risk of sounding parochial, I'll point out that Peel Region's population projection for 1981 differs by less than 1% from the interim population counts that have come out of Statistics Canada in reporting on the results of the Census of Canada. Second, Professor Comay said that Metro planners were very far out in their employment projections. Frankly, since there is little or no employment data available to start projecting from, it is not surprising that their projections were so far out.

My remarks this morning deal with a Committee that hopes to overcome some of the deficiencies in information available to planners in the Greater Toronto Region. I intend to cover several aspects of that topic — what the Committee is, why it was formed, a little bit about its accomplishments to date and what it intends to do in 1982.

First, what is the Regional Information Systems Committee (RISC)?

RISC is an intergovernmental group focusing on the development of data banks and information systems for regional planning, taken in its broadest sense. RISC's membership is made up of representatives from the planning departments of Metro Toronto and the Regions of Durham, York, Peel, Halton, Hamilton-Wentworth, Haldimand-Norfolk, Niagara and Waterloo and representatives from senior levels of government: the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Revenue, the Ministry of Treasury and Economics, Statistics Canada and CMHC. There are also representatives from the City of Toronto Planning Department and the Region of Ottawa-Carleton who come as observers. In October, 1975, this committee adopted a position paper that outlines two objectives: 1) to design, develop and maintain a regional information system, and 2) to act as the medium for an official interchange of information and ideas both inter- and intra-regionally and between regional governments and the appropriate agencies of the provincial government.

Why was RISC formed?

Professor Comay has explained that Metro originally had responsibility for a planning area that was somewhat larger than the actual boundaries of Metro Toronto. With the establishment of regional governments in southern Ontario, Metro planners lost the ability to collect and maintain data bases for the areas beyond Metro's borders. The rapid expansion of urban areas adjacent to Metro continued to have a significant impact on transportation and land-use planning within Metro Toronto, however. This is the commuting area that Professor Comay talked about. At about the same time — in 1970 — the property assessment function was returned to the Province. The Regions of York, Durham and Peel were unable to gain access to the same files that Metro used for its basic data — that is, to the Standard Assessment System (SAS) files of the Ministry of Revenue. As a means of addressing the need to develop a common information system, to support planning research and to monitor urban growth on an inter-regional basis, Gerry Nuttall, then Assistant Director of the

Research Division in the Metro Planning Department, convened a meeting of representatives of the planning departments of Durham, York, Peel, Halton and Metro. The outcome of this meeting was the establishment of the Regional Information Systems Committee.

What has RISC accomplished?

I have time for only a brief summary. In 1977, RISC prepared a manual detailing the full range of data elements the Committee intended to look at. As a result, RISC successfully negotiated with the Ministry of Revenue to gain access for the regions to the computer-based SAS files. In 1978, RISC prepared a brief to the Federal government on the need for a full and comprehensive Census of Canada in 1981, including detailed sub-municipal data on place of work related to place of residence. The transportation planners that are here today all know how important those data are to assist in analyzing commuting patterns. In December 1978 RISC drafted a brief to the Ministry of Housing, asking for financial support for the development of a regional information system based on the Ministry of Revenue SAS files. The Ministry of Housing agreed to pay 70% of the cost. In 1978, RISC also developed a land-use activity classification system for use in identifying types of employment at place of work. This system was further refined in 1981 in a bid by RISC to have it used by provincial assessors. In 1979, RISC prepared specifications for the writing of computer programs to create the regional information system, hired a consultant and supervised the successful completion of the project by October 1980. In September 1980, RISC prepared a brief to the Ministry of Revenue requesting that the provincial assessors who were already in the field be assigned responsibility for collecting employment data at the place of work. In 1981, RISC prepared a Manual on Monitoring for use by local government organizations concerned with ever-increasing demands for services in the face of limited financial resources.

People have often asked, *"How influential is RISC?"* and I have had to answer, "Not very". We simply do not have the political base to be effective. We have accomplished some things, however, that are very basic for those who work in regional and municipal planning. In Peel, for example, I can now tell you how many occupied and how many unoccupied or vacant units there are. Until 1980 I could only tell you how many assessed units there were but not how many households living in how many occupied units. Thus we could not arrive at such a simple ratio as persons per unit — a ratio that provides a basis for calculating new population in new development areas and calculating the lot levies that form a significant portion of the municipal revenue base. These two calculations play a major part in arguments made before the Ontario Municipal Board on a wide range of matters. In the OMB hearing that is going on right now, concerning the issue affectionately known as "Store Wars", a great deal of the argument centres on how many persons there now are in the houses in District 9 in Etobicoke and elsewhere and how many there are going to be in the same areas in 1986 and beyond. The persons per unit yield is the basic data element being used in the estimation of the retail market available to support the development of new shopping centre facilities. Having the RISC system in place has improved the data available to regional and municipal planners for such exercises.

What are the directions for RISC in 1982?

First, we're going to do what Mr. Comay suggests regional planners haven't done very well — develop population and housing forecasts on an inter-regional basis. We know that significant changes have occurred in the urban structure of Southern Ontario and the Toronto-Centred Region, yet no joint forecasting has been carried out since the ill-fated COLUC exercise of the mid-1970s. RISC has decided to carry out a joint forecasting effort using the Metro model at MTC to produce a population projection which will provide a basis for forecasting housing demand for each region. In addition, we will endeavour to develop a land use model that will allow us to forecast housing supply for each region in order to assess the short-falls in the market and the need for socially assisted housing.

We also intend to prepare a position paper on the need for population and employment data. In the summer of 1981 the Ministry of Revenue, in a push to cut costs, made three decisions that impact heavily on the work of RISC and everyone involved in urban analysis. The Ministry cancelled the 1981 comprehensive enumeration of households which it had carried out in the past on an annual basis. The Ministry prepared legislation to limit the enumeration of households to election years only; that is, every three years. The Ministry also rejected the RISC brief asking that provincial assessors collect employment data. At the same time there is already some question as to whether the Federal Government will be willing to carry out a Census of Canada in 1986 and a comprehensive census in 1991. In each case, diminished financial resources is the stated culprit for cutting back on comprehensive data

collection. RISC sees a real need to state the case of those working in local government organizations who are expected to have the comprehensive data available, on a sub-municipal basis, for a wide variety of planning, monitoring and programming activities. We are currently preparing a position paper which we intend to circulate widely. We will solicit formal support from as many organizations, agencies and individuals as possible. I invite everyone here to join us in this effort.

The Toronto-Centred Transportation and Planning Coordinating Committee

Ian C. Campbell
Executive Director, Policy Planning and Research Division,
Ontario Ministry of Transportation and Communications

Introduction

This morning I shall discuss a recent co-operative provincial-municipal response to urban growth and change; the Toronto Centred Transportation and Planning Coordinating Committee. I intend to discuss the role of the committee by reviewing its objectives, membership, activities, and, in broad terms, its future.

Background

Before getting into the committee's role it is necessary to establish the historical context and to review the role of both the provincial and municipal governments in dealing with urban growth and change.

Our review starts in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a time when we thought we had unlimited prospects in Canada, in Ontario and particularly in the Toronto region. We had a very healthy economy and rapid growth, which were symbolized by a constantly changing skyline in downtown Toronto. A basic problem in that period was how to accommodate and absorb the growth in an orderly and efficient manner, giving particular emphasis to the needs of future generations. Urban development was starting to reach Metro Toronto's outer boundaries and to spill into the surrounding municipalities, particularly to the west.

The Province recognized that the solutions were beyond the ability of individual municipal governments. It therefore adopted a positive role, through the creation of the Toronto Centred Region Concept. The TCR concept incorporated several principles, including:

- two tiers of physically distinguishable urban structure around the lakeshore with an open space/utility corridor as a separator between the tiers and communities;
- balanced growth around Metro;
- special emphasis on growth outside lakeshore communities, with a focus on communities such as Barrie in the north and Port Hope/Cobourg in the east;
- self-sufficient, employment-generating communities which would optimize internal travel requirements.

The inception of the TCR concept and its policies preceded two events, one institutional and the other economic, which influenced its application.

In the mid-1970s the Province created a series of regional municipalities to deliver certain basic municipal services in the Toronto-Centred Region, using Metropolitan Toronto as a model. It made planning a responsibility of the new, autonomous regional governments so that they would be responsive to local wishes and conditions. This represented a shift from centralized coordination and control.

This shift was occurring in parallel with changes in social and economic conditions. The 1970s saw a lowering of population forecasts for Ontario. Economic growth slowed down in Ontario and throughout the Western World, reducing pressures on the existing urban structure. The 1970s also saw higher energy costs and higher interest rates. Governments realized the need to maximize the use of their current investments, particularly to optimize the use of road, transit, railway and air facilities.

Many of the changes had a particular impact on Metropolitan Toronto. Its population stabilized while the surrounding regions continued to experience rapid growth. Its job base was changing as manufacturing jobs moved outwards, increasing the importance of the commercial and service sectors in Metropolitan Toronto. There was an increasing separation of home and work locations, placing added pressure on existing transportation facilities. As a result cross boundary travel grew rapidly on both the road and the transit systems. This travel contained the potential for conflict among various municipal governments. An effective response to cross boundary travel needs requires coordination and cooperation among the various participants. It has also required specialized institutional arrangements, such as special subsidies for cross boundary transit and the development and expansion of GO services.

Formation of the Committee

By 1980 there was increasing recognition that future growth would be limited and that inter-municipal competition to attract this growth was increasing. Municipalities also recognized that the Province should have a leadership role in economic and regional development and that a form of cooperation in developing long term strategies was required. Representative of this view was the Metropolitan Toronto report entitled *Regional Transportation Policies: Long Term Issues*, which had three basic recommendations:

1) that Metropolitan Toronto prepare its own preferred position regarding inter-regional land use and transportation development;

2) that the Province be asked to take a lead role in addressing the issues of inter-regional land use and transportation development;

3) that an inter-regional policy committee be established with provincial involvement and staff assistance.

The Ministry of Transportation and Communications responded that the Province would be prepared to assume a constructive and prominent role if Metro and the surrounding jurisdictions supported the concept. The result was the formation of the Toronto Centred Transportation and Planning Coordinating Committee as a cooperative effort, at a senior staff level, to deal with issues and problems of mutual concern.

In a decade we have come almost full circle, therefore, in terms of the provincial role vis a vis regional development. An important difference is that we are now facing the difficulties of low growth, not the difficulties of unlimited growth.

Committee Objectives

The committee was formed in the spring of 1981 as an informal mechanism to pursue two basic objectives:

1) to develop a better understanding of the various issues related to the coordination of transportation and land use planning;

2) to provide for coordination in Regional Planning and Provincial investments or spending in the Metropolitan Toronto Area and its surrounding regions.

The Committee also aimed to incorporate into its work the relevant problem-solving experiences of its members. It did not see as a worthwhile objective the preparation of a policy plan for the area, but concluded instead that an informal committee structure, consisting of representatives of the various staffs involved, was the most satisfactory way to proceed. This did not preclude individual members of the Committee advising their respective political bodies of the Committee's deliberations, nor does it preclude the possibility of more direct political involvement when substantive issues have been identified and analyzed.

It should be clear from the objectives that the basic theme of the Committee is one of consultation and cooperation. It also recognizes, however, that participants may have significantly different viewpoints on some issues and that these should be respected. Full consensus is not expected on all matters.

The committee is composed of staff members from two Ministries — Transportation and Communications and Municipal Affairs and Housing — together with senior planning and transportation staff from the following municipalities: Metropolitan Toronto (inclusive of TTC representation), Durham, York, Peel, Halton, and Hamilton-Wentworth. It is co-chaired by an Assistant Deputy Minister from each of the two provincial Ministries.

Committee Work Program

During the past year the staff from the Ministries, in consultation with the Regional municipality representatives, has undertaken a work program focusing on three basic areas:

- *current Long Range Plans*, particularly as expressed in the policies, objectives, projections and assumptions of

existing Official Plans.

- *an assessment of the current position of each municipality* as expressed in current social, economic, land use, demographic trends and viewpoints, and the way these might translate generally into a spatial distribution of population and employment.
- *a current assessment of the transportation plans* of the area's providers of transportation services (roads and transit) and their degree of compatibility with the Long Range Plans of all municipalities and with each other.

This phase of the committee's work is currently nearing completion.

During the past year the committee has been able to identify and clarify several issues of material interest to its participants. These include the following:

- *the need for a regional planning perspective.* There is a need for a common perspective based on several potential or possible scenarios for the Toronto area. The perspective could serve as a general guide for the provision of future infrastructure planning and investment.
- *the future rate of development/economic growth.* Many plans were based on the early 1970s growth rate and economic conditions. Future growth rates are expected to be lower, although significant new infrastructure may be required in selected areas. The rate of growth will have a significant impact on the rate at which new infrastructure will be required.
- *the location of future employment.* There is not an adequate data base on present employment levels. This makes it very difficult to assess the growth of and potential locations for new employment opportunities, particularly for office/commercial/service jobs. There is a need to develop a good appreciation of future job locations in order to plan adequate transportation services. The committee is working towards resolving the present employment data gaps in a cooperative manner.
- *the coordination of transportation facilities/services.* Both Metro and MTC are reviewing future transportation needs in the Toronto area. Coordination of the planning/decision-making efforts is necessary at some level to ensure that the new services are compatible, not competitive, and to ensure coordination of land use/transportation planning.
- *review of inter-regional transit services.* Various operators such as GO, TTC and Mississauga or Markham Transit are providing inter-regional transit services. The present funding and planning of inter-regional services, although adequate, contains a number of gaps or inconsistencies. There appears to be a need to rationalize the overall provision of inter-regional transit services.

Future Role of the Committee

The Committee is beginning a review and assessment of its future function and role. The Provincial government, through MMAH and MTC, has provided leadership in the Toronto area by convening this Committee. The land use and transportation issues which sparked the Committee's inception remain but they have become more focused through the Committee's discussions. Thus, the Committee should soon be in a position to assess its future role. This assessment will likely include a review of both the Committee's mandate and its objectives, as seen by the various participants.

Summary

In summary, the Toronto Centred Transportation and Planning Coordinating Committee is a young, informal provincial/municipal body whose role is continuing to evolve. It reflects an increasing awareness by both the provincial and municipal governments that the best way to approach certain issues may be through a low-keyed, consultative and cooperative forum which respects the individuality of each partner.

Cooperation for Conservation

Alyson Deans
Planning Coordinator
Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority

I'll begin with a bit of philosophy, a little history and some practical information about how conservation authorities operate, with specific reference to the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority.

The sub-topic that I have been asked to address is a particularly appropriate one, for conservation authorities provide a cooperative forum for the provincial government and member municipalities to deal with conservation. The municipalities that lie within a watershed, which is the way the boundaries of conservation authorities are established, must meet and vote to petition the province to form a conservation authority. First you have to have local community interest in establishing a conservation authority, therefore, and then you must have local political support. Finally, you must have provincial approval for the authority to proceed. The rationale for this procedure relates to the funding of authorities. An authority receives provincial grants for its programs and is also able to levy its member municipalities. Obviously, you need political support before you establish that type of arrangement.

Jurisdiction of the Conservation Authority

The watershed defines the area of jurisdiction because the mandate of conservation authorities relates largely to water and water-related land management. The Metro Toronto and Region Conservation Authority is an amalgamation of four small authorities that were formed in this area, one as early as 1946, immediately after the adoption of the Conservation Authorities Act. The amalgamation of the four authorities, in 1957, was a direct result of the formation of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953. It occurred for several reasons. First, Metro was the major source of funds from the municipal levy because Metro had the largest share of population and tax revenue. Second, Metro was the downstream municipality and was the focus of the works that the authorities would be carrying out. At that time the hinterland was not developing very rapidly. Third, all of these authorities were levying Metro for funding for their individual projects, and there was some feeling that putting together the four small authorities would increase efficiency and economy by reducing the duplication in program provision. Fourth, the decision related to the way the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board was then constituted, for the new authority was given jurisdiction over a similar area as that assigned to the Planning Board.

When the Metro Authority was formed in 1957 there were 23 member municipalities — Metro plus 22 towns, villages and townships. In 1970, the Conservation Authorities Act was revised to reflect the province's regional government objectives and the Act now designates the member municipalities for an authority to be the regional municipalities, wherever they have been formed. We now have six member municipalities in the Metro Toronto region: Metro, parts of Peel, York, and Durham, and parts of the two townships of Mono and Adjala. From an operational point of view, that change has streamlined the authority's approval and levy process. It is much easier to discuss projects and budgets with six member municipalities than with 23.

Responsibilities

Conservation authorities coordinate Provincial/Municipal program interests. The mandate for all conservation authorities is set out in the Conservation Authorities Act. Section 20 states that an authority will establish and undertake a program to conserve, develop and manage natural resources other than gas, oil, coal and minerals. The actual programs which an individual authority implements within its area of jurisdiction depend largely on local initiative — on the local municipalities deciding that they have certain resource management problems that the conservation authority can address. Because municipalities define the extent to which an authority develops programs, one authority's watershed plan may have ten programs covering different resource management issues while another authority's plan may

have only three. Therefore, a conservation authority provides the opportunity to have resource management problems addressed on a watershed basis in cooperation with the provincial and municipal governments.

Conservation authorities provide an excellent forum for cooperation in that they bring together the municipalities within a watershed and they also bring the municipalities together with the provincial level of government. One of the problems that an authority may encounter, however, is a lack of coordination in land use planning within its region. The one instance where you find the regional municipalities getting together to discuss planning within their communities is in the technical liaison committees established to discuss major official plans. These committees bring together staff from interested provincial and regional groups. The problem with this type of forum is that each staff member comes as a representative of his or her own organization, to identify where the plan conflicts with their organization's programs and policies. There is no real opportunity to identify how the plans of neighbouring areas can complement one another.

As a resource conservation agency whose interests are not related to municipal boundaries, the Metro Authority is attempting to deal with upstream development in an area where the downstream lands are already urbanized. We perceive a need for more coordination in terms of looking at the way adjacent developments can complement one another, regardless of municipal jurisdiction.

Discussion

QUESTIONER: I'm addressing my question to Alyson Deans. Often municipalities receive proposals for development along the top of a river bank or on the slopes or in the valley. We anticipate that the Conservation Authority will uphold its policies and, lo and behold, we find that the Conservation Authority will be more receptive to that type of thing than the municipality would expect. The Conservation Authority gives permission. When the municipality says, "Well, we think that shouldn't occur, but it is under the jurisdiction of the Conservation Authority", we expect you to uphold your policies.

MRS. DEANS: The problem lies with the Conservation Authorities Act that is presently in force. What you are speaking of is the ability of the Authority to act under its "fill", "construction" and "alteration to waterways" regulations. These are permissive regulations, unfortunately. The regulations say that the Authority may permit or require a proponent to submit an application which we then have to judge according to certain defined criteria. The things that the Authority is attempting to protect by shoreline stability or protection of properties from flood or erosion damage can be overcome by certain techniques. If a developer can prove that these will be used, then, in many instances, the Authority has to give a permit. Our requirements are backed up by our watershed plan which has very specific policies in it. We are also circulating a revised fill regulation which addresses such issues as side slopes. We are asking municipalities to strengthen their planning control by having a look at open space zoning or other measures that would give them more control. Unfortunately or fortunately, depending on what side you're on, the private property owner does have certain rights and sometimes those include development rights. So the process is not perfect, but I think that in 99% of the cases the Authority has been able to achieve its overall goals and work cooperatively with municipalities, although there are exceptions.

QUESTIONER: A couple of this morning's topics seemed particularly appropriate to those of us who have come from the Region of Durham, because we probably came as far as anybody in this room — something like 40 miles — to get here. That turned out to be a trip of something like an hour and ten minutes because what appeared to be a minor traffic problem on the 401 was a major time delay. The costs of that in time and energy, when multiplied by thousands of commuters each day, must be horrendous. It is becoming evident that the amount of traffic being generated by the regions is increasing every year. We have the City of Toronto with increasing job opportunities and decreasing population, so obviously there is a need to move more people. My question is whether it is easier to spend public money to move people to jobs or move jobs to people?

MR. CAMPBELL: If we look to the future, I guess that we should aim to get jobs to people rather than people to jobs. At the present time we have a problem, however, and it's getting worse. Even though the cost of fuel and the cost of transportation are going up, there are still more and more cars being registered. I think it's growing by about 3% per year. There will be increasing automobile growth in the Toronto area. There will be smaller cars and lighter cars, but there will be more cars. There will also be more trucks, and they'll be bigger and heavier trucks. So the problem is enormous. I think this is why we have been asked to set up this committee — to address the problem of commuting between regions.

I don't think anybody knows how to influence land use, to influence developers, to place jobs where people are living. That is what the committee has to look at. One of the things that we are looking at, and here again it concerns the future, is how to substitute communications technology for transportation. The communications side of the Ministry is looking at that. We're in a new technological era, and this may encourage developers of industrial or commercial establishments not to seek to build close together. There is a tendency to want to build together so they can have an economic unit. Downtown Toronto is typical of that tendency. The commerce down there does spark more commerce and so on. Possibly we can influence that by substituting information flow for transportation flow and have an information network as well as a transportation network.

Otherwise it is the responsibility of the individual municipalities and regions to try to influence development more directly by zoning controls. At the present time municipalities seem to be encouraging development, and that could start a trend in the direction of job dispersal. How you influence developers and industry and commerce to go along is something that I can't deal with. It needs a cooperative effort by municipalities, by the provincial government and maybe by the private sector to achieve this.

The one thing I can say is that, because of the demand for and shortage of capital, Ontario cannot afford to put a lot more money into infrastructure. We are reaching the stage where the infrastructure is approaching maturity. We cannot built an extra lane here, an extra piece of highway there. The plans we have are mature. We have to do the best we can to optimize what we have by traffic management procedures and technology, and by trying to encourage people to use more transit and to commute by car pool and van pool, and so on. We are making a major effort to do these things to try to solve the present situation and hopefully to reduce congestion in the future.

I'm skating around this question because, frankly, I don't know. I haven't got the answers. Apart from substituting communications for transportation, the use of zoning, and the restrictions on travel imposed by the maturity of the highway and transit system, I think cooperation and coordination is the way to do it.

QUESTIONER: As a person who works for the Province, I'd like to respond partly to what Ian has said and partly to the previous question. I think that question is at the root of what we are here to talk about today — why the Province's attempts at regional planning haven't been successful and why we've got some of the problems we've got today.

If you go back to the early '70s when we had lots of economic growth, the Province tried to do regional-type planning where we told people where they could go or where we thought they should go and where they couldn't go. That wasn't nearly as successful as the planners thought it would be. We also had the kind of municipal planning that went on in the City of Toronto in the early '70s, the Central Area Plan which tried to put a cap on development in the centre of Toronto, and we've seen that that hasn't been successful. You aren't successful by telling people what they can't do.

The other side of that coin is that the Province has tried to be pro-active. We've tried to provide facilities, like the "big pipe" Eli Comay spoke of this morning, that make it easier for development to go where we'd like it to go. That was an attempt to decentralize both population growth and economic development away from Metropolitan Toronto to the regions to the north and to the east. There is lots of capacity up there in York and in Durham. People are going to York, but they are not going to Durham at the present time. I think the question was really asking why we don't have more jobs in Durham so more people would go there and fewer people would come to work in Metropolitan Toronto. The infrastructure's there, but the people aren't going there because you can't make people go and live where they don't want to live.

We do have tremendous growth taking place in the south end of York region, in Vaughan, the south end of Markham, the south end of Richmond Hill. We've got a lot of jobs being created, particularly in the south end of Markham and Vaughan. We've still got this commuting situation Eli Comay talked about this morning in connection with East York, where 85% of the people that work in East York do not live there. The same thing is probably true in the south end of Vaughan and Markham, where 85% of the jobs are being filled by people who commute from Metro and 85% of the people who live in Markham or Vaughan are still driving down into Metro.

So I don't see the solution to this problem as being the creation of jobs close to where people live. Obviously it's a good theoretical solution but I'm not sure it works in practice. People are going to commute as long as they own cars and decide they like to drive into the sun in the morning and the same in the evening. I don't know why they live where they do and work where they do, but I don't

believe that there are necessarily planning solutions to these types of problems.

Changed economic circumstances in Ontario today are certainly a major reason why provincial planning probably won't work. We'll take jobs wherever we can get them. We're not going to tell them they can't go to York in the hope that they will go to Durham because the chances are they will go to Germany or Illinois or some other places. Quite frankly, Ontario will take all the jobs it can get and if they want to go to Markham or Vaughan, or the City of Toronto for that matter, we're glad to have them there. We are getting a lot of growth in downtown Toronto today and it is creating problems for our transportation system, but I don't think any sane-minded planner or politician today is suggesting we should try to put a cap on what we are getting.

QUESTIONER: My question concerns the three provincial/municipal committees and the problem of accountability. I believe there is a sincere effort in the Province as a whole, and I'm not speaking only about the Provincial government, to come to grips with the problems of planning. But the chairman hit a chord when he raised the question of accountability. I'm not talking about political accountability: I'm talking about reason for existence. There is the Regional Information Systems Committee, there is a Regional Transportation Committee but, speaking as a person from one of the local municipalities, quite honestly until this morning I did not know they existed. I see the role of these provincial/municipal/regional committees to be to serve the people who live in the local municipalities. If the people who are running the local municipalities don't know you exist, you're going to have a hard time getting political support for your objectives.

One of the reasons why MTRCA is as well known as it is is because it gets out and beats the sticks. It lets people know it is there, perhaps sometimes too much so. But it is very important that we know what you're trying to do because we are the statistics, we're the people, we have the miles of roads and we're the commuters. That is one area you might look at in terms of meeting your objectives and helping us to meet ours.

MS. BLADEN: I can say that the area municipalities in Peel at least do know of RISC's work. The Town of Caledon and the City of Brampton are using the data that we are providing. On the other hand, part of our problem is that we still do not have clean data. That is part of what our position paper will address. I agree with you strongly that our problem is that we are not particularly visible and we are not particularly well understood.

I would like to comment briefly on the question from Durham. I believe that part of the problem is that the regions are so young. We aren't used to being regions, or large municipalities for that matter. But it seems to me that the dollars are going to have to go into economic development and the promotion of the municipalities' economic situation and structure. That is going to be a difficult area for cooperation because we are all going to be competing with each other for the straw. It doesn't make it easy to cooperate when you're in competition. The other thing is that I know from my experience in Peel that when businesses are thinking to invest in Ontario, they are not looking at Mississauga versus Brampton, and they probably aren't looking at Durham versus Peel. What they are looking at is Peel versus New York State, and that is an enormous problem to deal with.

The Region Today, III: Social and Community Services

The Toronto Urban Rim Study

Professor John Gandy
School of Social Work, University of Toronto

I want to use the Urban Rim Study to make some observations about the planning of human services, rather than to review its long list of recommendations and findings. Those received extensive publicity when the study was released.[1]

Rationale for the Study

The Social Planning Council conducted this study between 1977 and 1979. Although previous research had dealt with health services, educational services or social services, this study was the first comprehensive study of human services in Metro. As conceived by the Council, the purpose of the study was to assess the capacity of the Metro suburbs to adapt to new realities. It was really a challenge to "conventional wisdom" about the suburbs and to widely-held perceptions about the suburban population and suburban problems. An important outcome was that the report actually did heighten the awareness of elected officials about the large population in the suburbs whose human and social needs were not being met by existing services and service organizations.

On the basis of data collected especially for the study, as well as a re-analysis of existing data, the Council presented a convincing case that Metro and its suburbs had not, for the most part, developed services that were relevant to the needs of today's suburban residents. It pointed out that the services that did exist were branches of services located in the inner city — structural adaptations that were inappropriate and ineffective. The failure of both governments and the voluntary agencies to face up to changing realities and to develop programs related to these changes seemed to reflect both apathy and a lack of understanding of the demographic changes that have occurred in recent years in the suburbs. The study succeeded in documenting changes and in interpreting these to elected officials in both Metro and the suburbs.

The Political Response

The chairman has asked me about the response to the study. Among elected officials the initial response was one of rejection and an unwillingness to accept it. This changed to limited acceptance and some willingness to look at the findings and existing programs. The findings indicated a need for dramatic shifts in public priorities and planning to meet the needs that had emerged in the suburbs. The Social Planning Council called on Metro and the suburban municipalities to assume a leadership role in addressing economic and social needs. There were over a hundred recommendations calling for changes in public spending policies and the development of new planning capabilities and programs.

In most instances elected officials and the staff in Metro and the suburban municipalities reacted to the findings by reviewing their programs and responding to specific recommendations. Those responses may reflect the level of public interest generated by the report and the fact that it

[1] The Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto issued two reports on the study: *Metro's Suburbs in Transition. Part One. Evolution and Overview* (April 1979) and *Planning Agenda for the Eighties. Part Two: Metro's Suburbs in Transition* (September 1980). (Editor's note).

challenged much of the conventional wisdom about suburbia and its residents, however, rather than a conviction that there were problems requiring immediate and far reaching changes. The study's long term implications are less clear because of the period of severe financial restraints on funding social programs that followed shortly after the report's release.

One of the areas that was highlighted by the study is the need for a social planning capability that will be responsive to unexpected changes. We concluded that we do need to develop new responses if we aren't to have a repeat performance of what has happened in suburbia. My position is that resources devoted to any follow-up to the study should be divided between the implementation of specific recommendations and the development of new perspectives and practices in the planning of human services.

The Need for New Approaches

The study raised several social planning issues that Metro should address. It seems essential that the suburban municipalities have planning resources and capabilities that will enable them to make some input into the more centralized planning being done at the Metro and provincial levels. The study makes it clear that some services have to be planned at the local municipal level, others at the Metro level and others at the provincial level. It was clear that neither Metro nor the province is going to develop very effective planning mechanisms unless there are strong planning capabilities at the municipal level. Unless resources are provided to the suburbs, local planning will continue to represent resource management, with the narrow aim of deciding how expenditures are to be made — the approach that characterizes much of the social welfare planning done in Canada.

The study also made it clear that there needs to be a change in emphasis, away from planning which uses input measures such as the number of staff required or the projected client population, and toward planning that emphasizes output or the effectiveness of services. The Urban Rim study responded to this concern by emphasizing output measures rather than input measures, but it was limited in this regard by the data available. Unless we question the impact of services, however, planning is going to remain an exercise in juggling input. Although this may seem unrealistic in a period of financial restraints, it is consistent with the greater demand for accountability.

Part of the problem stems from the continuing use of trend data and projections in developing programs. One of the reasons for the lack of, or irrelevance of, services in the suburbs was the widespread use of trend data for forward planning, with its assumption of a linear relationship between the past and the future. Decision-makers looked at the suburbs as they were settled and projected from there, and so saw no apparent need to respond to social problems. It is now recognized that this is an inappropriate way of planning to meet social problems but, by and large, we continue to use this approach.

Despite the limited financial resources devoted to the planning of human services, the question of social equity has often been neglected. These reports highlight the importance of social equity and the idea that we cannot permit efficiency to dominate planning any longer. I'm sure there are people here who would say that it is unrealistic to minimize "efficiency" in a time of financial restraints but it is important to recognize that the overemphasis on efficiency has left us with a system of human services that is inadequate and often irrelevant to social needs.

The Urban Rim study was successful in highlighting the problems faced by people in the suburbs and the way these problems are met. However, we have to move away from a dependence on survey research and administrative statistics to research that provides information on the environment in which the planning is done and the nature of the planning process. The Social Planning Council did this by developing its recommendations with the help of people from the public sector, both staff and elected officials, and the volunteer sector. One of the important lessons that emerged from this work, then, is that we have to move away from the model that has been used in fiscal planning for so long to a more developmental approach if we hope to anticipate new problems and develop new ways to deal with them.

Serving a Scattered Population

W. Douglas Johns
Commissioner of Social Services
Regional Municipality of Durham

When Professor Frisken first asked me to make this presentation I was mildly surprised. It had never occurred to me that we serve a scattered population in the Region of Durham. After a modest amount of research, however, I now believe her suspicions are correct. The Region of Durham, Metropolitan Toronto's closest neighbour to the east, stretches some 20 miles along the lakeshore from the Rouge Hills on the west to slightly east of the town of Newcastle. From the lakeshore it extends north to the hamlet of Gamebridge, or Beaverton, if you are more familiar with that, a distance of approximately 55 miles. It's composed of eight area municipalities which jointly account for a total regional population of nearly 300,000 persons, occupying a total area of about 960 square miles. Our urban population is concentrated in the City of Oshawa, with about 115,000 persons, and the town of Whitby, about five miles to the west, with about 35,000, and the Town of Ajax, with about 27,000. There are several smaller "urban" concentrations with an accumulated population of 59,000 persons. The balance, some 60,000 persons, live in rural surroundings and constitute a problem with respect to service delivery.

The Work of the Social Services Department

The human services in which our department is involved are, in order of priority, 1) general welfare assistance, 2) family counselling, a very controversial service (we are probably the only municipality in Ontario that maintains an entirely separate division of family counsellors), 3) daycare services, 4) the provision of homes for the aged and care and support services for senior citizens (probably most imperative, notwithstanding the fact that it can be delayed somewhat), and 5) homemaker and nursing services, another mandatory service in the Province of Ontario. According to the principles of regional government and as a matter of policy, we consider it essential to deliver those services equally within the Region of Durham, notwithstanding the degree of population concentration and the place of residence of the person who requires this service.

I will speak briefly about *general welfare assistance*. Families that are usually self-supporting are reluctant to apply for financial assistance until the fridge is empty or until the fuel company says it won't deliver any more oil unless it's paid by cash. I am not exaggerating. I have been called out of bed at two o'clock on a Sunday morning because a family is without oil and the fuel company, notwithstanding the absolute necessity of heat, refuses to deliver. Frantic telephone calls ensue and the commissioner invariably loses a little more of his calm on each occasion. But invariably the fault is corrected.

It does little good to assure the complainant, or the person who requires the service, that someone will call at the house next week. Next week won't do. We are therefore obliged to deliver that service, sometimes within a matter of hours, certainly within 24 hours in many cases. This is easy to do in the City of Oshawa because the department office is there and most of our staff is there. It's a relatively simple matter for a caseworker to visit the home, therefore, and to issue such emergency assistance as seems justified by the circumstances. When we are advised that the person lives six miles off Regional Road 2 on the south side of the 9th Concession of Brock township, some 55 miles from head office, the problem becomes acute. Notwithstanding the difficulty, our department goes by the old motto that says "difficult things we do immediately, impossible things sometimes take 24 hours." There have been many instances where that seemed to be true.

Family counselling is a rather controversial service, but I believe it fosters the economic and sociological health of our population. We maintain a staff of fourteen family counsellors in the Region of Durham. Sometimes I have to explain to some of our Council members that it is an economically advantageous service. Without family counselling, we are likely to have to support separated wives and children at a continual expense to the taxpayers. The provision of general welfare assistance, and certainly crisis intervention by family counsellors, can offset that

necessity in a great many instances. But it seems unfortunate that we have to use economic arguments to justify the provision of a social service. I have to agree with the previous speaker that sometimes governments don't look far enough ahead.

Homemaker and nursing services are mandatory services under the General Welfare Assistance Act. Again, it's sometimes very easy to deliver such services in the City of Oshawa or the Town of Whitby or the Town of Ajax because we have people there who are involved in their delivery. There are the Canadian Red Cross Society and other proprietory agencies who are willing to enter into a purchase-of-service contract that guarantees the provision of that service if and when it is required. It is not quite so easy to guarantee that service in the north end of the Township of Brock, or in Scugog, of which the centre of population is Port Perry. In a large area it's often difficult to find qualified staff. One way is to insist that the agency guarantee that they have staff available to provide that service in the area municipality concerned, regardless of the difficulties involved. If we fail to receive that assurance, we cannot enter into an agreement with the agency. It seems to work, although at times it's difficult to provide the necessary service.

Daycare is probably one of the most controversial services we provide, at least at the regional or municipal level of government. Some of our non-urban councillors will argue that "I was able, with the help of my wife, to raise 11 kids and I didn't require anybody to help me raise my children. So I don't see why we have to spend one and one-half million dollars a year looking after somebody else's kids." We explain that because of today's high costs, which some of those folks didn't have to face, the necessity of both parents working should be obvious to all. If we are to maintain our society's sociological and economic health, it is essential to provide daycare services.

Once again, it is no problem to deliver those services in areas of urban concentration, assuming of course that we have the necessary resources. But it is more difficult 55 miles north of the lakeshore. Our answer to this problem is to embark upon a program of private home daycare, whereby a housewife confined to her home agrees to care for up to five children, including infants. We enter into a contract with that hostess to ensure that the children are looked after. I don't think that it is equivalent to regional daycare services, which enter into involved exercises in pre-school education, behavioural management and other facets which I think are extremely good for children. Nevertheless it does provide a modicum of service to remote rural areas which otherwise would not be served. We could not build a 45-capacity daycare centre to service 10 farms on the 9th concession of Brock Township. It would be impossible. But we can find a hostess to guarantee efficient and confident service to those children who require it.

In the north, in the villages of Cannington, Beaverton, and Sunderland, we have also established cooperative daycare programs, facilities or accommodation. These programs are usually provided by area municipalities. We in the region provide nothing more than supervision, guidance, advice and direction. The programs themselves are administered on a cooperative, volunteer basis by the parents of children who require care. It is an extremely economical service for the regional municipality because we are encouraging and partly sponsoring a program that cares for some 100 children at a cost of less than $18,000 dollars a year. For that reason, the program is viewed with great enthusiasm by regional councillors. Not only does it provide those small villages with a service that they would not otherwise receive, but it also encourages us to look for and secure more volunteer effort. There is a great deal of expertise in the community among people who, since marriage or child rearing, have failed to exercise their knowledge in their fields.

Homes for the aged are my favourite subject. We are restrained at the present moment by provincial resources, or lack of them, from providing additional accommodation for senior citizens. At the present moment we operate three homes for the aged in the Region of Durham, one in the City of Oshawa, one in the Town of Whitby and a smaller, but more modern, home in the Village of Beaverton. It is called Lakeview Manor. We have a total capacity of 828 beds.

We provide three types of service. The first is extended care for those who require partial or complete care in bed. I don't want anybody to say that I'm getting emotional because that is what I hear from Regional Council, but I have difficulty with the provision of care in a purely hospital setting to senior citizens who, because of physical and mental disability, conceivably will spend the balance of their lives in an institutional setting. They require a great deal more than that. So we work on the "tender loving care" principal and will continue to do so, because humanity can't be supported with less than that. Our waiting list at the present time numbers some 506 persons, of which some 50% require bed care.

It is currently the intention of government at all levels to try to provide support services in the community, and this I wholeheartedly support. But I have to be deeply concerned about the day when the support services fail to allow the 86-year-old lady to get off the couch. Such support services are preventing the necessity of more institutional accommodation at this time, but they're serving as a dam to hold back the water. At some point in the future all those who are being supported in the community won't be able to be supported there because they'll be physically incapable of lifting a hand. They'll require care and accommodation in an institutional setting. I find rather ridiculous the attitude of those government officials who suggest that we can look after senior citizens who are not able to look after themselves by providing support services. Notwithstanding that opinion, and notwithstanding the constraints imposed on us by governments at various levels, we continue to press for additional support services and for additional institutional accommodation, although I don't like the word "institutional." The building is an institution, the people who work there and the people who live there are not. We try to differentiate between the building and the services provided therein.

We do make use of foster home care for the aged because a very small percentage of elderly people seem to want care in the community rather than in an institutional setting. We have very old people who are very independent and don't object to going to board with someone who is able to provide the necessary meals and laundry services. We feature that type of accommodation where it seems in accord with the wishes of the applicant. We have found, however, that persons applying for care in a municipal home for the aged expect to be admitted to that type of environment because of the programs featured there and the joy that exists in those surroundings.

An Illustration

I would like to give an example of the type of circumstance that can occur. Last Saturday morning I was called by a very nice old lady. She lived out in the concessions about fifteen miles from Oshawa, so I was able to find her place. She was 92 years old, living alone in an eight room farmhouse where her husband had died some six or eight years ago. She was very frail — not feeble, but very frail. She was very sharp in her mind and I enjoyed talking to her. But she said, "I am afraid I may fall." And I thought, at 92 I too would be afraid that I might fall. While some of her relatives were living a mile and a half or two miles away, they obviously weren't able to keep an eye on her all day and all night. I took her application for admission into a home for the aged. She said, "You know, I hope I don't have to use this, because I would like to stay here and I hope I die in bed." That wasn't a morbid suggestion, that was a statement of fact. She preferred to live in her own home. Only her recognition of her own frailty made her apply for care in one of our homes. So she assured me that her application was only by way of insurance in case she should ever get so feeble that she couldn't climb the stairs any more.

I didn't wish to contribute to her apprehension, but I asked if perhaps we could send in a homemaker a couple of days a week to help with the vacuuming or something like that. I asked "Would meals on wheels help you? You don't have to cook them, you know." She advised me very smartly that she didn't need any of those things. She had been doing this for 92 years; she had raised eight sons; and by golly there was no reason she needed anybody to cook her meals or wash her dishes either. I had to admire her. Those are the kind of people who built our society, and thank God for them. At the same time, as the Commissioner of Social Services, I left that farmhouse in some apprehension. I'm not sure that I would like to think that my mother, at 92, was living alone in an eight-room farmhouse and climbing the stairs every night to go to bed. Its a remarkable reflection on the courage of some of our seniors that they adopt that attitude. Let us hope that more and more of us will do so and not require the care and accommodation that is provided by governments at various levels. But I wonder whether the coming generation will adopt the same attitude, or whether its members will expect care long before the 92-year-old lady would expect it.

That is just an example of the things we face. Fortunately this lady would not have accepted a bed in one of our homes for the aged if I'd had it to offer her. But I am apprehensive as to what might happen if she did require care and we were unable to supply it.

Mister Chairman, within the ten minutes allotted to me, I have attempted to recognize and resolve these hazards which we, daily, face in the delivery of Social Services, apparently without insurmountable complaints. While this dissertation may appear overly simplistic, I frankly admit it is not so and I would be pleased to answer any questions or reservations expressed by concerned members of this audience who feel so inclined.

Thank you for listening.

Social Services in a Time of Restraint

Don R. Richmond
Deputy Commissioner of Community Services
Metropolitan Toronto

The preceding speakers have given us a good overview of what is. I'm going to get out a crystal ball and talk about the changes and the problems we will face in the '80s in trying to respond to some of the difficulties they have described.

Why Governments Respond to Social Issues

It seems to me that governments respond to two sets of circumstances. Either they respond to a real or perceived crisis or, as in the happier days of the '60s, they respond to a surplus of revenue.

Let me deal with the first in an historical context. Of the thirteen municipalities that were brought together to form Metropolitan Toronto in 1953, twelve were bankrupt and in receivership because of heavy welfare costs during the Depression. That situation produced a major decision relatively fast, to amend the Constitution of Canada to introduce unemployment insurance. That was a response to crisis.

A response to a perceived crisis takes longer. During the period after 1945, as we came out of the war, we had major consultations and conferences about reconstruction. The federal government's perception at that time was that the return of people from the armed services might bring on another depression. As a result, it came out with far-reaching proposals for the development of a welfare state in this country. These proposals, particularly the health plan, took time to put into place. I think we put them into place because, instead of getting the expected depression, we went into a 25- to 30-year period of unprecedented economic growth. As a result, the revenues flowing into the governments of this country, particularly at the federal and provincial levels, made it possible to introduce a variety of social programs.

Reaction and Retrenchment

In the heyday of the '60s, when we were fighting the late and lamented War on Poverty, we had sufficient funds to try everything. With the '70s came a shattering awakening to the fact that we couldn't do everything for everybody. During the '70s there were radical changes in the way the public and government perceived our ability to deal with problems. As you recall, the Henderson report proclaimed that we couldn't afford these luxuries and senior governments underwent a change in thinking with respect to the ability of the public sector to pay for progressive social programs.

We're not through that period. My crystal ball tells me that the '80s will be a continuation of what we saw in the last part of the '70s. We will continue to hear from the federal and provincial governments and from powerful interest groups that government must cut back, government must restrain, government has not got the revenues, that we are putting too much of a burden on taxpayers in order to pay for government services. We may argue that it's a shortsighted attitude, we may say that it is not going to work, that we are going to have real problems. Nonetheless, the perceived crisis today is not in the area of social or health or what are commonly called human services. It is in the area of jobs, economics, income — all those things.

As we go through the decade, those of us who, like Doug and myself, have a responsibility for the delivery of human services will find it a frustrating and trying time. It's frustrating to know without a shadow of a doubt, on the basis of studies carried out both by Metro and by the Social Planning Council, that we could use three or four thousand more daycare spaces tomorrow. With that number we would probably eat up the existing waiting list, but more people would line up. We know that, but there isn't enough money. We know that we have to spend more money on homes for the aged. We know we have to spend more on this, more on that, and more on the other thing. And there just isn't money available. So for the foreseeable future we are faced with the reality that needs will explode, and I mean explode, while our resources diminish in real terms.

The work of the Social Planning Council and the Ontario Welfare Council have demonstrated the failure of the Province of Ontario to recognize the growth of the needs out there and to supply the money to meet them. There has been a major philosophical change in the way we are distributing our resources in this community and in this province, and it is going to hurt increasing numbers of people. Housing, for example, isn't the problem of the poor any more; housing is a problem of the middle class. We haven't many answers to that problem. We certainly haven't got any programs and, to paraphrase Susan Fish and Mike Dennis, "without programs there is no hope of a policy."

New Realities

What then can we do? Professor Gandy referred to the Urban Rim study, better known as "Suburbs in Transition." For most of us, politicians as well as bureaucrats, that study didn't tell us something that we didn't know, but it was something that we didn't want to hear. The major contribution of the Social Planning Council was to make us hear it. It became a public issue. It became something that we could no longer afford to ignore. We have to respond to that, but we have to respond in a situation of diminishing or, at best, inadequate resources.

How do we do it? As a metropolitan planner, I can say that it is a delightful exercise to plan on a global scale, where you put maps on the wall, colour them blue and red and green and purple and draw a few lines. It is all very wonderful. I think Eli Comay was correct in his observations about the successes and failures of those exercises. What I found missing in his comments, however, was a sense of the enormity of the social change that has occurred in this municipality.

In the period from 1950 to 1970, the population of Metropolitan Toronto increased by one million. The number of immigrants from every country in the world who settled in Metropolitan Toronto was 1.3 million people. No physical planner had any sense of that reality and its implications for the kind of lifestyle we were going to have. Nobody could have predicted in the 1960s the rates of divorce and separation that we have experienced and the rise of the sole support family. No one could have predicted these changes, yet they are facts of life, so how are we going to deal with them?

In the absence of any federal or provincial willingness to deal in grand designs, we will be standing around until the 1990s if we wait for that kind of solution, and we still won't have a hope of getting it. Medicare was first debated by the Government of Canada back around the First World War and we got it after the Second World War. So the great changes that we thought about in the '60s — guaranteed annual incomes, for example — are not going to happen in the foreseeable future.

Focus on the Community

Our only hope is to adopt a bottom-up approach to government, concentrating on specific issues and dealing with them on a neighbourhood or community basis. If we ask for major changes we won't get them. If we ask for variations on the theme — carburetor adjustments, a few bucks here, a few bucks there — we have hope. I agree with Professor Gandy that those adjustments have to be assisted, aided and abetted by more effective planning for the human services, both in Metropolitan Toronto and in related bodies.

The critical thing is to find solutions to the problems at a much more local level. We have to deal with the community, but we have to stop talking about it as that nice sort of thing that has been popular in the literature for at least 20 years, and translate it into reality.

There are several ways we can talk about community. One of them, obviously, is geographic. Geography is extremely important for the way you organize to deliver services. An equally important sense of community, and one that is legislatively recognized but not to the degree it should be, is the community of culture, or ethnicity, or race. We have done work in the last several years that suggests that a number of the mainstream agencies in this municipality are not serving, and cannot serve, significant groups of people that live in this community. They cannot serve them because their boards and their workers are not of the right cultural background, race, or colour. They have a difficult time understanding why someone of a different ethnic background does not relate easily to the mainstream service. On the other hand, when the same ethnic group says, "Look, we're not being supported, we're not getting service, we don't understand it, we don't feel comfortable with it, it's not ours, give us some support," we say, "Oh no, over there you've got an agency. Go there." That's not good enough any more.

One of two things has to happen. Either the mainstream agencies, including governments, are going to have to change the way they do things and how they treat people of

different cultural backgrounds, and that's difficult, or we are going to have to support those groups one way or another, but primarily with dollars, to build their own services and deliver them in their own way. There is nothing surprising or new about that; it's just that newer groups are asking for that kind of treatment. And I think they deserve it and should have it.

There are two basic tasks for the metropolitan or the regional level of government in an urban area. First, we have to encourage and support the development of agencies that are rooted in communities to serve the needs of those communities as they perceive them, and not as we perceive them. Second, we have to ensure equity across the metropolitan area. We have been criticized rightly over the past several years for the way we have handed out social service grants, with too much going to the inner city and too little to the suburbs. We are trying to respond to that reality, although perhaps not fast enough, as some people will tell you.

Make Welfare a Provincial Responsibility

My last comment is somewhat revolutionary. We have argued successfully with the Province of Ontario that housing subsidies should not be a municipal responsibility because they are a form of income transfer. We have not made the same argument with respect to welfare assistance. Until we do we will be saddled with an everlasting cost in Metropolitan Toronto. This year our welfare budget is in the order of $100,000,000, of which Metro is responsible for 20%. The province frequently reminds us that it's 80/20, but they never tell us that 50% of that is federal. If you actually look at welfare expenditures, in fact, it turns out that it's 50% federal, 25% municipal and 25% provincial because of the way certain programs are funded.

We shouldn't be in the welfare game; we shouldn't be in income distribution. It's an anachronism left over from the major changes that occurred in the '40s and '50s. If we could convince our provincial government to make this important change, Metropolitan Toronto, at least, would have sufficient revenue to support an enormous range of needed services that we cannot now provide.

If I have one goal for the '80s, in addition to doing things better, it is to continue to fight to get the provincial government to recognize the difference between asking us to provide services for people who need service, whatever it may be — family counselling, daycare, what have you — and the incredible burden it puts on us to have to pay for income transfers out of a totally unfair, unequitable property tax.

Discussion

QUESTIONER: I thought Don Richmond's presentation was quite thoughtful but overly pessimistic. Don was arguing that, from an historical perspective, we deal with social conditions in the community either when events or conditions produce a crisis or when we have a surplus of money that allows us to act. The danger with that perspective is that it leads us to wait for a crisis. In a concrete sense, the danger is that the Metropolitan Toronto Council only begins to believe that youth unemployment is serious when a knife in the hand of one youth goes into the body of another youth. If we take that perspective then we are left with little option but to wait for the knife, the insurrection or the vandalism. Then some people ask "Why wait for it? Let's just go and do it and we'll get something done?"

Don Richmond contradicts his own argument by saying that one of the values of the suburban report was to make us hear what we already knew. That gets us back to the issue of political will. I think there is too much pessimism about the absence of government revenues. What is beginning to happen is that lots of groups in the urban fabric who accepted the neo-conservative explanation of how we got into our economic mess are starting to understand, through their experience with Reagan, Thatcher and Davis, how self-serving and how destructive that philosophy has been.

Since 1975 we've had a mini-version of supply side economics in Ontario, where we cut down public spending in order to transfer revenue to the private sector. I think there's growing awareness that we ended up with the worst of all possible worlds: that we have record unemployment, record inflation, industrial stagnation and social neglect. With that recognition, things are beginning to change. The best evidence of that is the fact that Metro Council is being prodded to increase its grants to agencies from 12% to 30% in an era of government restraint. That didn't happen because politicians had new insights or professional planners got their message across to the community. It's happened because important social constituencies are recognizing that fiscal capacity is a false issue. There is much more government capacity to respond in the urban fabric than we hitherto were led to believe.

So my question, Don, is how you generate political will if you believe that social change only comes about because of a crisis or a surplus?

MR. RICHMOND: The optimistic side of the scenario is that government can react relatively fast in a crisis. The issue of youth unemployment is an interesting case in point. As you well know, that is an issue that we have been grappling with in Metropolitan Toronto for seven long years. We were unable to get anywhere because the federal and provincial governments seemed to take the attitude, "Well, so what, they'll get older and then they'll be the elderly unemployed." After seven long years, I have hope that this particular issue has been recognized by our friends, not in Ontario but in Ottawa. We have hope — no promise, but hope — that something will happen.

Anybody who has had anything to do with politics knows the old cliché about the idea whose time has come. You can hammer at the door and hammer at the door and hammer at the door but, if the public perception isn't there or the political winds are not right, you are a prophet in the wilderness. If you happen to have the right idea at the right time, you are a hero.

QUESTIONER: Earlier this morning, Don, we talked about the fact that, until recently, municipalities had a stake in the delivery of the Public Housing Program sponsored by the provincial and federal governments. They had that stake because they were paying 7 1/2 percent of the total cost of operating revenues or subsidies. As George Fallis indicated, they could determine, at least to some extent, the nature of the program that was being delivered and the location of the projects within the community. I want to jump from that to your remarks about welfare funding. The bottom line would be to merge Family Benefits Allowances with General Welfare Assistance and have the total bill paid by the federal and provincial governments. I'm concerned about what that means for local government.

I agree with John Gandy that the Urban Rim Study showed that services were not being delivered in the suburban areas and that there was a need to restructure delivery on a neighbourhood basis. The Commissioner from Durham also indicated that his preference is to have some capacity for local delivery. You said yourself that you see services being distributed more equitably if they are planned at the regional level but delivered locally. How on earth do you expect to have local involvement in programs if all the costs are borne at the federal and provincial levels?

Historically, any time the province takes your 7 1/2 percent or, in this case, your 20 percent, they take your program, they take your flexibility and they take all the mechanisms for local delivery away from you. I think that that 20 percent contains all those flexible things that Doug Johns has to offer when he goes to see the 92-year-old lady. He is not going to offer a home support program or Meals on Wheels if the program is being defined at a totally different level from where it's being delivered. By having a municipal stake you can at least argue at Queen's Park and in Ottawa for changes and for flexibility in the programs.

My last question, Don, is where did the $12 million go that you saved when you no longer had to pay the 7 1/2 percent subsidy in housing? Did it go into social services?

MR. RICHMOND: First of all, you have to realize that there isn't any flexibility in the delivery of welfare under the General Welfare Assistance Act. It is formally laid out and the municipality is just a delivery agency for the Province of Ontario.

I draw a distinct line between what I consider a straight income transfer operation and a whole range of services — family counselling, senior citizen support services, homemaker and nursing services, and so on — that *have* to be delivered locally, *have* to be at the discretion of the local government, and *have* to be administered without the dead hand of bureaucracy at Queen's Park limiting, restricting and controlling what we can do. The only way we are going to get the flexibility is to get rid of what is obviously not our job, which is the income transfer, and say that everything that has a service orientation has to be delivered locally.

The reason why Social Services were moved to the metropolitan level in 1967 was because of the onerous cost of welfare to local municipalities. I am even willing to go so far as to say that in the longer run social services in Metropolitan Toronto should not be delivered by Metropolitan Toronto.

MR. JOHNS: The provincial and federal governments are never directly involved in immediate service delivery. We deliver General Welfare Assistance to unemployed persons because they fail to get their unemployment insurance benefits. We phone them and say, "Why didn't you get the cheque?" and find that the thing is lost in the computer somewhere between Oshawa and Belleville. In the meantime the man hasn't anything to eat.

So I wholeheartedly support what Don Richmond has said. Service can only be delivered by those persons at the local level who understand the individual needs of persons in that community. He is also right in suggesting that financial support for those services should come from senior levels of government but they cannot deliver. The reason Mr. Gray is presently suggesting that Family Benefits Allowances be transferred to the local level is because we can do a better job. It is economically advantageous for the Province of Ontario to transfer that case load to us.

The Region Today IV: Local Impacts of Regional and Provincial Decisions

The Local Interest in Regional Planning

Hazel McCallion
Mayor, City of Mississauga

My theme today is that, when it comes to planning, we have not clearly defined the responsibilities of the various levels of government in our province. As a result we get into chaos. Coordination is the only thing that will bring some order out of that chaos.

Before regional government was established, I represented the little communities of Port Credit, Streetsville, the Town of Mississauga or the Township of Toronto on the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board. We had some input, although they never listened to us. But at least we were present to observe what was going on and could get some idea about the planning of the Metropolitan Toronto area. The Board also commented on all our plans and there was nothing wrong with that. I think it was good. When the Province established regional government, however, it cut off that communication with Metro Toronto. Where is the coordination now? As much as I kid about our lovely Mississauga International Airport, and about Toronto being a suburb of Mississauga, I have to say in all honesty that what happens in Metro Toronto has to be coordinated with what happens in Peel and York and Durham. And the Province is not doing it.

Need for a Provincial Plan

We would like to see an Official Plan for the Province of Ontario. The Province tells the local municipalities and the regions that they must have an Official Plan. Why shouldn't the Province have one? We spent close to a million dollars on an Official Plan for the City of Mississauga and it was certainly needed. Before we did that, developers were responsible for all the planning that was done in Mississauga, and that caused complications. We have Meadowvale, for instance, which you hear described on the radio as "that beautiful town in the country." And it is in the country; it's way off the beaten track. So we have a problem servicing it with transit because we haven't yet designed a bus that picks up cows and horses between Meadowvale and the city core of Mississauga. That's what planning was all about in our city before we had our Official Plan.

That is just one example of lack of coordination, although I agree with Eli Comay that it is not just coordination that is needed to change some of these things. As Mayor of Mississauga, I presented a brief to the Robarts Commission on Metropolitan Toronto. One of the things we said (and it was rather generous on our part) was that there is a need for some overall body to plan for the Greater Metropolitan Toronto area. One reason we said that is because the Credit River, which runs right through our municipality, has development on the west and east of it, and there is more to come. Our problem is to decide how many times we are going to cross the Credit River to allow the people on the west to travel to Mississauga and to Toronto. As you know, as soon as you start crossing the river, environmental concerns come to the surface and there is great opposition. In fact the time will come when the river is so polluted that it will either dry up or the fish will not be able to live in it. So people get concerned about Mississauga being a thoroughfare for getting people to Toronto from the west. We finally realized that no matter

how many bridges we build across the Credit River to allow people to travel through Mississauga they are going to encounter bottlenecks getting into Metropolitan Toronto because there are not enough points of access into Metropolitan Toronto. Who is doing the planning on that? Nobody is.

The intent of the new Planning Act, as I understand it, is to try to allocate, or designate, or delegate planning authority down closer to the local level. But I don't see anything in that Planning Act that will solve the planning problems that exist in this province. Our brief to the Robarts Commission asked when the Province was going to start putting policy down on paper, as they tell us we must do. If a municipality, or a developer, goes to the OMB, the OMB first wants to know the policy. Well the Planning Act will not help the OMB to know the provincial point of view. Provincial officials use "guidelines". What are "guidelines"? Is that policy or is it something that twists and changes to suit the situation?

Regional Government Was Not the Answer

Peel Region is one of the most unbalanced regions in the Province of Ontario. Because it is in Peel Region, Mississauga has to be more concerned about what happens in Caledon than about what happens in Metropolitan Toronto. But Caledon is going to grow to 30,000 at the very most. Mississauga, according to its Official Plan, will grow to three quarters of a million. It is my guess that it will go to a million. What relationship has Caledon to Mississauga? In fact, what relationship has Caledon to Brampton? Very little. But what happens on the Metropolitan Toronto boundary and what happens in Oakville is very important to Mississauga, because that's where the traffic is going. It's not going north and south except on weekends, when people want to go up and enjoy the hills of Caledon. There is no GO-Commuter line to Caledon, and there never will be.

Lack of coordination and lack of planning have a serious impact at the local level. We are faced with making decisions about the future in a vacuum. There is a major extension going on at the Mississauga International Airport. We're going to have all kinds of terminals up there, and we may get another runway — when the noise problem is solved. But people are not going to be able to get there to catch a plane. We have a Master Plan for the airport but no plan for improving access to the airport. They tell me that if you go to Japan it takes almost as long to get out of Tokyo airport as it takes to get from Canada to Tokyo. That is going to happen here because the state of transportation planning in the Greater Metropolitan Toronto area is pitiful. Yet the Province once spent a lot of money on a Toronto-Centred Region plan. What did they do with it? Where is it? Nobody talks about it any more.

This problem concerns Mississauga because we do not relate to Brampton and we do not relate to Caledon, but we do relate to Metropolitan Toronto. You don't know if you are crossing from Mississauga into Etobicoke or into Metropolitan Toronto unless someone puts up a sign. What happens on the boundaries of Oakville is also very serious to Mississauga. We have set up a liaison committee to try to deal with that fact. We have a road there from which we want to ban truck traffic and they don't, so we sit and argue. It's a pitiful situation. I don't know what will be done about this problem because millions of dollars were spent to set up these fancy regional governments around Metropolitan Toronto and it would be a costly exercise to dismantle them. But that decision has created problems that are going to be very detrimental to this most precious part of the Province of Ontario, where planning could be an example for the rest of the world.

There is a lot of vacant land out there that should be planned properly. We could begin with the domed stadium. I don't think the domed stadium should go into Metropolitan Toronto at all. It should be in Mississauga, because otherwise it will add more congestion both to Toronto and to Mississauga as people try to get to it from the west, only to find that there isn't adequate parking anyway. Wherever it goes, however, the domed stadium should be properly placed. If there were an overall body looking at this then it would be properly placed, and not just go into a municipality because the Chairman of Metropolitan Toronto can twist the arm of the Province and others to get the money to put it in.

I have given you just a few ideas about the problems in the Region, as perceived by the mayor of an exciting municipality of 111 square miles, 30% of which is still to be developed and 40% is still to be built on. We have an opportunity to do it right for future generations, and so I'm asking you to think about the implications of the lack of co-ordinated planning in this Greater Metropolitan Toronto area.

Provincial Transit Priorities and the Metropolitan Toronto Plan

A. Bruce Davidson
Commissioner of Planning and Development
City of North York

I'd like to welcome everyone to the City of North York, Canada's fourth largest city, and the second largest in Metropolitan Toronto and in Ontario. We have the perfect location for the domed stadium and we'll be letting people — especially the Province — know that at the appropriate time. Its advantage is that it is situated at a perfect location on a brand new transit system, which is an appropriate way to open my comments today.

Inconsistencies in Metropolitan and Provincial Plans

Metropolitan Toronto's transit system has been directed towards the City of Toronto and the growth and development of the city's downtown area, or Central Business District. Historically, the Central Business District has been the preeminent focus of development in metropolitan areas throughout North America. In Metropolitan Toronto, however, we said during the 1960s and 1970s that we were going to try to change that pattern by having a metropolitan plan that diversifies the development potential of different parts of Metropolitan Toronto rather than putting it all in one downtown central core. That was the goal and it is beginning to work. The Provincial transit program threatens to damage that process, however. There is now going to be a major struggle between the Metropolitan Toronto governments — not only the local governments but Metropolitan Toronto itself — and the provincial government to stop the development of the City of Toronto as the preeminent city within the greater metropolitan area. This issue concerns the areas outside Metropolitan Toronto as well — areas like Markham, Vaughan, Mississauga, Thornhill and Newmarket.

A critical issue at the present time is the new waterfront Intermediate Capacity Transit line. We're beginning to see planning by newsprint, planning by the media. The City of Toronto, the Toronto Star, the Sun, CFTO, and other news media organizations, together with the Province, are pushing for a transit system on the waterfront, to make the City of Toronto's CBD the preeminent CBD in Metropolitan Toronto. If they succeed, they will destroy the Metro plan. In destroying the Metro plan they will destroy the viability of Metropolitan Toronto as a good community in which to live — as a community with a diversified transportation system.

The Province has always been a little schizophrenic about its transportation. It stopped the Spadina Expressway, but it built the 404, widened the 401, is building the 407, and has extended the 401 east. It really can't make up its mind. Those policies may have been initiated with the knowledge that the Province would be buying into Suncor at some point in time. But I don't know how the Province can tell us that you can't have a mixed transportation system within the metropolitan area if you provide good road accessibility to certain areas and municipalities, and then turn around and build automobile-oriented transportation systems to serve single family homes in Newmarket, or in Mississauga, or in Oakville, or in any other part of the Province you can think of. They're worried about urban sprawl, they're worried about housing costs, and yet they can't decide what kind of transportation system they want within the greater metropolitan area.

Implications for local Municipalities

The proposed ICTS on the waterfront has created a situation where we may see a penetrator system that will link up to it. I'm concerned about this because the Metropolitan Toronto plan calls for the City of North York's downtown at Sheppard and Yonge to have approximately 40,000 office jobs. The only way that we can achieve that and diversify land uses within Metropolitan Toronto is to have an east-west line crossing the Yonge and Spadina lines, one that will connect North York Town Centre with the Scarborough Town Centre and Etobicoke at some future date, and perhaps with Mississauga some time after that. A new system based on a waterfront ICTS would

destroy any potential for realizing the diversified land use pattern that we agreed to in the Metropolitan Toronto plan. Pressure for that system comes from the Province, which wants a nice showplace for the ICTS that it is developing in Kingston. It's a matter of concern not only for City of Toronto planners but for planners in the metropolitan municipalities and for planners beyond the metropolitan municipalities.

Provincial planning standards are non-existent when it comes to the periphery of the Metropolitan Toronto area. Plans approved by the Ministry of Housing continue to be essentially the same plans that produced the Don Mills area of the 1950s. They have nice wandering streets, single family homes, and low density residential designations of 40 units to the acre, except maybe on Yonge Street north of Metropolitan Toronto where they have some densities of about 60 units per acre. That's really inconsequential, however, because that area is just a natural extension of North York and Metropolitan Toronto.

Rising Costs

Meanwhile the cost of transportation services continues to go up. The cost of ICTS at the present time seems to be in the area of $100,000,000 for about a quarter mile of track. That's horrendous. We could probably put a new east-west transit line on the Finch Hydro right-of-way for about one-eighth of that cost by using a rubber tired system. The right-of-way is already there. All that is needed is a road reserved for buses and it would have the same capacity as an ICTS line or a line that penetrates into the City of Toronto. Of course, the City of Toronto would love to see more development downtown but the costs of development and the renting of office accommodation downtown have become exorbitant. It costs $45.00 per square foot for rental space in the City of Toronto. We can offer such space for about $20.00 per square foot.

The Province is going to have to get a handle on how it is going to service the metropolitan area with transportation. It's not just a matter of putting in ICTS lines. It's a matter of having a balanced transportation network that makes provision for cars as well as transit, because the car is going to be here for a long time, though not necessarily in the form we see today. It is going to be here in some form because we're not going to give up the independence that comes with being able to get into an automobile and driving where we want to drive. And here I want to assure Mayor McCallion that our nice location for a domed stadium has great access from Mississauga.

Impacts of the York-Durham Servicing Scheme on the Town of Markham

Anthony Roman
Mayor, Town of Markham

My remarks concern the effects of the so-called "big pipe" on the Town of Markham. Fifteen years ago or so, the six southern municipalities in the County of York were concerned about their limited capacity to service either residential, industrial or commercial growth. One reason for the formation of the Region of York was that these municipalities concluded, after several years of discussion, that there had to be a better way to service a landlocked area than by going through the Metropolitan Toronto system. By 1967 the Ontario Water Resources Commission had asked Gore and Storrie Limited to prepare a report. After that the Province of Ontario implemented the York-Durham Servicing Scheme at a cost of some $300 million or $400 million. I'm not quite sure of the amount because the pipe is still being built. Sections of it that go to Aurora and Newmarket are not yet complete and some of the laterals within the southern municipalities are still under construction.

A Boom for Local Autonomy

We're very pleased about the Province's decision because it gave Markham, and then the Region of York, some autonomy with respect to Metropolitan Toronto. I still remember when, as deputy reeve for the Township of

Markham, I had to go hat in hand to the City of Toronto to ask for either a few more gallons of water or a few more gallons of sewage capacity so we could have a little more development.

The capacities that the York-Durham servicing scheme has given the Region of York also allow the Province of Ontario to implement its Go East policy to some degree. We recognize that it's difficult to force people to move where they do not want to go, but the Township of Markham had a large geographic area and an opportunity to grow around an established nucleus of communities. We consider ourselves to be a community of communities — the Thornhills, the Unionvilles, the Villages of Markham. That gives us an excellent selling point, for we are able to attract people to what are basically small rural communities without necessarily becoming a large conglomerate like North York, for example, or possibly Scarborough. Fortunately, the Province of Ontario implemented the Parkway Belt system which physically separated the various communities within our town, especially the communities of Markham and Unionville and Thornhill. In addition, the extension of the Don Valley Expressway, which we call the 404, created a physical separation between the residential areas and our industrial park, which lies east of the 404 and runs along Steeles Avenue.

On the whole, the York-Durham Servicing Scheme has been very beneficial to the Town of Markham. Without it I'm not quite sure where we'd be today, but we would probably be part of Metropolitan Toronto. Growth is very important to any municipality because without some growth it finds itself in a position of stagnation. In Markham we have been both very fortunate and fairly selective. We have been able to build some 2,000 residential units of housing each year for the past four years and approximately a million square feet of industrial space. That represents a growth rate of about six or seven percent. We have an opportunity under the Official Plan, approved in 1976, to grow to a population of some 140,000 people and an approved industrial acreage of 2,780 acres used at the rate of 100 to 120 acres per year. We are now able to plan for that growth, we hope, without duplicating some of the mistakes that have been made in other areas.

Discussion

QUESTIONER: As a Member of Council for the City of North York, it strikes me that there's a lot of competition going on. Our planning director mentioned that North York is striving for a downtown. We're competing with other municipalities but we're all talking about avoiding urban sprawl. How do we put the two together? How do we know how what you're doing in Markham relates to what we're trying to accomplish in North York in the way of getting our own central core and our own comprehensive, official plan. How do we know what impact we're having on you and you're having on us? How do we deal with this thing called urban sprawl?

MAYOR ROMAN: I don't mind competition at all and at the moment I'm not concerned about urban sprawl. We have a large city in this area that has probably remained constant at two million people for the last year or two. As a matter of fact I read a report that the City of Toronto is very concerned that people are leaving and its population is decreasing. When people leave a municipality, it loses some of its tax base. I think proper planning takes care of urban sprawl. I'm a strong proponent of municipalities getting together and communicating with each other and there are a number of opportunities available to do that. So I'm not that concerned about either problem.

MAYOR MCCALLION: I can give you examples of the lack of overall planning. We're into a Store War with Etobicoke right now, similar to the Sherway Gardens battle of a few years ago. It has to do with where a regional shopping centre should be put — whether in Mississauga or in Etobicoke. The OMB is trying to decide that issue, but I assume that eventually it will be a political decision because it will go to the Cabinet. We don't know what's going on in your area and you don't know what's going on in Mississauga and we are closely connected. We should be going farther with the Toronto-Centred Region plan because I think there should be some direction.

I agree that we're into a very competitive situation. We're looking for twelve million square feet of office space in our city core, and we're competing with everyone else to get it. There has to be some umbrella group to look at these matters, and I don't mean just casual meetings where we say, "Look, I've got a problem. Let's discuss it." There has to be some direction. I had hoped that the Robarts Commission would make a recommendation as to how to get it.

You mentioned transit systems, for example. Where is transit going to hook up to Mississauga? Should the subway be extended out to Mississauga? Who's answering those questions? Nobody. We don't know and they don't know.

Nobody is taking an overview of the entire area. There are boundaries to be clearly defined in this greater metropolitan area that includes Peel and York and Durham, and transit is one reason they are needed. The Province did set up TATOA (The Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority) because it saw the need for an overall body to say whether transit service should go to Mississauga or Durham or York, or wherever. That was a step in the right direction.

QUESTIONER: Mr. Davidson accused the Toronto media of pushing the ICTS. I wonder if that's really true, or whether the media are simply allowing the Provincial government to use them to prepare public opinion for the ICTS. There's been a lot of talk this morning about a lack of decision-making by the Province. What I see is a lack of cooperative decision-making. We have decisions thrust upon us by the Province, like the ICTS, like the latest rumour of a waterfront line. The real problem, as I see it, is that we don't have enough input into decisions.

MR. DAVIDSON: Since I came to North York six years ago, I've seen noticeable pressure from the City of Toronto media to amalgamate the suburban municipalities with the City of Toronto. That effort goes on all the time. Just their type of coverage shows how little interest the media have in what's going on in the suburban municipalities, despite the fact that some of the major planning decisions and most of the major planning changes are taking place there. North York's decision on group homes, which a lot of people considered a minor step, was in fact a major decision for a suburban municipality. The new Official Plan for the City of North York is an important planning policy that the Metropolitan Toronto media haven't looked at or discussed.

North York has over half a million people, all living within the Metropolitan Toronto area, and the media don't even discuss their problems. For example, there is the problem faced by 250,000 people who want to get to the services, the cultural facilities and the work activities that are located downtown. The metropolitan media don't care. They would rather see those people remain isolated than give them access to cultural and athletic services in the City of Toronto.

Perhaps the Metropolitan government should diversify not only jobs and office work but also cultural and athletic facilities within Metropolitan Toronto, so more people could have access to them. I think the media puts forth the concept (of ICTS); the Province just takes advantage of it as best it can any time it can.

MAYOR MCCALLION: Many decisions made by the Province concern matters that could not be settled at the local level. Spadina was one; the Island issue was another. One could go on. What is lacking is the necessary vehicle that would allow these decisions to be made closer to the people and that would address the question of planning the greater metropolitan area. The Province would only have to come in occasionally if we really had responsible planning at the local level.

I don't usually come to the rescue of the Province, but I'll tell you that this Store Wars deal between Etobicoke and Mississauga is going to be settled by the Province. They didn't ask to get into it but they're going to get into it. It's going to land on the desk of the Cabinet. Many of these problems come up at a local level and go to the Province for a decision because we do not have any vehicle to coordinate planning within a certain boundary area. It has to stop.

QUESTIONER: It appears that the Robarts' report, and many other studies of its type, have never been implemented and that there is no coordination of planning between municipalities and, to some extent, within municipalities. It also appears that the Province is resistant to setting up some sort of overall coordinating body. If anything it has diffused the system in a way that makes it more difficult for residents to participate and have input into decisions. I wonder what alternatives there are in terms of planning more completely?

MAYOR MCCALLION: There are some moves in the direction of a coordinating group. One is The Niagara Escarpment Commission which crosses many boundaries. The Province felt it couldn't leave the fate of the Niagara escarpment up to each municipality, so it set up an overall body. The Parkway Belt was another example. That is the only direction in which we can move that's to our mutual advantage. You can't expect the municipalities to get together and solve their problems. There has to be some directive to get together and solve their problems and then open it up to the public.

Both the Niagara Escarpment Commission and the Parkway Belt had much public input. I think you will see many more of these commissions in the future — authorities that are set up to look at overall areas and to eliminate boundaries. Conservation authorities are not set up along political boundaries; they are set up on

watersheds. That is the type of planning that has to come into being.

MAYOR ROMAN: One of the criticisms that local municipalities have had in the past is that there was too much Provincial interference in their affairs. The Province got the message fairly loud and clear and it had to decentralize. The regional governments in and around Metropolitan Toronto were designed primarily for that purpose, as were such Provincial policies as the Parkway Belt, the Niagara Escarpment, and others. I think there has been excellent cooperation between municipalities in the last four or five years. In our own area we once had to get together with fourteen or fifteen municipalities; now we are only dealing with nine. The regional government is probably the only umbrella required to look after local coordination within the Region of York. The regional chairmen get together on a regular basis. They meet with Provincial ministers and other technical staff to discuss some of the long-term problems that may exist between regions. I think we have made excellent progress and I for one would not like to see more Provincial government interference in the affairs of local municipalities.

MR. DAVIDSON: As a planner for a Metropolitan Toronto municipality, I can say that we are concerned with what is taking place on our immediate borders. We realize, for example, that the Town of Vaughan will soon have approximately 70,000 to 80,000 people situated just north of Steeles Avenue, between Yonge and Dufferin or Yonge and Bathurst. We've taken cognizance of that in considering where the new East-West connection should go so it can pick up those people from their automobiles and take them to the Spadina line or the Yonge line and distribute them to jobs in Metropolitan Toronto. Those things are being looked at by the City of North York Planning Department, and probably by Metropolitan Toronto, but I think there has to be some additional coordination between those municipalities.

QUESTIONER: Mr. Davidson, where do you think the East-West connector should go?

MR. DAVIDSON: There are two possible locations: Sheppard Avenue or Finch Avenue. I prefer Finch because it can give us the cheapest line in terms of present and future costs. The right-of-way is already there. It is a matter of putting on a rubber tire system with the capacity of any rail line presently in operation. It would serve the City of North York much as the Bloor line has served the City of Toronto. In other words, it would carry people from work areas or residential areas in Markham and Scarborough to North York's city centre at Sheppard and Yonge. There are different views held, even among our own staff, of course. Some believe that Sheppard Avenue should be the main line because it would foster the type of development we want to see in the Sheppard/Yonge area. But I have some difficulties with that, in terms of how I want to see the Yonge Centre develop.

QUESTIONER: Mr. Roman, most people except yourself have been very critical of the Provincial government. You seem to praise them in many ways. The area that I find of particular interest is the Parkway Belt. It seems to me that this was a noble idea of the Province, but in fact it has been chipped away and chipped away throughout its length, especially when people said that it infringed on their rights as property owners. I have the distinct impression that there is not much of the Parkway Belt left. How much of the Parkway Belt is left in the Town of Markham, for example, and what effect does it really have on your planning and development?

MR. ROMAN: As I understand it, there's something between 5,000 and 6,000 acres of Parkway Belt in the Town of Markham. Since it was first announced, we have chipped away at it only once. A block of land approximately one hundred acres was removed from the Parkway Belt, but one could argue that it shouldn't have been there in the first place because it was adjacent to one of our industrial parks.

The Parkway Belt remains pretty much intact in our municipality. There are a number of uses that are compatible with the Parkway Belt system. We already have a number of them and we have made approaches to the Province of Ontario about others. I understand we will be acquiring some space for such specific purposes as community colleges, a hydro building, a municipal building and other uses that keep the concept of the Parkway Belt intact. Personally I'd like to see most of that land remain as it is today, looking if necessary at what we can do with the Parkway Belt within the existing framework of Provincial policy.

I'm not necessarily here to praise the Province of Ontario, I'm only telling you of my experiences with Provincial bodies. They may have treated me a little differently than they have treated others.

MR. DAVIDSON: I just want to go back to the first

question. Marvyn Novick said in an earlier session that a new east-west transit line would create additional urban sprawl. The new ICTS that the Province is developing on the waterfront will probably create greater urban sprawl than any east-west line, no matter what route it takes.

PART B:

Planning for Development in the Toronto-Centred Region: Past, Present and Future

The Toronto-Centred Region in Retrospect

H. Ian Macdonald
President, York University

Today I should like to review, first, what we attempted with the Toronto-Centred Region Plan, and second, what went wrong, in the hope that this will help us to sort out what is truly important in planning our collective lives, and what we can learn from the past as a guide to the future.

Background

I shall begin with a word about the organizational background, which is important to understanding what happened and what did not happen. I trust you will not think me immodest if I take a somewhat autobiographical approach to describe that background. I do so simply because it helps me to see the order of things and the context within which the so-called Toronto-Centred Region Plan must be perceived. It also explains my professional input to the process as well as some of the complications on the road to progress.

This particular story begins at a time in 1965 when I was appointed Chief Economist of Ontario, an office that was established by the Premier in what was then the Department of Economics and Development. The general assignment that I had at that time was:

1) to introduce an element of fiscal policy into the provincial budget, which theretofore had been looked upon largely as a reconciliation of revenues and expenditures, rather than as an economic policy instrument;

2) to coordinate intergovernmental affairs, which was then becoming, and of course has since become, a giant activity within all governments;

3) to coordinate all economic research in the government;

4) to integrate the statistical framework for government planning, which was scattered and ill-defined at that time;

5) and most important for our purpose this afternoon, to formulate regional development plans, building on the momentum of a large and prominent international conference on regional development that had been sponsored by the Ontario Government early in 1965.

Of course, there were many other activities already underway in parts of the Government that related directly to that assignment — two in particular. First was the so-called MTARTS — the Metropolitan Toronto And Region Transportation Study — that had been set up in the earlier part of the 1960's to review and analyze transportation directions in the Metropolitan Toronto Region. I believe the formation of MTARTS was a recognition by the Ontario Government that transportation was an important tool of development in our society and in our economy. I recall very well some conversations at that time with Premier Robarts, who had seen very clearly that there is an alternative to building highways in the province according to the latest traffic count or to taking roads in the direction where people seemed to want to go. He saw that we should use transportation, as well as a number of other public facilities, as deliberate directive tools for economic development and economic planning.

The second was the Community Planning Branch in the former Department of Municipal Affairs. This had existed for some time with a core of physical planners whose responsibility it was to administer the Planning Act and to relate municipal planning responsibilities to the Department. The Department was experiencing a new lease on life at that time as a result of the arrival of Darcy McKeough. His characteristic energy and ministerial strength and determination surfaced very early in a movement toward the creation of a system of regional governments across the province. Those who recall the many stormy meetings that took place during that period will also remember the questioning that was going on, as well as the strong conviction that Mr. McKeough brought to that Ministry.

We move on to the third phase of the process, which opened in 1966 with *Design for Development*. I was given

responsibility for producing the White Paper, with certain clear objectives being spelled out by the Ontario Government. The first of these was to provide a coherent government framework for regional development planning in the province through the creation of a Cabinet Committee. The second was to provide for professional input to the Cabinet Committee through the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Regional Development, a committee which I chaired and which consisted of the Deputy Ministers of the government departments with responsibilities for or contributions to development in the province. The underlying intention was to produce regional development plans for the ten economic regions of the province.

Looking back, I must say that the work of the Advisory Committee on Regional Development was a most satisfying experience, although in many ways it was also trying. The Committee made great strides toward comprehensive thinking about the impact of government and the need for the coordination of government policies, programmes, and practices; however, it was always a strenuous process. At the beginning, for example, the notion of a Ministry of the Environment was merely a gleam in the eyes of a few Committee members. By the end of that period, however, no decisions bearing on development were being made in isolation from one another. Whether or not one would agree with particular decisions, what evolved was full coordination of governmental decisions, including the location of hydro lines.

For many of us, certain decisions had ironic consequences in the longer run. You will recall the collision of values which burst forth publicly in the debate over the Spadina Expressway. I was among those who felt that a stand must be taken against the Expressway. Now I stand before you as a monument to self-inflicted wounds. Shortly thereafter, I left the Government to come to York University and, since I live in the middle of Toronto and work in Downsview, I contemplate the folly of that decision at least four or five times in a normal day!

Regional Planning as a Concept

Our objective, as I have said, was the promulgation of ten regional development plans of which the Toronto-Centred Region was one. Let me turn then to our perception at that time of what we were trying to do. What was the concept all about? Recently, I reread a lecture that I gave to the Royal Canadian Institute shortly after we announced the Toronto-Centred Region concept. It sums up what we were attempting to do. As I look back, we really were undertaking a rather bold venture and responding to a rather exciting challenge. My thoughts at that time were as follows:

"Man has an infinite capacity for retrospective wisdom. How easy it is to look back and to castigate those who did not have the foresight which we so readily ascribe to ourselves. We are concerned in the Toronto-Centred Plan not only with the need for foresight, but also with the capacity to sort out a complex of forces as complicated as putting a man on the moon. In its simplest terms we are seeking to decide the nature, character and quality of life to which we might aspire in the province and, more importantly, which we can pass on to our children and our grandchildren. I had no hesitation, as a civil servant, in venturing forth in this delicate area of public policy because the decisions to be taken in shaping the economic, social, and ecological life of the province are not primarily decisions for governments; they are decisions for you and for me and for all of us.

I am speaking about a planning concept, not a plan in the technical sense but a planning concept down to the year 2000 for the Toronto-Centred Region, a region that represents a 90-mile arc about Metropolitan Toronto — west of Hamilton, around Brantford and the Golden Triangle of Guelph, Kitchener, Galt, and up to Georgian Bay, around Lake Simcoe and in a broad sweep about Peterborough and Lindsay, Cobourg, and Port Hope. This concept, known as *Design for Development: The Toronto-Centred Region*, was placed before the people of this province on May 5, 1970, principally to challenge the imagination and to place, in a workable framework, the potential shape of this region for the next 30 years.

Perhaps, at the outset, I should warn you what it is not.

- It is not a plan for regional government or governmental structure in the Toronto area.
- It is not an exercise in drawing municipal boundaries or delineating areas of local government.
- It is not a venture in power politics, an effort to stultify Metropolitan Toronto, a panacea for rural Ontario, or a capitulation to urban inevitability.
- It is not a process of redistribution of powers between the provincial and municipal levels of government.
- It is neither a straightjacket designed to curtail local and private self-determination, nor an ultimate answer to all the problems posed by a commitment to the concept.

I make this declaration because I can only assume, from much of the commentary, that we failed to make our

objective clear. "No specifics," "insufficient detail," "an absence of policy instruments" — such are the editorial darts that have punctured our professional pride. However, when the government was deciding to put out, not a full-blown plan, but a generalized concept, for the first round, I often amused myself by writing mock heads for the editorials that would have accompanied the promulgation of a rigid, inflexible, and completely committed plan for the Toronto-Centred Region. "Dictatorship Descends on Queen's Park," "The Death Knell of Local Government in Ontario," "The Citizens' Enslavement by Technocracy," and, to an appropriate flourish of trumpets and roll of drums, "Once a Place to Stand and a Place to Grow, Freedom Now Crushed in Ontario."

I suggested that these decisions would not be the decisions of governments but must be the decisions of people. What degree of limitation are we prepared to place on self-determination in the interest of future generations? What balance are we willing to strike between those economic forces seeking a place to grow and those conservationists who want to be assured not only of a place to stand but even a place to breathe? We must remember that whereas 100 years ago John Stuart Mill said that the best government was the one that interfered least in the life of the citizen, today, government is subjected to the paradoxical public demand for action in every imaginable field, combined with minimal interference with the rights and in the lives of individuals. I stress those things because the human factor is at the centre of the issues — as in the dilemma of our individual freedom versus social control — and, eventually, it is a question of how far and how fast government is prepared to go. Part of the reason that the Toronto-Centred Region Plan failed to be translated into practice was, to be sure, the difficulty of reconciling a number of professional objectives and concepts, but the ultimate constraint was the government's sense of how much people were prepared to accept.

The Fundamental Objective: Decentralization

Behind the concept, when we began, was an objective that appeared to enjoy wide support. Boiled down, the objective was a decentralization of both people and industry, or deconcentration, if you will. This implied more than a shift to the suburbs or to commuter communities; it involved the intensification of economic life as far out as Barrie and Midland, Port Hope and Cobourg.

The concept itself was composed of several points.

1) Along the Ontario shoreline, from Bowmanville in the East to Hamilton in the West, we envisaged a two-tier parallel arrangement of cities that would accommodate approximately 5.7 million by the year 2000, or 72 percent of the overall Toronto-Centred Region's eight million people, compared with 76 percent in 1966.

2) Policies of urban expansion in the northern and eastern segments of what we called Zone 3, the distant part of the Toronto-Centred Region, envisaged an increase from 700,000 people in 1966 to two million in the year 2000, a shift from 20 percent of the total population to 25 percent.

3) Through a major restructuring of the form of urban growth occurring in the western part of Zone 3, heavy industry, which for years traditionally congregated in that part of Western Ontario, was expected to move to the north and to the east.

4) In the intermediate zone, Zone 2, which was designed to provide breathing space, there was to be limited growth and moderate expansion of the smaller communities then in existence on a relatively small urban axis. In fact, it was conceived that Zone 2 could be confined to a growth of from 160,000 to 300,000 by the year 2000, or a decline of 4.5 percent of the total to 3.7 percent.

5) Within that area, growth was to be confined in a narrow urban northern axis, from Metropolitan Toronto through Richmond Hill and Newmarket to Bradford.

6) Within the whole area, there was to be preservation of adequate open space for overall regional needs, and an overlay of parkway belts, which were to be a priority, crossing the two parallel tiers of cities in Zone 1, from north to south and east to west within the zone.

7) The concomitant growth of public transportation facilities was intended. Various schemes were being contemplated in the Government for the rapid movement of people, such as Go-Transit.

Complicating Factors

Now let me say a word about a series of parallel events within the Government which tended to complicate the evolution of the plan as such. I shall refer to six points.

1) In 1967, the Ministry of Treasury and Economics was formed, as the maturing of the first of the responsibilities of the Office of the Chief Economist to which I alluded earlier. In order for government fiscal policy to be made truly economic policy, the Economics Branches were moved over to the Treasury to form Treasury and Economics. Since the Regional

Development Branch was part of the move, we now had a key instrument for the fulfillment of regional development plans through use of the provincial budget to assist planned location and development.

2) The preparation of plans for regional government was moving ahead rapidly in the late 1960's within the Department of Municipal Affairs.

3) Housing was becoming an increasingly important issue in the Ontario Government, leading in the early 1970's to the establishment of the Comay Task Force on Housing.

4) Large developments were beginning to surface in other parts of the province, requiring a reassessment of how easy or how difficult it would be to decentralize people and industry. The expected developments in Haldimand-Norfolk, particularly Nanticoke, were predicted to have a major impact and, as a result, to cause a tug-of-war in the government. That strong economic force would draw attention to Western Ontario once again, while the objective of policy was to try to push economic activity to the north and to the east.

5) Difficulties emerged rather quickly in the implementation and the application of the Parkway Belt concept, difficulties that originated, perhaps, in the concept itself. The parkway belt was conceived as both a service corridor — a place to congregate service facilities — and a greenbelt. As I look back at the literature and the debates, that was a source of confusion and difficulty. People were not committed to the concept, because they were not sure whether these two objectives — service corridor and greenbelt — were in fact reconcilable. Once it became clear that the cost of establishing those greenbelts, in the face of high commercial value, was going to pose a great problem for the government and also a good deal of legal uncertainty with respect to compensation and expropriation, the issue became very tangled.

6) In this period of time, there was gathering concern about the environment. Perhaps the best applied example of this important new concern about the environment was to be found in other work going on in our ministry; to wit, the Niagara Escarpment Study, under Professor Gertler, and preparations for Environmental Assessment Acts.

Consequences for Planning

As you can see, the task was complicated indeed by the concurrence of a number of major new influences on government thinking and on the government delivery system, all imposing very heavily on local people, local politicians, and the community broadly defined. What were the consequences of all that? Let me try to sum up the consequences as I see them in seven points.

1) We had a lot of difficulty because *Design for Development* merged two planning concepts — regional planning in the physical sense and regional planning in the economic sense. Therefore, we had a difficult professional task in keeping together the forces and aspirations of the physical planners with the concepts and objectives of the economic planners. Overlaid on top of that was *Design for Development: Phase II* which wedded regional government to the process. The result was a full-blown restructuring of government, all of which matured into the establishment in 1972 of the so-called TEIGA. TEIGA brought together Treasury and Economics with Municipal Affairs into one central ministry of government with the added consequence, I might say, that I suddenly found myself becoming the surprised midwife at the birth of some 11 regional governments in the next couple of years. "Region" and "regional" quickly became dirty words in political terms, a situation that clearly affected the momentum of the Toronto-Centred Region Plan.

2) As I mentioned, housing had become a great priority and faced the Government with the difficult decision of how to reconcile the obvious need for housing people who were expecting to have a roof over their heads with some of the land preservation plans, parkway belts, and so on, in the Toronto-Centred Region. One of my own great favourites from the fiscal side of the Ministry in those days — the Land Speculation Tax — became a victim of that era as well. It was perhaps a little too adventuresome for Ontario at that stage.

3) People continued to move into the existing suburbs, where growth continued to take place. I note with interest, for example, that between the years 1976 and 1981, the population of the City of Toronto went down by 6.4 percent, while in Brampton in the same period the population rose by 43 percent, in Mississauga by 25 percent, in Newmarket by 19 percent, in Markham by 34.5 percent, and in Pickering by 34.8 percent. Clearly the force of natural movement was running very strongly against the objectives of the Toronto-Centred Region plan.

4) The plan envisaged the creation of some new cities in the east, in Durham Region, and so on. I believe that the new city concept largely foundered, as I look back on it, from the fallout of the airport location issue. That was another issue on the public agenda at the time. We were heavily involved in a joint task force with the Federal Government about the location of the new International

Airport. Four sites were identified, and the one that would have suited our regional planning purposes most effectively was the most easterly one, in Port Perry. It fell victim to a number of technical constraints, however, not only in terms of the movement of people, but also in weather patterns and so on. The compromise location was in the Pickering area, thus deflecting the debate into the location of an airport and away from the decentralization of people and the establishment of new cities. The compromise was too close to the city for proper decentralization and thus it really would have added to urban-suburban agglomeration. The unfortunate timing of the whole debate over the airport badly distracted attention away from the issues of the Toronto-Centred Region.

5) Economic growth was not looked upon as an unmixed blessing by those for whom it was destined. I remember well coming up to a conference in York University at that time and being faced with some friends from Port Hope who expressed, in no uncertain terms, what they thought of the idea of transferring Metropolitan Toronto's future growth down to their community — they were having none of it.

6) Another large external element that hovered over the scene at the time was the location of hydro lines. Again, this accident of timing also helped to undermine public support for planning because, ironically, the need for more power became confused with planning. Planning was perceived as the culprit that was bringing in power lines. What people began to see most vividly from the talk about planning was 500 KV lines humming over their heads or looming over their backyards.

7) Most interesting of all was the gathering energy crisis that arrived around 1973, because it challenged some of the basic concepts of decentralization. Now we should be reducing transportation costs, largely fuel-based, not adding to them; therefore, economic growth should be concentrated in metropolitan areas, while making it easier for people to move within those metropolitan areas. This was reinforced by another factor — mounting concern about disappearing agricultural land, which suggested that people should move up rather than out.

Consequences for Policy

The net result was a large policy overload on the Ontario Government where public impact was concerned. It should be remembered, in addition, that this same period coincided with the great growth of government at all levels. During the period 1950 to 1970, government moved from handling approximately 22 percent of the gross national expenditure to some 40 percent. People were deeply conscious at the same time of the intrusion of government in their daily lives. Along with these changes, the Ontario Government was active in other areas of the province in programs similar to the one I have described for the Toronto-Centred Region. As I was leaving the government in 1974, one final task force was being set up, perhaps aptly called "COLUC" — Central Ontario and Lakeshore Urban Complex.

I recall that, as early as 1970, there were some events that might have been prophetic, and I will mention these in closing, quoting from my lecture to the Royal Canadian Institute.

"You will have recognized that the concept is based on one underlying principle, a principle which came through persistently in the briefs of MTARTS — people and economic activity must be decentralized from the urban core into the outlying regions, but this must not be done in the manner that will destroy green space for agriculture and recreation. To put it in a paradoxical nutshell, we required "centralized decentralization." I am happy to report almost unanimous support and approval in the submissions that we have received. However, this is not as easy as it would sound. I must have seen at least 20 delegations myself and the prologue was always the same. "This is a wonderful plan, we support you entirely, you cannot afford to do otherwise, please stick to your guns — but, by the way. . . ." And then comes the conflict with backyard "X" or community aspiration "Y". Such is the real test of altruism, because planning cannot be only for your neighbour, it must be for you. It requires consistency, unselfishness and some sacrifice. I recall the late Premier W.A.C. Bennett of British Columbia describing a television programme in which he was being assailed unmercifully, in an eyeball-to-eyeball conversation, by a professional anti-pollutionist. Mr. Bennett finally said to his adversary, "If you would do me the courtesy of refraining from asphyxiating me with cigarette smoke, my mind might clear up long enough to talk about pollution."

There is a deep subjective element to these questions. For example, we received two briefs from highly competent professional organizations — each diametrically opposed to the other on the basic principle to which I referred. The Town Planning Institute argued that we were not going nearly far enough in our decentralization policy, whereas the Urban Development Institute argued that decentralization is totally unwarranted.

Whatever the degree, there is no question that we were talking about a planned environment and a degree of deliberate reshaping of the environment which would surpass anything attempted (or attempted successfully) anywhere in the world. When we are tempted to be impatient, or emotional, or categorical, one should really ponder the extent of those proposals. I recall very well at a Metropolitan Conference in Toronto, talking to a Russian urban planner who was describing the early plans to confine the growth of the city of Moscow to 6 million and how it reached 8 million and had been a total failure. I said to him, "In your country of all places, what went wrong?" He said, "Well, the people just kept coming." So the people keep moving, they keep coming into the area. If the Russians have found it difficult to reverse those trends, then it is no wonder that we find it difficult too."

Two Lessons from the Ontario Experience

If there were anything to be learned from these planning concepts, it is the need to be aware of two conditions. First, we will continue to face conflicting values, and second, emotions rather than reason will more often be dominant.

Let me illustrate what I mean from an experience of those days. About the same time that we presented the Toronto-Centred Region Plan, the Government presented a different type of plan to the people in a region of Ontario where circumstances were radically different. The plan was *Design for Development: Northwestern Ontario* down to the year 1990. I shall never forget the first two questions that were put by members of the audience in the ensuing discussion. The first person was very angry and said, "The plan does not go nearly far enough in bringing new industry and urban development to the Northwest," and the second comment was, "Go home, we don't want Southern Ontario-type economic development in our part of the province." Obviously the answer is that we have to guide economic growth in a manner that will minimize pollution and maximize conservation and preservation. In a word, the task remains as it always has been, and as John Stuart Mill reminded us in 1850: to reconcile economic advancement with environmental enhancement.

That leads me to one other example of the problems of such planning. Suppose we look just at the Zone 2 concept of 300,000 people by the year 2000, gathered mainly along a narrow vertical axis — not a lot of people for an area the size of Zone 2. The questions are: who would be responsible for retaining the land in a natural or conserved state, and how much would we be willing to pay society to do so. How are those municipalities whose plans for greater growth have already been approved, and the individuals who have acquired lands for responsible development, to be compensated?

I remember a rather sobering experience in that regard when we were doing the work leading to the plans for the preservation of the Niagara Escarpment. I began to find that the most militant conservationists I knew seemed to be living comfortable lives in the middle of Toronto. I decided to talk to some farmers, who, presumably, could be expected to have a particular affection for the soil, the true grass-roots, as it were. I was shocked to find that most or many could not wait to sell their land for industrial uses. Of course there are good reasons not unrelated to taxation and other matters of public policy, but I cannot refrain from mentioning one particular conversation with a man who was arguing, in the same breath, for preservation of the fruit lands and a reduction in the mark-up on imported wines. Anything is possible at a price, but the whole process of public policy is a matter of deciding: who should pay and what should be the price?

The climate has clearly changed and some of the failures of this process are manifest, although I think the lessons are extremely helpful. I believe that those who are professionally involved in these matters should persevere. My guess is that the focus of Ontario over the next two decades will be on the intensification of the present structure, rather than its fundamental redirection, not the least because of the arrival of deep-seated and enduring structural economic problems. That, then, leads me to conclude that perhaps our best efforts should be directed after all at the quality of our cities and their human dimension. Even Wordsworth, the poet of nature and rural England, found that he could be moved by the beauty of London. Overlooking the city from Westminster Bridge, he was inspired to write this sonnet:

> Earth has not anything to show more fair:
> Dull would he be of soul who could pass by
> A sight so touching in its majesty:
> This city now doth, like a garment, wear
> The beauty of the morning; silent, bare,
> Ships, towers, domes, theatres, and temples lie
> Open unto the fields, and to the sky;
> All bright and glittering in the smokeless air.
> Never did sun more beautifully steep
> In his first splendour, valley, rock, or hill;
> Ne'er saw I, never felt, a calm so deep!
> The river glideth at his own sweet will:
> Dear God! the very houses seem asleep;
> And all that mighty heart is lying still!

What better place to begin than Downsview?

Discussion

QUESTIONER: You talk as though the Town Planning Institute were on equal terms with the Urban Development Institute. There is something wrong with that equation. UDI has money for development; the Town Planning Institute does not. You talk about the process as being natural but someone decided to put in that big sewer which is allowing more low-density sprawl in Vaughan and Markham. That decision was not "natural". Perhaps you were right to suggest that all people are equal but you might have acknowledged that some people are more equal than others.

PRESIDENT MACDONALD: I was not talking about values that have to do with money. The values I was talking about were individual or human values. Their consequences are an entirely different matter, of course. What you've raised is the question of the political process and political decision-making. That is not a topic I set out to talk about today. I have been talking about what happened from the point of view of the planners, the professionals and the public servants who were involved in it. If you want to know my view of why the government made certain political decisions and whether they were good or bad I'm quite prepared to talk about that some other time, but that's not what I set out to do today.

Alternative Regional Morphologies

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The Toronto-Centred Region (TCR) concept, originally made public by the Government of Ontario in 1970, remains, to use its own catch-phrase, the basic 'design for development' in the physical planning of the south-central portion of the province (Government of Ontario, 1970). The aim of this paper is to suggest that the TCR concept, in spite of its numerous sensible recommendations, is basically inadequate for the needs of the region because it views the pattern of settlement in general, and the structure of the urban system in particular, in monocentric rather than polycentric terms. After first clarifying what is meant by monocentric and polycentric thinking, the paper attempts to indicate specifically how the polycentric concept of settlement growth can be applied to the problem of urban expansion in south-central Ontario.

Monocentric and Polycentric Thinking

The essence of monocentric thinking is the idea that only the largest city in any particular region is really important, and that the fate of other cities in the same general area must be sacrificed to the expansionist tendencies of this dominant centre. According to this monocentric concept, the dominant city grows steadily outward in all directions (unless blocked by natural barriers such as coastlines or rugged terrain), engulfing formerly separate communities and ultimately suppressing their identities. Polycentric thinking, in contrast, holds that the identities of *all* cities, except possibly the very smallest, are worth preserving, and that steps should be taken to ensure the continued separate existence of all the chief centres throughout the region in both physical (i.e., land use) and psychological terms. Thus, the polycentric view regards all the principal cities of an area as being equally 'important', even though these cities may differ from one another quite considerably in population size.

Although many well-documented examples of monocentric development could be cited, we may take London, England, as the classic case. Essentially, London has expanded — and has been allowed to expand — radially outward in all directions, and several historically distinct towns have been absorbed as this process has continued. Only once in London's history has a deliberate effort been made to control the city's growth; this was the creation of the celebrated green belt in the late 1930s. The planners (notably Sir Patrick Abercrombie) who advocated

the introduction of the green belt seem to have sincerely believed that the act of encircling the metropolis with a tightly regulated band of open space some eight kilometres (five miles) in width would somehow bring the growth of London to a halt. The proposal received a sympathetic hearing from the politicians of the day, and the Green Belt Act was passed by Parliament in 1938 and took effect in 1939, ostensibly freezing London's growth. By a truly remarkable coincidence, London *did* stop growing for the next six years, but this stoppage (as we now know with the wondrous advantage of hindsight) was primarily a result of the fact that the Second World War put a damper on population movements in general. After the war, the demographic drift to southeast England soon re-established itself, but most of the new Londoners found that they had to take up residence *outside* the green belt rather than inside it. The planners, meanwhile, were busily engaged in the development of new towns, modelling their efforts on Ebenezer Howard's early successes at Letchworth and Welwyn Garden City.

For the most part the new towns have been successful in environmental terms (though Milton Keynes, still under development, is a horror story in this respect — but that is a story for another occasion); but they have been quite unable to keep up with the steady influx of newcomers and the resulting demand for additional housing and urban infrastructure. London, in short, has continued its monocentric pattern of expansion. Old centres — and some of the new ones too — continue to be engulfed. The green belt is now a circle of open space *within* the body of the metropolis, and, although it is an amenity for those who live nearby, its main effect has been to add ten miles per day to the commuting journeys of those who must cross it in order to reach their places of work.

The Monocentric Bias in Ontario Planning

There are three pieces of evidence which suggest that it is justifiable to accuse the creators of the TCR concept in Ontario of monocentric thinking. First, the very name of the concept is itself incriminating. To say that the design for development is 'Toronto-Centred' is to express an implicit commitment to the overwhelming significance of a single dominant metropolis. The reader is naturally led to infer that planning proposals of all kinds will be evaluated, so far as the provincial government is concerned, from a Torontonian point of view, and that the needs and aspirations of other cities will take second place to the expansion plans of Toronto. It is most likely, of course, that no one connected with the writing of the TCR report had any deliberate intention of giving offence to the inhabitants of other cities. Nevertheless, the term 'Toronto-Centred' at the very least was an unfortunate choice of words.

Secondly, as is generally well known, the spatial framework used in the TCR report as a basis for organizing the various recommendations takes the form of a series of concentric circles — or rather, given the presence of Lake Ontario, concentric semicircles. The focus of this framework, of course, is Toronto. Implicit in this concentric pattern is the idea of an 'urban field' (Friedman and Miller, 1965) or a sphere of metropolitan influence that can be subdivided into zones, with each zone serving a distinctive function in relation to the metropolis at the centre. In brief, the innermost zone is set aside for dense urban development as the built-up area expands; the second zone is identified as a 'commutershed' containing towns functioning as dormitory satellites, some of which may also be sites for decentralized industry; and the outermost zone is intended to provide recreational facilities to serve the needs of the metropolitan population, particularly in the west along the Niagara Escarpment and in the north and northeast on the fringe of the Precambrian Shield. In the present context, the specific details of this scheme are less important than the simple fact that the over-all pattern is so distinctly concentric. By definition, concentric circles have only a single centre.

Thirdly, monocentric thinking is clearly evident in the peculiar manner in which the TCR report deals with the cities of the Middle Grand River Valley — that is, Guelph, Kitchener-Waterloo, Cambridge, Paris, Brantford, and several smaller centres. These cities, which collectively house more than 425,000 people and account for a significant slice of Ontario's and Canada's industrial production, are simply regarded as part of the urban field's outermost zone — the zone set aside for recreational land uses (together with some farming)! It seems incredible that an urban complex such as Kitchener-Waterloo, which is important enough to be regarded as a Census Metropolitan Area by the federal government, should be placed in the same land-use zone as southern Muskoka and the Kawartha Lake District. A more blatant attempt to suppress the significance of a major urban community would be hard to conceive.

These various pieces of evidence make it clear that the TCR concept was developed essentially along monocentric lines. As we shall see, the polycentric view of urban system structure offers a more flexible and more rational foundation for the orderly physical development of a region of south-central Ontario's type.

The Polycentric Alternative

Examples of polycentric settlement systems involving large cities include the Ruhr Valley of West Germany, the Lorraine industrial region of eastern France, certain parts of the English Midlands, and, on this side of the Atlantic, the Cleveland-Akron-Youngstown-Pittsburgh district of northeastern Ohio and adjacent Pennsylvania. The classic case, however, is that of the western Netherlands. Here the accidents of history have given rise to a horseshoe-shaped cluster of major cities containing almost seven million inhabitants within an area barely eighty kilometres (fifty miles) in diameter. Beginning in the southwest at the mouth of the Rhine and proceeding clockwise around the horseshoe, the principal cities are Rotterdam, The Hague, Leydon, Haarlem, Amsterdam, Hilversum, and Utrecht. The Dutch calls this whole region the 'Randstad' or 'rim City', from an analogy between the arc of dense urbanization and the raised rim of a dish or saucer. The region of the Randstad, including the inhabitants of the smaller towns and the open countryside, contains forty-eight per cent of the Dutch population on only twenty-four per cent of the national territory.

Even by European standards, the Randstad is an area of marked urban congestion. Moreover, strong forces are at work which threaten to make the situation even worse. Industrial investment is attracted to the cities of the Randstad because these centres offer a large local market for manufactured goods, a ready supply of labour with diversified skills, and an established infrastructure of services required by the business community such as legal firms, financial institutions, advertising agencies, brokerage houses, and so forth. Like many other parts of the world — including, of course, southern Ontario — the Netherlands has been experiencing a protracted period of 'metropolitanization', accompanied, as usual, by a steady drift of population into the largest cities. In the Randstad there is a real danger of total urban coalescence, in which case the historically unique cities of the region would lose their identities in an undifferentiated mass of bricks and mortar filling the western quarter of the country.

But the Dutch have anticipated this danger and have taken steps to try to prevent its occurrence. From our present point of view, the most significant aspect of the Dutch planning proposals for the Randstad is their clear dependence upon a polycentric conceptualization of the structure of the urban system. It is taken as an axiom that the identities of the major cities are individually important and worth preserving; all the principal elements of the over-all plan flow from this one basic assumption. In effect, as Hall (1966, pp. 111–115) has reported, a four-point programme has been put into operation, consisting of the following components:

First, by means of various incentives such as tax concessions and construction subsidies, the national government promotes decentralization by encouraging new industries to locate away from the Randstad in the eastern part of the country. Cities in the east such as Groningen and Breda are the beneficiaries of this decentralization policy. But the Randstad also benefits by a lessening of the pressures for rapid urban expansion.

Second, in order to preserve the identities of the main Randstad cities in physical terms, the government has established buffer zones of open space between each pair of neighbouring centres. These buffer zones are typically four kilometres (2.5 miles) wide and resemble green belts in the sense that virtually all new building is prohibited. Unlike the classic green belt of London, however, they do not encircle each city's entire built-up area.

Third, since the cities of the Randstad lie, geometrically speaking, around the perimeter of a circle, and since they tend to grow toward one another, there is a likelihood that the central open core or 'green heart' of the Randstad could become completely filled in by urban development if growth is allowed to continue unchecked. In order to prevent this inward collapse, the Dutch have declared the green heart, or most of it, to be out of bounds for future urban growth. Thus the central core, several portions of which are occupied by important market gardening and horticultural enterprises, forms a hub of open space from which the buffer zones between the major cities radiate like the spokes of a wheel.

Finally, since *some* future growth must be anticipated, and since the cities of the Randstad will not be permitted to expand either laterally into each other's suburbs or centripetally into the green heart, provision must be made for *outward* expansion into areas beyond the perimeter of the horseshoe. The principal directions for outward growth will be southeastward from the city of Utrecht, northeastward from Amsterdam on the world-famous Ijsselmeer polders (centring on the new city of Lelystad), and southward from Rotterdam on to land reclaimed from salt water as part of the Rhine Delta Plan.

Taking this four-point programme as a whole, the important lesson to be learned is that polycentric thinking

leads to quite a different *geometry* of development than monocentric thinking. In place of general concentric outward sprawl, interrupted (but not contained) by one or more circular green belts, the polycentric concept implies an integrated system of green heart areas, buffer zones, and outward-facing radial wedges along which future urban growth will be channelled. This type of layout is shown schematically in Figure 1 for a Randstad-like system involving a single green heart. Note how the buffer zones or 'spokes' link the green heart or 'hub' to the open countryside beyond the perimeter of the ring of cities. Note also how this pattern of development not only provides ready access to open space for everyone, but also preserves the separate identity of each city while still providing room for every centre to expand in specially designated directions.

A Polycentric View of South-Central Ontario

We are now in a position to apply the above ideas to the problem of the future development of south-central Ontario. It must be emphasized at the outset that the polycentric concept of urban system structure, like all planning concepts, does not give rise to a 'single true and final answer' for any region to which it may be applied. The application of polycentric thinking invariably involves the exercise of professional judgment at many points. Thus, the proposal we are about to consider should be regarded only as *one possible* scenario for the future urban development of south-central Ontario. Variations on this theme would have to be given careful consideration at both the local (i.e., municipal) and the provincial level before any firm decisions could be made.



Figure 1. Schematic representation of a policy for planned future expansion in a polycentric urban system



Figure 2. The polycentric planning concept applied to south-central Ontario. For the meanings of the symbols, see Figure 1.

Green Heart Districts

The area to which the present proposal applies extends from Oshawa in the east to Woodstock in the west and from north of Highway 7 to the shoreline of Lake Erie, including the whole of the Niagara Peninsula (see Figure 2). Within this area it is suggested that not one but *two* green heart districts can be identified. The first lies east of Guelph and Cambridge and northwest of the already highly urbanized strip of territory along the north shore of Lake Ontario from Burlington to Oakville. The second lies south of Hamilton and west of the line of industrial towns along the Welland Canal (St. Catharines, Welland, and Port Colborne).

The first of these two green heart districts is crossed from east to west by the major traffic artery of Highway 401, but the district as a whole nevertheless remains largely rural in character. The small industrial town of Milton lies near the area's eastern edge, but does not seem to pose a major threat to the district's potential role as a zone of open space. From the viewpoint of recreation it is important to note that this green heart area is crossed from north to south by a section of the Niagara Escarpment. Portions of the escarpment, of course, have already been developed for recreational purposes, as at the Kelso Conservation Area. Further development is certainly possible. In terms of the polycentric model this district occupies the interior of a rough quadrilateral that has the major cities of Toronto, Hamilton, Brantford, and Kitchener-Waterloo as its vertexes. Other important towns lie along the sides of this quadrilateral, such as Oakville, Cambridge, and Georgetown (Figure 2). The area is therefore well situated to serve as a major tract of open space for a large surrounding urban population.

The second suggested green heart district is, if anything, an area of even more pronounced rural tranquility than the first. No expressway, as yet, cuts through the area, and the only urban centres of note are sleepy country towns such as Dunnville, Caledonia, and Hagersville. The natural spine of the district is the lower course of the Grand River, a stretch of navigable water that seems capable of supporting more intensive recreational use than it sustains at the present time. Although the urban population around the periphery of this Lower Grand green heart zone is not nearly as large as that surrounding the Milton zone farther north, there is a significant 'market' for open space in the line of cities extending from Brantford through Hamilton and Grimsby to the St. Catharines-Niagara urban complex. Moreover, the current activities of Stelco and Ontario Hydro on the north shore of Lake Erie, and the attendant rapid growth of this Simcoe-Nanticoke urban axis, may be expected to create additional demands for open space and recreational facilities in this general area.

Buffer Zones

Once green heart zones have been identified, the next step in applying the polycentric concept is to designate the buffer zones that will, on the one hand, separate the major urban centres from one another, and, on the other hand, connect the green heart districts with the open countryside beyond these centres (or, as the case may be, with the green heart zones of neighbouring polycentric systems). Some possible buffer zones for south-central Ontario are indicated by the letter 'B' on Figure 2. It no longer seems feasible to place buffer zones between Toronto and Brampton or between Brampton and Georgetown, but a buffer between Georgetown and Guelph would seem to be mandatory. Similarly, the Brantford-Paris complex should be clearly separated from Cambridge on the north, from Simcoe-Nanticoke on the south, and from Hamilton-Burlington on the east. Note how this last-mentioned buffer zone would serve to connect the two green heart districts described earlier. It also seems desirable to have a buffer zone between Hamilton and St. Catharines, although quick action is necessary if this option is not to be lost owing to the rapid expansion of Grimsby in the middle of this gap.

At this point it should be observed that the idea of green hearts and buffer zones can be applied simultaneously at different scales. Consider, for example, the cities of the Middle Grand Valley. At this local, rather than regional, scale of analysis, one might place a small green heart of open space in the centre of the triangle formed by Guelph, Kitchener-Waterloo, and Cambridge, with buffer zones added along the sides of this triangle in order to keep these three cities apart. Similar local arrangements might be made at the eastern end of the Niagara Peninsula to separate St. Catharines, Niagara-on-the-Lake, Niagara Falls, Welland, and Port Colborne (although the separation of St. Catharines from Niagara Falls is perhaps already a lost cause). In short, by intentionally varying the scale at which the situation is perceived, we can interpret the entire urban pattern as one of polycentric systems *within* polycentric systems. Green hearts and buffer zones can then be identified at two or more scales, as desired. This great flexibility adds considerably to the appeal of the polycentric concept as a regional planning tool.

Directed Expansion

The final step is the identification of designated paths for the future outward expansion of the major cities. When this is done for the cities of south-central Ontario (see Figure 2 for some schematic suggestions), an interesting feature emerges. The cities of what might be termed the 'outer arc', extending from Oshawa via Kitchener to Nanticoke, are free to expand to the north and west, but Hamilton and the cities of the eastern end of the Niagara Peninsula are trapped by the configuration of the international border and the shorelines of Lakes Erie and Ontario. For Hamilton, one possible solution might be to abandon the idea of a buffer zone separating this city from Brantford, and to allow Hamilton to grow westward to Brantford and even beyond. Some would argue, however, that a better answer might be a policy of dispersal aimed at retarding the growth rates of Hamilton and of the St. Catharines-Niagara complex. The latter area, for reasons connected with the present economic fortunes of several of the main industries located there, is currently stagnant, but this is no reason for assuming that it will not grow rapidly at some future time.

As intimated earlier, the ideas put forward in the preceding paragraphs are intended only as a sketch of a set of possibilities, and not as a unique 'perfect solution' for the region's growth. It seems clear, however, that the issue of future expansion cannot be effectively addressed by any proposal that only takes account of the requirements and aspirations of the area's largest city. A broader conception is needed, one that recognizes the region as a shared space in which many cities have valid territorial interests. Only a polycentric view is capable of meeting this important demand.

Conclusion

In contrast to the monocentric concept of urban expansion, the polycentric view offers a flexible method of accommodating the future growth of a whole series of cities while simultaneously ensuring the provision of large tracts of open space and the preservation of each city's unique identity. It is suggested, therefore, that the polycentric concept is superior to the monocentric concept as a general foundation for physical planning at the regional scale. More specifically, it is contended that the future well-being of south-central Ontario's urban system would benefit significantly from a complete reformulation of the Toronto-Centred Region concept along the polycentric lines sketched above. It is hoped that the suggestions put forward in this paper will stimulate a fruitful discussion of the advantages of the polycentric concept as a regional planning tool.

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Discussion

QUESTIONER: I was interested in your emphasis on Southwestern Ontario. I'm sorry that I didn't get the opportunity to ask President Macdonald why the Toronto-Centred Region ever looked east in the first place.

PROFESSOR MARSHALL: I can't speak for Ian, of course, but, for reasons having to do with the historical evolution of cities in this part of the world, it does seem rather silly to try to promote massive development east of Toronto. The links with the United States are simply too great. We have all kinds of studies showing the reluctance of individuals to invest in new development in the shadow zone east of Toronto. I might add that the area that I showed in my map of Southern Ontario is essentially cut off when you get into London's sphere of influence in the far west. That seems to be a quite separate monocentric Ontario region, with very different development problems from those of the Golden Horseshoe.

QUESTIONER: Professor Marshall, you are probably aware that the Provincial Ministry of Revenue is moving to

Oshawa. Other ministries are moving to other parts of the Province. Would you advocate this type of public sector planning?

PROFESSOR MARSHALL: I'm neither for it nor against it. The difficulties in evaluating the costs and the benefits of any such move are so great that even though some may claim they have arrived at a rational solution, it seems to me that the decisions are ultimately moral decisions. I deliberately don't say political decisions because I think all decisions are political decisions. As far as I'm concerned, Oshawa is part of Metropolitan Toronto. The Regional Municipalities of Durham, York, and Peel represent little more than a containment device engineered by the Province because of its fear of the expansionist tendency of Metropolitan Toronto. That is not intended as a criticism of the Province. I've already indicated that I tend to think provincially rather than locally. But functionally Oshawa and the whole Durham Region are part of the Metropolitan Toronto complex. Moving to Kingston is a much bolder and more meaningful venture. Kingston can be described as a centrally isolated town. It offers many advantages that cannot be found in places like Toronto and Montréal, although I would hope that it doesn't expand to the extent that its small town atmosphere is destroyed.

I get very tired of interminable debates about decentralization that ask "Is it a good thing? Is it a bad thing? Should we preserve the small town atmosphere or should we not?" Many of these questions beg the issue. The real issue is whether we can preserve a livable environment regardless of the size of the urban complex. I know of no evidence that says you can stop the growth of large cities.

QUESTIONER: The idea of green wedges or a green heart surrounded by urban areas seems to be an inverted garden city approach. Don't you think that in the long run there would be overwhelming development pressures around the periphery that would eventually destroy that objective?

PROFESSOR MARSHALL: There are indeed strong pressures for inward development into green-heart zones. All I can say is that unless we think along the polycentric lines I was outlining, we may miss the point that you've just raised. There are indeed dangers of inward collapse and the loss of central open spaces. We need to be pluralistic and to experiment with a variety of concepts. If we don't include the polycentric concept in our thinking, however, we may be in danger of failing to spot that particular danger. Whether we do anything about it is a matter for the next level of debate.

We heard comments this morning about reports that are written and then put on the shelf to gather dust. This happens at the local as well as the provincial level. I think it's useful to think of such reports in terms of Malinowski's conception of manifest and latent functions. The manifest function of the Toronto-Centred Region Report and similar documents is to guide the development of the Province. The latent function is to keep certain people employed and drawing their paychecks. This is not a facetious or cynical remark. Think of what unemployment would be like if the civil service had not expanded as much as it has.

QUESTIONER: What kind of service does Southern Ontario provide to counteract the tendency for development to go elsewhere?

PROFESSOR MARSHALL: The tendency for net migration at the interprovincial scale to favour the western provinces will affect development in Southern Ontario. It is difficult to forecast what these effects will be, but they will primarily take the form of changes in *rates* of development rather than changes in specific patterns.

QUESTIONER: The TCR plan assumed that Southern Ontario would provide a focus for development. Now it appears that it won't be the focus. How does that affect the plan?

PROFESSOR MARSHALL: Do you mean a focus for the whole country?

QUESTIONER: Yes. Do you think the plan overestimates the area's importance?

PROFESSOR MARSHALL: No, I don't think so. I tend to think of the planning enterprise as being analogous to the fable of the mouse and the elephant. A lot of things that are happening in the region will happen anyway, with or without planning. We have to do our best to preserve a livable environment. That is not purple prose; that is what it really comes down to. It doesn't really matter where the next airport or the next subway line goes, so long as the living conditions faced by the individual are taken into account.

The City and the Region

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It falls to the local politician, either at the municipal or the regional level, to cope with the conceptual plans of senior governments and our friends, the planners. The title of this symposium, *Conflict or Cooperation*, is a most timely question. The answer, I'm sure, is going to prove in the short run to be neither conflict nor cooperation, but competition. It's going to be ever sharpening competition between the Region of Metro Toronto and the surrounding Regional Municipalities.

Old Plans, New Circumstances

The first blow to the buoyant planning of the late '60s and early '70s was the 1976 census, which proved how wrong we all could be. That census clearly demonstrated that the population of the City of Toronto was shrinking at a rate of 2% a year, and it continues to do so. Up until about 1977, apparently, nobody noticed. Toronto has lost approximately 16.8% of its population over the last 10 years, and Metro Toronto's growth rate has levelled out. You recall the controversy when that 1976 census first appeared. The planners at the City said "This can't be right; there was a miscount; this didn't happen; this isn't happening." It was a long time before governments and bureaucracies would accept that very surprising development. Planning policies had been formulated to accommodate the explosive growth of the sixties, in the expectation that that growth would continue into the foreseeable future. Many of those projections were simple straight line projections, right out into infinity. This perception was strengthened by the statistics coming from municipalities all over the Province that exaggerated population growth potential because, of course, government per capita grants are based on population. By the time planning policies were reflected in planning decisions at the provincial and municipal levels and in official plans, the trend had changed. Growth had disappeared or the rate of growth had slowed considerably. But the policies of the '60s legislated in the '70s are now affecting us in the '80s by accelerating a thinning out and dispersal of population, jobs and industries over a wider and wider area.

At the provincial level there are two policies that are seriously affecting Metropolitan Toronto's ability to retain its population. First, there is the big sewer adjacent to Metropolitan Toronto's boundaries and second, there are very large provincial subsidies that are funding expressways, super highways and especially GO-Transit.* The Province decided to fund the big sewer and the commuter and bus lines because of an expectation of continuing population growth. The first two phases of that huge sewer will open up 10,000 acres of serviced land on the periphery of Metropolitan Toronto. Toronto planners estimate that this is twice as much land as will be required by the turn of the century.

The infrastructure is in place in Metropolitan Toronto to sustain a population of approximately three million. It would appear, however, that there is no way to interfere with the dispersal that is going on because of the enormous cost of the sewer and other services and the need for the outlying regions to attract populations to pay these costs. They're locked in.

In the face of the developing competition between Metropolitan Toronto and the outlying regions to attract people and industry, the Chairman of Metro Council, Paul Godfrey, set up a steering committee on economic development to recommend an economic growth strategy to Metro Council. As a result, the Planning Committee of Metro Council became the Economic Planning Committee, with an advisory group of business and labour representatives. Two economic goals emerged. The first calls for the expansion of employment and the retention of existing jobs; the second calls for the expansion of property assessment to meet the rising costs of government. This is the policy direction for Metro and I'm sure it's duplicated in all regions adjacent to Metro.

*The GO railways and the bus-commuter service operate within a 50-mile radius of Metropolitan Toronto, presently carrying approximately 75,000 passengers daily into Union Station.

Population Trends and Implications

Why are the planners at the municipal level, and particularly the Councils at the municipal level, so extremely concerned about these population trends? Let us look for a moment at the figures in the 1981 census. According to these, the population of Toronto continues to nose-dive. Metro's population grew slightly from 1971 to 1976 and has now levelled out; in fact, there was a slight decrease of under 1%. On the other hand, the regions beyond Metro are continuing to grow, but not nearly as quickly as anticipated. The most recent study I've been able to uncover is John Bousfield & Associates' Study, dated Fall 1981 and called "A Report on the Spatial Patterns of Urban Activity." It estimates a growth of approximately 880,000 people in the whole Region by the turn of the century. Out of that number 160,000 is attributed to Metro. Metro's own projections indicate little or no growth for Metropolitan Toronto. Nevertheless, the infrastructure is there, and the infrastructure has to be paid for. Metropolitan Toronto could absorb half of that 880,000 people by the turn of the century without a ripple.

If we turn to the provincial population figures we get absolutely no comfort. The population in the Province is growing much more slowly. The 1981 census shows it to stand at 8 1/2 million. That's an increase of just one quarter million in the last five years. If one looks at the rate of growth, however, one realizes that that growth took place right after 1976 — in 1977. It slowed down in 1978, so that by 1981, when the census was taken, the rate was a few thousand a year. The interprovincial trade-off in population has left Ontario in a deficit position for the last two or three years. We've been relying heavily on the population transfer from the Province of Quebec but that's dropping off significantly. The Bousfield report indicates that 70% of the Provincial growth will have occurred by the end of the 1980s. In other words, the Province will have 95% of its population by the end of the 1980s.

Where are the people coming from to swell those statistics in the regions beyond the fringe of Metropolitan Toronto? That's what concerns Metro and the City, because Metro and the City see themselves as the population pool from which people will leave for the outer regions. The advent of the new sewer forces the Region of York to strive for a rapid population growth because the charges for the sewer service will be based on the province's cost for providing it — the per capita cost. And the greater the difference between the actual population and the capacity of that sewer, the greater the per capita cost. The Region of York is absolutely locked in. They've got to go for a very substantial rate of growth. On the one hand, Metropolitan Toronto must try and retain its population and the City of Toronto must strive to reverse the population outflow of the last ten years. On the other hand, the regions ringing Metro Toronto have their own goals and all of them are looking forward to substantial growth. Durham sees itself at 432,000 by the year 2,000; Halton at almost 400,000; Peel at almost 900,000 and York at something over half a million. These are very significant growth projections, and they don't coincide with what we expect to happen provincially. So the question remains, where are the people to come from? It's my view that in the short run we're entering a period of fierce competition which, I fear, may become simply "Beggar thy neighbour." There will be competition for new jobs, for keeping what jobs we have within our municipalities, and above all for residents.

Local Government Responses

In response to the growing concern about this population loss and at my urging, City Council in 1979 set up a Committee on Population Redistribution. It produced two reports that became best sellers almost overnight. The Committee prepared a brief to the Provincial government indicating our concern and requested the Provincial government to step into this policy vacuum, because it is a vacuum. The Province has deserted what it created and is probably surveying the situation with as much confusion and concern as those of us who are having to cope with it. We requested the Province to set up a Select Committee of the Legislature to review planning policies and to indicate once again its intention to control urban sprawl. We have not received a positive response from the Province. Metro Toronto has set up its Committee on Economic Planning and has identified priorities from a Metro point of view. As well, the City has developed economic strategies and has hired staff to develop programs and strategies for attracting and keeping jobs in Toronto. The City continues to support the decentralization of large office building concentration and has put very definite caps on that development in its Official Plan, however, because of the strained capacity of our transportation system. The City target this year was approximately 5.8 million square feet of office space downtown. We've attained about 5 million square feet, so we're well within that target. The development of North York and Scarborough Town Centres is going ahead and we're pleased to see this happening.

Metropolitan Toronto's economic strategy involves

policies and programs for the expansion of employment and assessment, improving relations with the private sector and lobbying both Provincial and Federal governments. It has undertaken a series of studies to assess the development potential of vacant, public and private lands and to assist area municipalities to upgrade deteriorating industrial and commercial areas. The manufacturing study will explore the decline of manufacturing in Metropolitan Toronto and recommend means to improve the manufacturing base. The primary goal of all this activity is to generate jobs. The City of Toronto has undertaken a new economic development initiative with very much the same goal. It is placing a very high priority on encouraging existing manufacturers to update their technology. The aim is to encourage selective, secondary manufacturing and to develop our port lands for modern, economically and environmentally acceptable manufacturing industries. We hope to work with other levels of government to attract industry and to improve the climate for investment in Toronto. Toronto is already recognized as the centre of business and finance for Canada. Out of the 40 foreign banks that have come into this country, for example, 36 have located in the City.

Conclusion

In the short run, it seems that we're locked into this situation of going it alone. Each region will develop its own plans to promote its own growth to sustain the services that must be supplied. Surely in the long run we should be able to accomplish something better. Can we really afford the extensive and expensive infrastructure without sufficient population to sustain it? In times of severe economic recession where do we find the dollars to support the hard services? Where do we find the dollars for the soft services — dollars to provide day care; to provide proper care for the elderly? How do we sustain the quality of life referred to by the previous speaker? These are our concerns and this is why City Council has called on the Provincial government to set up a Select Committee of the Legislature to deal with this problem.

President Macdonald indicated that at one time, about 1974, the Provincial government was suffering from policy overload. I'm sure that's correct, but what they've done as a result of that overload is to abdicate. That has to be changed. We must get together but we may not be able to do this until we are forced to learn the hard lessons of competition. Eventually, however, we shall be forced to come together to rationalize the distribution of growth and the funding of the required services so that ten years from now we don't have to look back to this time and wonder at our collective stupidity.

Discussion

CHAIRMAN: In observing what has been happening to Metro Toronto's growth patterns and the changes that have occurred in Metro over the last ten years, I have been struck by similarities between Toronto's present situation and the situation in which American cities found themselves about 1910 or 1920, when they were no longer growing and when most of the growth was taking place outside their boundaries. I wondered if this has been a concern of yours. Do you see any similarities between either the pattern of economic development here or the way the provincial government is responding to it and what happened in the United States?

MRS. ROWLANDS: What has interested me is that this movement of people out of the core of metropolitan areas into wider areas is something that happened in some of the large cities, notably London, in the 1960's. It started in many of the large metropolitan areas of the United States in the late 1960's or early 1970's and then began to hit us in Metropolitan Toronto and Montreal. It isn't just Toronto. So there would appear to be a dynamic at work. I do not think that we will go the route of American cities, however, in terms of the problems that American cities have in their cores, for many reasons. Our assessment base is fairly secure. The Ontario Municipal Board made sure that we did not overextend ourselves, so we do not have the financial problems that American cities have. I also think the kind of planning that we have done, particularly in the City of Toronto, has given us a different pattern of growth. We have tried to bring people right downtown to live. When that plan was originally developed it was considered impractical and visionary, but there are now people living in a lot of large buildings right downtown. We are going to have a condominium right at Queen and Yonge Streets for example. So I do not see us having the same problems. I am sure we are going to have our own unique problems, but they will not necessarily be the American ones.

QUESTIONER: At the session this morning I raised the question of competition and urban sprawl. The Mayor of Markham responded that he welcomes competition and, as far as he's concerned, urban sprawl is great. The Mayor of Mississauga indicated that the Province needed to take a position on this matter. North York is basing its planning on its central core. How are you going to change all that? I can't see that you're going to be able to convince anybody

that they ought to retrench and take another approach because we all need the jobs, we all need the people, we all need the assessment. You've just indicated that there is just so much, so what do we do?

MRS. ROWLANDS: That's why I am saying that in the short run we are going to compete. I don't think that's good, but there's absolutely no machinery to allow us to do anything else. After a few years of this we may learn that we are going to have to cooperate because we are all part of one large area and our economies are interlocked. But I agree with you. In the short run there does not seem to be any alternative except for each region to develop its own policies to attract jobs, to attract people and to try to provide services. The problem is that it is the taxpayer who is going to pay. If we get into a serious economic recession it is going to be extremely difficult to pay for the kinds of hard services that are now in place to service this extremely large area.

QUESTIONER: You suggested earlier that the York/Durham pipe and the GO system were primarily responsible for the decline of the City of Toronto. It seems to me that much of that decline had started to take place before those facilities came into being. I think people left Toronto because housing prices were getting out of sight. The type of housing that they wanted — family housing, that sort of thing — was no longer available in the city. City Council — not necessarily yours, but prior City Councils — seemed to have a policy of encouraging high rises and then, more recently, of encouraging luxury housing. People wanted homes that were affordable and they were prepared to pay for cheap gas to afford homes in the suburbs. We have seen that turn around recently with the price of gas going up. In a sense the GO system is in response to that. I am a little worried about the comment that somehow that big pipe was the cause of all Toronto's ills.

MRS. ROWLANDS: I am sorry that I left that impression. I indicated that we are involved in a dynamic which has been occurring in the British Isles, in the United States and now here. The big pipe is only exaggerating the dispersal of population. It would have occurred anyway, but the difficulty now is that we have the GO system, we have the big pipe, and we have York Region absolutely locked into a situation where they have to attract growth to pay for the pipe. What might have occurred is being exaggerated because of these services.

I do not agree that the City of Toronto is in decline. It is a very prosperous spot. It is losing population, but that does not mean it is in decline. It could very well be that a population of 600,000 or 630,000 is about right. The City of Toronto has dropped below the 600,000 mark to 592,000. When it was at its peak, it probably was a little overcrowded.

Your comments about the cost of housing certainly are correct, but we have a lot of inexpensive housing in Toronto. We have thousands upon thousands of houses sitting on 18 foot lots that sell for $60,000 to $70,000. The City of Toronto is built at reasonably high density.

With respect to high rise development, the Council has worked very hard to reverse those policies. With respect to expensive condominiums, we will try to do something about that too. Market forces are very difficult to turn aside. The best that one can do is to try and blunt them, but they are almost impossible to satisfy. The Council that stopped the high rises. . . .

QUESTIONER: . . . pushed up housing prices too. I just want to make a comment that reflects on the sessions this morning and a couple of them this afternoon. My impression is that the words, "We need planning", and "We need coordination", were repeated by practically every speaker. President Ian Macdonald related an unhappy tale of how the TCR came to nothing for reasons that he did not want to make explicit. It struck me, as we heard these examples of interregional coordination and interregional planning, that they failed because there is a lack of political will or political ability to make them stick.

I might add, parenthetically, that I also do not think Toronto's Central Area Plan is going to work because of all the millions of square feet that are available for development in the waterfront area, on railway lands, on Harbourfront, on the Harbour Commission lands. I do not think the City of Toronto Council is going to hang tough on that. I am sure it will not. If it doesn't, there go Metro Toronto's regional strategies as enunciated in the Official Plan.

We put all sorts of plans together but apparently in our situation we do not have the political will or the political ability to make them stick. How would you do it?

MRS. ROWLANDS: To begin with, we may have the political will but we do not have the political ability. It is difficult to interpret the political will because there is seldom political unanimity on these things. To speak very

briefly of the Toronto Plan, I suspect it is going to be successful, but perhaps not for the reasons that we would like. I think that it is very unlikely that we are going to attain eight million square feet of office space by whatever year it is, simply because the economic situation will discourage that kind of growth. Whether council would have the will not to approve any more building permits if we began to get close to the target would depend very much on other stresses, on other pressures. The main one is transportation and how we are going to move this vast army of people twice a day, back and forth. There are a lot of questions involved in that.

I am not quite sure that the COLUC plan and the other plan have failed because there was not the political will. I think the assumptions were false. They were built on a belief that a phenomenon that was unique to the '60's would somehow continue. I was working for the Social Planning Council when, about 1971, the birth rate started to drop and immigration was cut off. We took those new numbers and we did some straight line projections just for the heck of it. They showed that Canada would run out of population in about 48 years and 6 months, something like that. But straight line projections were used to forecast those exaggerated growth patterns and now we are stuck with them.

You asked me how we are going to solve this. I did not recommend "planning" to solve it. I said that we had asked the legislature to convene a Select Committee to bring together the folks from the Regions and ourselves to talk about how to begin to straighten this out. Obviously, it is going to require a tremendous amount of ingenuity to solve this problem, and I cannot solve it this afternoon. If the legislature agreed to this, however, we would all begin talking to one another and the regions everywhere would begin to recognize the problems of other regions. I do not think that is going to happen. We are going to be competing and some will be successful and some will not.

Recent Economic Trends in the Toronto Region

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Professor Frisken called me last night to say the announced speaker for this session was unable to attend and asked whether I would stand in. She explained that a gentleman from Queen's Park would deliver a lot of slides and all I'd have to do would be to speak to the slides. When I arrived this morning, however, there were no slides. There was some written material, but I don't think it captured what people expected from this session. The written material reflects the Provincial government's preoccupation at this time with economic development and boosterism. To present it would not be a very helpful way to end our day. So I spent the last hour or so preparing some overheads of my own. I have never in my life used or prepared an overhead. I've regarded it as high tech and just a little too glamorous for an academic, so bear with me.

It seems to me that what we have been thinking about in today's Symposium is the past evolution of the Metro region, the basic social, economic and demographic trends that have helped to shape it, and the kinds of government policies that we put into place to respond to these trends. We then asked whether or not we should continue the past policies into the 1980s or adopt some different course. For this concluding session, I would like to review past trends and government policies, and then forecast future trends and discuss possible policy responses.

To summarize at the beginning, I will argue that the basic trends have been the same from 1951 to the present and will continue into the future. Toronto is a growing, decentralizing metropolitan area, with growth occurring at the periphery. In the 1950s and 1960s the periphery was

Etobicoke, North York and Scarborough, with Toronto, York and East York making up the inner city. Over the 1970s and into the 1980s the periphery will be the regional municipalities and Metropolitan Toronto will be the inner city. I will argue that we mounted different policies in the 1971–1981 period than we did in the 1951–1971 period and that we should return to the earlier approach for the 1980s.

The first task, then, is to sketch the basic economic trends. Unfortunately, I was limited to using the data which I could find in colleagues' offices, but the data presented in Table One do illustrate the main points. Consider first the period from 1951–1971. I think we're all aware that that period was characterized by very rapid growth in gross national product, very rapid growth in per capita income, rapid urbanization and rapid urban growth. The first half of Table One presents percentage increases in population. From 1951 to 1971, Canada had a total population growth of 54%, Ontario 68% and the Toronto region 109%. The nation was growing very rapidly, but the Toronto region was growing even more rapidly, an indication of continuing urbanization. Now, if we think spatially about the allocation of the 109%, we go down to the next rows in Table One and we see that over the 1951 to 1971 period the inner three municipalities — York, East York and the City of Toronto — grew by only 8%. The outer three — Scarborough, North York and Etobicoke — grew by 393% and the rest of the region — Durham, York and Peel — grew by 223%. The spatial allocation of this growth was very uneven. The main thing to recognize here is that the inner city experienced very little growth and the outer three municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto experienced explosive growth. The percentage increase in the rest of the region can be misleading because few people lived there at the outset. Even so, the increase was not as high as it was in the outer three. The population hadn't spilled out into the region. If we had broken the period down by 5-year intervals, we would have seen high growth rates towards the late 1960s. Over the interval, however, it's best to characterize the trend as one of growth in the outer three municipalities.

This is a process that is sometimes referred to as decentralization or suburbanization. It is important to recognize that this is a process which is not simply associated with the post-war period. We can document suburbanization in the United States going back to 1880 or 1890. We can document it for all western European cities, and we've recently documented it for Japanese cities. The pattern of slow central growth and rapid peripheral growth is not unique to Canada. Very basic forces generate

Table One
Basic Population and Employment Trends[1]

	Percentage Increase in Population	
Canada	1951–1971	1971–2001
Canada	54	46
Ontario	68	60
Toronto Region	109	75
Inner Three[2]	8	18
Outer Three[3]	393	43
Rest of Region[4]	223	200

	Percentage Employment Increase	
	1951–1971	1971–2001
Canada	41	72
Ontario	42	76
Toronto Region	46	97
Inner Three[2]	1.9	50
Outer Three[3]	276	
Rest of Region[4]	n.s.	259

[1]Source: Background Studies to Metroplan
[2]Toronto, York, East York
[3]Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough
[4]Peel, York, Durham

suburbanization. I would venture to speculate that if you looked at Soviet cities you'd see a similar pattern as well.

The second half of Table One relates to employment. Here a similar pattern emerges. If we look down to the spatial allocation of employment growth we can see that this decentralization — this explosive growth of the outer three — is even more dramatic. These data were derived from the 1975 Metroplan and initial supporting documents. The writers did not present figures for the rest of the Region, which partly reflects the limited amount of employment growth that had been occurring there. People weren't even thinking about measuring employment growth because it was so small.

The structural changes in the Canadian economy which were going on over the 1951 to 1971 period changed the

nature of available jobs and this also forms an important context. Over that period, employment was sharply declining in the primary sector and was also beginning to decline fairly significantly in the manufacturing sector. From 1951 to 1971, manufacturing employment fell from 22% to 20% of the labour force. And there was a sharp rise in the proportion of jobs in trade, finance and the service sector. I couldn't get data on the spatial dimensions of this change, but I suspect that the inner three experienced a decline in manufacturing employment over the period and a rise in service, finance and administrative employment, resulting in a net rise of 1.9%; and that the outer three had a much more balanced pattern of change with a substantial amount of manufacturing growth taking place. There was also a westward bias in the spatial allocation of both employment and population, as we've heard often today. Growth occurred more towards Hamilton or in the direction of Hamilton and Kitchener-Waterloo than towards the east.

These were the basic trends. Now I want to characterize three aspects of government policy in response to these trends. Metropolitan-wide government was a response to this growing urban area. The Province imposed a government structure whose spatial boundaries overlay what I call the urban area, or the area of interaction. And it attempted to equalize service provision and put the financing of the school system, the police system and water provision on a metropolitan basis.

The second aspect of policy during this period is that both the province and the local governments engaged in what I would call accommodative planning. They saw their role as encouraging growth, as getting the infrastructure in place to accommodate the growth that the national economy was generating in the Toronto area. There wasn't an attempt to change the basic spatial pattern.

The third aspect is that there was no attempt at the provincial or local levels to deal with the decline in manufacturing and the rise in service employment. Particularly at the local level, there was almost no concern with an employment strategy or industrial strategy. That was regarded as a federal prerogative.

The next thing I want to do is to sketch the basic trends across the 1970s and forecast them out into the 1980s and beyond. The best data I could find, comparable to the 1951 to 1971 period, were forecasts of the 1971 to 2001 period, prepared in 1970. Again, the data are scarcely ideal but the points can be made. The basic trends are the same, except that the area of interaction, the urban area, is no longer Metropolitan Toronto. It has expanded to include Peel, York and Durham.

Consider first the 1971 to 2001 population forecasts. Although a lot of growth is forecast, and the Toronto region will grow faster than Canada, the difference will not be as great as before. If we look at the forecasts for the inner three municipalities, the outer three municipalities and the rest of the region, we can see that Metro itself will experience relatively less growth over the 30-year period and the outlying regions experience significantly more. Whereas in the previous period it was the outer three, over the next 30 years it will be the regions which grow. The employment figures reveal the same pattern. There is relatively low growth in both the inner three and the outer three municipalities and explosive growth in the rest of the region.

I would argue that this is simply the continuation of the decentralization that occurs in a growing urban area. The periphery has moved out. I think we get into very inappropriate kinds of analysis if we believe that something dramatically different is going on now as compared to the 1950s. Often we are forced into this belief by the political boundaries that are here. I would argue that what goes on from 1971 to 2001 is very like what went on from 1951 to 1971; it's just spatially more removed from the centre. Although growth rates are lower in the national economy and aggregate growth rates will therefore be lower in the region, and although the decline in manufacturing employment and the rise in service sector employment are speeding up, the basic trend is the same.

How should we respond to this similar pattern now written one dimension larger spatially. In the 1970s, we tried to adopt policies which, in almost every way, were different from those we adopted from 1951–1971. Then we had a metropolitan government, we had accommodative planning, and we left the issue of employment to the federal government. In the 1970s we changed each of those responses. Instead of providing a metropolitan government for the interactive area, the urban area, we surrounded Metropolitan Toronto with separate regional governments. We also changed from accommodative planning to prescriptive planning. There was a very strong feeling that we should change the basic trends which underlay urban development. The provincial government gave us MTARTS, and COLUC and TCR. The Province proposed a go-east policy and tried to introduce green belts. Local governments began to engage in much more

prescriptive planning as well, trying to change the basic pattern of what was there. They began to worry about the mix of land uses in their inner cities, they tried to change the makeup of the housing stock being created by market forces, and so on. And finally, particularly toward the late 1970s, there emerged a concern at the local level with what had traditionally been areas of federal concern. Local government began to discuss industrial strategy.

Much of the debate that's gone on today has revolved around what strategy we should be following in the 1980s: partly in response to the belief of many people that what was tried in the 1970s has failed. Do we want to have stronger prescriptive planning to alter the basic forces? Should we be developing some form of metropolitan-wide government? Should we have stronger, more developed local industrial strategies? From an historical perspective, I think that the best strategy is to adopt the approach we used from 1951 to 1971. We ought to have some form of metropolitan-wide organization. Whether or not that involves another level of government, it would involve some form of tax base equalization, which is probably a more important issue. We need some form of redistribution between the regions, recognizing the differing needs of each part of the region — for example, the special educational needs of the inner city in Toronto and the high infrastructure costs of the growing regions. A move back to a metropolitan-wide form of government and a focus on redistributive policies would help to sustain a sense of community in this growth and suburbanization process. It might assist us to see the urban area as a functional unit by generating a sense of our interdependence.

I would also argue that we should not try to engage in massive prescriptive planning. Rather we should go on much as before, accommodating the fundamental underlying forces and dealing with the cost of these through our redistributive programs. I would argue that the reason TCR failed was not because sinister 'market forces' defeated the glorious designs of planners but because the Province began to realize the tremendous costs of achieving this alternative form. In other words, if you're going to change the pattern and engage in prescriptive planning, it's going to be at significant cost. If the cheapest place to manufacture microchips is in Mississauga, it will cost a lot to move the plant to Toronto's east end. Particularly it's at significant cost in terms of the degree of government involvement in people's lives. TCR failed when the Province began to discuss policy instruments, and began to see who would bear the cost of rearranging urban forms.

I think we ought to be much more circumspect about prescriptive planning. This extends to the local level as well. Many of our current dilemmas are really only our first awareness of the cost of what we thought was an unadulterated good thing at the time. A classic case is the reduction in high rise construction. Michael Goldrick candidly admitted earlier that it led to increases in housing prices. Now people are beginning to realize that reduced high rise construction and preserved neighbourhoods have had very significant social costs elsewhere. Social planners are now pointing out that older people who sell their homes attach a great deal of value to being able to remain in the same community. If you asked who moved into the highrises that were built in the early 1960s, you would find that 50 or 60% of the movers were people from the surrounding area. If you don't build highrises, elderly people won't sell their houses and move out because they don't want to leave the neighbourhood. So you have people continuing to live in extremely large homes and you continue to have high house prices.

I think a lot of our prescriptive planning has had costs we don't realize and that we would be much better served by focusing on developing a sense of community and on redistributing income within the community. I would argue that most of the prescriptive planning which has emerged at the local government level has tended to benefit the middle class despite being justified as help for the disadvantaged. In support of this, I would cite the restrictions on high rise, the defence of neighbourhoods and even rent control.

The final item is the concern with macro-economic issues. I don't know whether that's been raised a great deal today, but I know that the Urban Studies Programme had a symposium last year on an industrial strategy for Metro Toronto. I would argue that local governments should not be concerning themselves with trying to change the aggregate level of employment, or with structural changes in the Canadian economy, but rather should be focusing on attracting growth that is compatible with their community.

Discussion

QUESTIONER: I'll deal with the non-argumentative issue first. It seems to me that more relevant than those percentages would be dollars and cents figures, in terms of the distribution of income and the trends in income in different types of employment. In the Toronto area, look at the growth of the service industry. Look at the spatial

allocation of the service jobs versus manufacturing jobs. If you look into groups like the Toronto Industrial Development Board, this outfit which was supposedly going to save us from all kinds of nasty things, you find them trying to create jobs in the mandated region of TIDB, but none of it is coming into Metropolitan Toronto. I'm parochial when I say that. There's nothing wrong with bringing more manufacturing into Mississauga and Peel and so on. But the bulk of the jobs that are coming into Metro are low-paying jobs, not very permanent, in the service sector. I think probably the dollars and cents statistics would be more relevant to the type of analysis you were trying to show. That's not a criticism, I'm just looking for some more ammunition to use when I go back to Council.

DR. FALLIS: Well, I think that's a very complicated position that you've advanced. Just a couple of comments. The first question I think you are asking is whether or not the distribution of income in Toronto has become more or less equal as a result of the basic economic trends that we've seen. And you emphasize the growth in the service sector in downtown Toronto. I don't know whether we can evaluate that. Certainly there are a lot of service jobs that are minimum wage jobs and don't pay very well. A lot of the manufacturing jobs in the 1950s in Toronto in the garment district didn't pay very well either. Another point that I would make is that the most important change in the distribution of income or wealth in the region has resulted from the increase in housing prices. That is far more important than any change in the makeup of the labour force. As a result of the change in housing prices, those who were outside the housing market have lost tremendously, against those who own houses.

The other point I would make is that I would be extremely cautious about trying to change the distribution of income in Metropolitan Toronto by trying to change the structure of employment there. You're saying that this changing employment pattern has created low-paying jobs and therefore what we ought to do is intervene and try to change the kind of employment which is generated in central Toronto. I think that's a very poor way to redistribute income. Again, this gets back to the cost of prescriptive planning. To create a manufacturing job in downtown Toronto when its most efficient location is in Mississauga or the Ottawa valley means you have to engage in an enormous subsidy to get the job to move there. We've got to repave the roads in downtown Toronto, we've got to put in new trunk sewers and so on. It's extremely costly. Let's, hypothetically, take a woman who's working in downtown Toronto as a waitress and earning $9,000 a year. Instead of letting the service job come in, you encourage a manufacturing job to come in and she earns $12,000. Chances are the subsidy to get that job there is about $30,000. You only have to look at the cost of jobs created through the DREE program to realize that it is a very, very costly exercise. It's much cheaper to redistribute income directly.

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